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ABSTRACT
Civil appeals involve a balancing of the costs of appealing a deter-
mination of a lower court against the probability of reversal, modifica-
tion, or affirmance at the appellate level. The rules of appellate
procedure affect this calculation, and, in that manner, affect the sub-
stantive outcomes of litigation in a number of respects. This article
examines two variables in the calculus of appeal: suspensions of the
effectiveness of judgments pending appeal and sanctions for frivolous
appeals. Appeals postpone the finality of a lower court determina-
tion; suspensions of judgments postpone the effectiveness of judg-
ments. Each can be used to heighten the judgment-deadening effect
of the other. The recent amendments to the civil appellate rules in
Oklahoma respecting suspensions of the effectiveness of judgments
pending appeal and frivolous appeals provide a useful framework for
exploring the ramifications of procedural changes on substantive out-
comes and the distribution of the power of process between plaintiffs,
defendants and the courts. This article explores these ramifications
from three perspectives, each based on the underlying issues and
[Vol. 29:65
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problems set forth in the Introduction and in Part I. Supersedeas, Friv-
olousness and the Utility of Appeal. Although related, the analysis of
each perspective can stand alone.
1. PRAcIcAL PERSPECrrVE. The first perspective, set forth at
Part II., focuses on the practical ramifications of change to appellate
procedure based on the 1993 changes to the Oklahoma civil appellate
rules of supersedeas and frivolous appeals. It discusses in detail the
nature and effect of suspensions of the effectiveness of judgements
and sanctions for frivolous appeals on judgments and the process of
determining whether to appeal (or resist and appeal of) a judgment
under prior law and current law.
2. STRATEGic AND THiORETicAL PERSPECTIVE. The second per-
spective, set forth at Part III, Consensus, Complexity and House Bill
1468, explores on a more theoretical level, the changes to civil appel-
late rules of supersedeas and sanction for frivolous appeal. It provides
a stategic analysis of the direction and utility of changes to civil appel-
late practice rules from both a systemic and participatory view. It ar-
gues that these changes do little more than create complexity and
ambiguity which result in an increasing sense of unfairness which may
affect substantive determinations.
3. PARADIGMATIc PERSPECrrvE. The third perspective, set forth
at Part IV, Putting the Changes in Perspective, examines the manner in
which civil appellate rules are modified in the context of the critical
assumptions underlying American notions of the adversarial process
of dispute resolution. These assumptions add unpredictability and ar-
bitrariness to the appellate process, and limit the choices available to
further the process of appeal.
INTRODUCTION
On June 10, 1993, Oklahoma Governor David Walters signed
House Bill 1468,' which made substantial changes to civil appellate
practice in Oklahoma. These changes represent the second attempt in
three years by the Oklahoma Legislature to substantially amend the
state's rules of civil appellate practice. The first attempt, memorial-
ized in the Oklahoma Judgments and Appeal Act (the "OJAA"),2 ag-
gressively overhauled state appellate practice. The overriding
1. H.R. 1468, 44th Leg., 1st Session, 1993 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. A-2.
2. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1001-1008 (Supp. 1990)(repealed 1991). This Act is discussed in
Charles W. Adams & J. Michael Medina, Recent Developments in Oklahoma Civil Appellate
1993]
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purpose of the OJAA was to bring order and regularity to the deter-
mination of finality of judgments, decrees and appealable orders of
the lower courts 3 To accomplish this task, the OJAA provided that
judgments would become final and effective on the date of the filing
of a written judgment with the court clerk and specified written form
for judgments. It also changed state rules affecting the awarding of
fees and costs on judgments, the timing of post-trial motions, the man-
ner of commencing an appeal, the appealability of cases involving
multiple claims, rules governing stays of execution of judgments, and
the authority of courts to sanction frivolous appeals.4 The OJAA was
repealed in substantial respect six months after it went into effectS
Repeal of the OJAA by the Legislature did not mean rejection of
the notion that there was a need to reform civil appellate practice
rules. At the time it repealed the OJAA, the Legislature also created
the Joint Interim Committee and an Interim Advisory Committee on
Judgments and Post-Judgment Procedure.' The result of the work of
these committees, House Bill 1468, represents an attempt to carry out
the original purposes of the OJAA and avoid the problems which led
to the OJAA's repeal. House Bill 1468 attempts to clarify the time for
filing appeals by tying finality and effectiveness to the filing of a writ-
ten judgment executed by a judge.7 It also specifies the time for the
Procedure, 26 TULSA LI. 489 (1991). The legislative history ot the OJAA is discussed in Law-
rence Tawater, The Proposed Appellate Procedures Act, (OBA/CLE Seminar, October 26,1990);
Wallace, The Legislative History of the New Act on Judgments and Appeals, (OBA/CLE Seminar,
October 26, 1990).
3. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1001 (West Supp. 1990) (Committee Comments). Final
judgments, orders and decrees of the trial court subject to appellate review are specified in
OK A. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 15, App. 2 Rule 1.10 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (Rules of Appellate
Procedure in Civil Matters); appealable interlocutory orders are specified in OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, ch. 15, App. 2, Rule 1.60 (West 1988) (Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Matters).
4. For a brief discussion of these provisions see Adams & Medina, supra note 2, at 491-493;
see also the committee comments to the OJAA, OaLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1001 (West Supp.
1990) (Committee Comments).
5. Apparently, the Oklahoma Legislature concluded that repeal (not amendment) was the
"better part of valor" in light of opposition to the OJAA expressed by members of the
Oklahoma legal community. Opponents insisted that the prescribed forms of judgments would
be difficult to work into their established manner of practice and that the new finality and effec-
tiveness provisions were inappropriate in certain instances. See House Bill 1468, § 9, adding the
Committee Comments to new OK.LA. STAT. tit. 12, § 696.2 Committee Comments (Supp. 1993)
(draft, on file with author).
6. S. Con. Res. 20, 43d Leg., 1991 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. A-2.
7. House Bill 1468, §§ 9-10, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 696.2 and 696.3. For a discus-
sion of these new rules, see Charles W. Adams, Appellate Procedure: Amendments for the
Oklahoma and Federal Courts, 29 TULSA LJ. 31 (1993).
[Vol. 29:65
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filing of post-judgment motions," provides a savings provision for pre-
mature appeals,9 clarifies the rules relating to the suspension of the
effectiveness of judgments after the filing of judgment,10 and expands
the authority of the courts to sanction frivolous appeals."
This article examines two House Bill 1468 changes: (a) suspen-
sions of the effectiveness of judgments and (b) frivolous appeals. Sus-
pensions or stays of judgments postpone the effectiveness of
judgments; appeals, even frivolous appeals, postpone the finality of a
lower court determination. Suspension of effectiveness and postpone-
ment of finality are inexorably tied together; each can be used to
heighten the judgment-deadening effect of the other, or to preserve
the status quo until errors below can be corrected. Both represent
ways in which litigants and the courts distribute the costs of correcting
erroneous determinations in a system where the litigants ideally con-
trol the scope and pace of the dispute and its resolution.' 2 Like other
"procedural" rules, these affect the ability of a litigant to protect suc-
cessfully substantive rights either as plaintiff or defendant. In this
sense, both serve as useful barometers of the way we perceive what is
a fair process for the protection of the rights of litigants on average.
The rules respecting the availability of stays of execution and the
power of the courts to punish the bringing of substantively weak ap-
peals (however broadly or narrowly defined) as "frivolous," represent
a consensus about the value of appellate review in the dispute resolu-
tion process. Stated another way, both evidence current consensus re-
specting the amount of deference which ought to be given to trial
court determinations. The value of appellate review, in turn, is based
on this initial determination. Underlying this consensus building is the
goal of maximizing the probability that disputes are settled in a man-
ner perceived by the litigants to be just and fair.'3 The stronger the
8. House Bill 1468, § 8, amending OKLA. STAT. AN. tit. 12, § 653 (West 1988 & Supp.
1993); id. § 19, adding Oa.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 990.2.
9. Id. § 18, amending OKLA.. STAT. tit. 12, § 990A by adding § 990A(F).
10. Id. §§ 20-21, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 990.3-990.4.
11. Id. § 24, adding O, A. STAT. tit. 12, § 995.
12. For a discussion of the critical assumptions of the adversarial system, on which
Oklahoma's system of civil appellate procedure is grounded, see LON L. FULLER, THm
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 705-708 (1949) (describing the elements of procedure which soci-
ety believes strengthens the moral force of dispute resolution); Judith Resnick, 7Tiers, 57 S. CAL.
L. Rnv. 837, 845-70 (1984) (identifying twelve of what the author describes as "valued features"
which underlie American approaches to civil procedure). Cf. John Thibaut & Lorens Walker, A
Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. Rav. 541 (1978) (examining a theoretical basis for valuing the
adversarial system).
13. See Resnick, supra note 12, at 845-70; Thibaut & Walker, supra note 12; (examining the
theoretical basis of the value of the adversarial system); Laurens Walker et al., The Relation
1993]
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perception that trial court decisions are consistently fair, the more
likely appellate review will be restricted and the more likely that sus-
pensions of judgments will be difficult to obtain and appeals will be
likely characterized (and sanctioned) as frivolous. The converse also
applies: where trial courts on average are perceived to be incompe-
tent, appeals will be encouraged, suspensions of judgments' effective-
ness will be easier to obtain, and the sanctioning of almost any appeal
will be difficult.' 4 The modifications brought by House Bill 1468 rep-
resent a change in the consensus respecting deference to be given
lower court determinations. This change has effectively modified the
optimum allocation of cost and risk among the parties, altering the
relative weighing between the desire to foster the collection of judg-
ments and the desire to correct erroneous judgments. Likewise, the
modifications evidence the continuing trend toward the fragmentation
of ostensibly uniform rules, 5 and the increasing resort to discretion in
the application of the rules. 6
Part I provides the contextual background from which the article
considers the problems of appellate procedure. Part II examines the
practical ramifications of the distribution of the costs and benefits of
suspending the effectiveness of judgments and interposing frivolous
appeals under prior law and the effect of the House Bill 1468 on both.
Between Procedural And Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. REv. 1401, 1415-20 (1979). Obviously,
other factors enter into the calculus" for instance, the cost of the dispute resolution system, the
willingness of society to bear those costs, the value of the object of the disputes to be resolved,
and the identity of the disputants. These considerations lie outside the scope of this article.
14. Professor Dalton has spoken of the effect of easier appeal on the reputation of the trial
courts. He has argued that as appeals are more accepted or viewed as more necessary, the value
of trial court decisions, and the deference given those decisions at the appellate level shrinks.
See Harlon Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE LJ. 62, 92
(1985).
15. On the notion of the trans-substantive nature of procedural rules, especially of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, see Paul D. Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The
Summons, 63 No=n DAME L. REv. 733 (1988); Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of
Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of
Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. Rnv. 2067, 2067-87 (1989). For a criticism of the idea of trans-
substantivity in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see, for example, Stephen B. Burbank, The
Costs of Complexity, 85 MicH. L. REv. 1463, 1473-76 (1987)(book review). For a discussion of
the advent of local rules of procedure and its effect on the goal of uniformity, especially of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the
Tension With Uniformity, 50 U. Prrr. L. Rsv. 853 (1989); A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experi-
ments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1567 (1991).
16. For a critical examination of the shift toward discretionary judicial decision-making in
the context of settlement, see Richard L. Marcus, Apocalypse Now, 85 Micn. L. REv. 1267
(1987) (reviewing PETER H. Scsrrcx, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL- MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN
Tr CouRrs (1986)). For criticisms of the modem judge as discretionary decision-maker, see
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House Bill 1468 represents a shift of consensus in favor of deference
to the determinations of lower courts by making appeal more costly to
litigants. Part III examines the House Bill 1468 changes as a reflection
of the ongoing process of refining the general consensus respecting
the utility of the civil appellate process. House Bill 1468 evidences
less of a shift in the fundamental consensus respecting the utility of
appellate review, than the growth of a more fractured view of this
utility. Suspending judgments has increasingly become a function of
causes of action. The added powers of the appellate courts to sanction
frivolousness evidence the importance of the appellate courts as man-
agers of their own dockets. The discretionary power to sanction cases
brought for review carries with it the power to burden (and thus limit)
parties considering appeal. The price litigants pay for the new consen-
sus is complexity and ambiguity, and both are unavoidable by-prod-
ucts of the critical assumptions shaping our adversarial system of
dispute resolution. In this case the "by-product" produces its own
danger to the integrity of the adversarial system-for complexity and
ambiguity produce unpredictability. From an awareness of unpredict-
ability in the implementation of procedural rules may come an in-
creasing uneasiness about the very fairness of the process the new
consensus was attempting to enhance.'7 Part IV explores the sources
which drive Oklahoma's persistent search for the refinement of its
civil appellate procedure. The unpredictability which increasingly
emerges from the indulgence in complexity and ambiguity in our pro-
cedural rules and which threaten to undermine the fundamental no-
tions of fairness which animate them are an inevitable by-product of
the critical assumptions which both define and limit the American ver-
sion of the adversary system of dispute resolution.
I. SUPERSEDEAS, FRivOLOUSNESS AND THE UTILrrY OF APPEAL
Let's put the discussion which follows in context and set the stage
17. Indeed, the nomadic search for oases of consensus on the utility of appellate review and
the enforcement of such consensus obliquely through procedural rules such as that of sanction
and effectiveness may well act perversely to create the opposite of that which was sought.
At a time when the ideal of egalitarianism rides as high, as it does today, it is supremely
ironical that we should at the same time be embracing discretion and rejecting princi-
ples; for this process must of necessity encourage and legitimize a greater inequality of
treatment in the judicial process.
P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism. Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and
the Law, 65 IoWA L. Rnv. 1249, 1271 (1980). See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation,
Public Interest Litigants and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CoRNELL L. REv. 270
(1989); Georgene Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988).
1993]
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for Parts III and IV. The trial (perhaps lengthy and complex, perhaps
short and simple) is over.'" Neither litigant chose to settle at any
stage prior to judgment, each believing the risk of loss was less than
the cost of settlement.' 9 Well, the court (or the jury) has now brought
substantial certainty to the risk of winning (or losing) the litigation.
What next? If the plaintiff was the judgment winner, he will want to
collect his judgment. He, therefore, has an incentive to seek execu-
tion of the judgment as quickly as possible.20 To wait for execution of
18. I employ the example of a judgment or decree after trial for purposes of illumination.
Similar considerations or pressures exist in the context of appealable interlocutory orders.
19. For an interesting study of the patterns of settlement, see David M. Trubek et al., The
Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 72, 89 (1983) (studying cases in five federal
district courts and one state court in each district, finding that less than 8% of the cases went to
trial; the others were either settled or dismissed at the pleading or summary judgment stage).
See also Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. CH. L. Rnv. 337 (1986) (dicussing positive value of judicial settlement, espe-
dally of complex cases); but see Marcus, supra note 16, at 5. An argument has been made that
the settlement of disputes should be discouraged in the context of the adversary process because
it reflects the notion that the speedy resolution of disputes is to be preferred to their just resolu-
tion, the result being that justice suffers, and the risk of having to live with erroneous results
increases, as settlements are encouraged. See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073,
1075-78, 1082-85 (1984).
20. As a technical matter, "execution" is the name of the writ permitting the seizure of
property and the process of its issuance and delivery to the sheriff. "Levy" of the execution is
what the sheriff does when he seizes property pursuant to the authority of the writ of execution.
The process of execution to satisfy a judgment is highly technical, can be quite tricky, and lies
beyond the scope of this paper. In very general terms, the following provides a short synopsis of
the process: Executions are deemed a process of the court in Oklahoma, issued by the court
clerk and directed to the county sheriff. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 731 (West 1988). The
general form of execution is a pre-printed two page form which can be obtained from the court
clerk and which directs the sheriff to search for and seize enough property of the judgment
debtor to satisfy the amount of the judgment. Id. § 736. For a discussion of the difference be-
tween writs of attachment and execution in Oklahoma, see Mount v. Trammel, 175 P. 232 (Okla.
1918) (noting writs of attachment permit seizure, writs of execution generally permit enforce-
ment of judgments by sheriff's sale). Generally, upon the refusal of a judgment debtor to pay a
judgment, all of his "[1lands, tenements, goods and chattels, not exempt by law shall be subject to
the payment of debts, and shall be liable to be taken on execution and sold." Id. § 733.
Oklahoma provides broad exemptions from execution, at least for personal property. See id. at
tit. 31, §§ 1 etseq. (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). The sheriff is required to return the completed writ
on which he is to describe the property levied within sixty days from its issuance. Id. at tit. 12,
§ 802 (West 1988). Levy, first, is to be made on personal property (goods and chattels), and if
none are found, on interests in real property. Id. § 751. It has been the practice, however, for
sheriffs to refrain from seizing items of personal or real property unless the writ of execution lists
specific property to be seized. Where no such listing appears, the sheriff will ordinarily hold the
writ for a week and then return it to the judgment creditor with the notation "[n]o property
found." See Steven L. Barghols, Judgment Enforcement Against Real and Personal Property:
Practical Considerations, 61 OKLA. BJ. 3402, 3404 (1990). Writs of execution with no listing of
property are usually issued in order to preserve the judgment from dormancy under OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 735, 801 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). Sales of personal property seized in
execution may be made no less than ten days after notice to all persons with an interest in the
property. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 751 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). Written notice of the sale
of real property must be given the judgment debtor at least ten days prior to the sale; public
notice must be given for two consecutive weeks prior to sale. Id. § 764. For more detailed
discussions of execution in Oklahoma, see Mac D. Finlayson, Getting Your Money-Possessory
8
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judgment, especially if the litigation involved close questions of law or
evidence, increases the chance that he will never collect the judgment.
Indeed, the longer he has to wait for his judgment, the greater the cost
to him,21 and the more likely he will be to settle the judgment for
something less than the entire amount awarded or relief accorded.22
Even if he can collect his judgment quickly, the recovery may prove
ephemeral if the judgment creditor is able to overturn the judgment
after obtaining review. The mere possibility of review (at the trial or
appellate level) diminishes the real effectiveness of his judgment; fi-
nality, thus, influences the value of effectiveness of judgments.23
The defendant, on the other hand, will have an incentive to avoid
paying (or performing) the judgment. Assuming the defendant is not
judgment-proof,24 he will be strongly inclined to do two things: (1) get
the tribunal rendering judgment to reconsider its decision or get an-
other tribunal to overturn the original judgment and (2) put off the
time before he will actually have to pay the judgment (certainly until
all appeals have been exhausted). Even if it is unlikely that either the
original tribunal or an appellate tribunal will seriously reconsider the
original determination (i.e. there was a substantial probability that it
was correctly decided under law that is firmly established), the de-
fendant will still have an incentive to seek appellate redetermination,
if and to the extent that pending such redetermination he can delay
execution of the judgment.
The size of the incentive depends on the balancing of the benefits
of delay against the costs of appeal. The cost of appeal is a function of
the strengths of the anticipated arguments to be made on appeal (the
significance of the errors of the trial court), the size of the judgment,
Actions, in COLLECrING JUDGMENTS IN OKLAHoMA 177, 1192-205 (1992) (Paper presented on
September 11, 1992, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma); Barghols, supra.
21. The cost is greater even if one includes the payment of interest on the judgment to
which the judgment winner may be entitled. The cost of delay, in terms of lost opportunities may
well exceed the legal compensation therefor.
22. On the dynamics of this process, see Fiss, supra note 19, at 1076-77. Professor Fiss
discusses these dynamics in the context of an extreme case, that of a dispute between a very well
off litigant and an indigent litigant. However, the economic dynamics of the situation described,
and its coercive effects, are equally applicable in every dispute involving litigants who do not
possess unlimited resources.
23. However, the pressure in this instance bears more heavily on the judgment loser who,
while exerting pressure in the form of the potential for reversal on review, still bears the substan-
tial burden during the review period-the judgment loser had to pay the judgment, and hopes to
get it back (less the value of the opportunity cost of the deprivation of the assets paid in judg-
ment during the period prior to repayment).
24. A judgment-proof defendant should be indifferent to a judgment since, by definition,
such a defendant is unable to pay the judgment, whatever its size. Where the award is for some-
thing other than money, most defendants are not "judgment-proof."
1993]
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the direct attorneys fees and costs the judgment loser will incur to
pursue the appeal, the cost of staying or suspending the judgment, and
the extent (or possibility) of bearing additional costs in the form of
sanctions. The more expensive the appellate process, the less likely a
judgment loser will be to seek reconsideration or appeal (absent a
high countervailing cost of not seeking appeal, and subject to the like-
lihood of victory).
Thus, increasing the cost of any factor, such as the "cost" of po-
tential sanctions (by broadening the power of a court to sanction cer-
tain appeals or by more expansively defining the types of appeals
subject to sanction), or increasing the difficulty (and therefore the
cost) of suspending the effectiveness of the judgment (for instance, by
eliminating suspensions as of right in favor of purely discretionary
stays), creates real, and potentially significant incentives to abandon
the process of post-judgment review. On the other hand, if the cost of
delay to the plaintiff (in terms of risk of reversal, cost of delay of col-
lecting his judgment, and cost of defending the judgment) outweighs
the cost to the defendant of pursuing post-judgment review,2 the
plaintiff will have a strong incentive to settle, if only to maximize the
real value of the judgment. Thus, underlying all of these considera-
tions is the notion that the longer the defendant can delay execution,
the more likely he will be able to effect a settlement of judgment, on
terms more advantageous to him (reducing, thereby, the actual total
cost of the litigation to him). The harder or more costly it is for a
defendant to attack a judgment and seek review, the more deference
is accorded the original disposition of the dispute and the closer the
value of the judgment comes to the amount awarded; but it is also
easier to preserve erroneous decisions from attack (thereby increasing
the risk that a greater amount of bad law or bad judging will be per-
petuated). The converse is also true: easy or less costly review dimin-
ishes the deference given lower court determinations and makes it
easier to overturn erroneous decisions; but it also makes it easier to
delay (diminish the value of) decisions which should not be over-
turned (and increases the risk that such decisions will be erroneously
overturned). Consider also that bad law at the trial level is less costly
to perceptions of the fairness of dispute resolution in the aggregate
than bad law at the appellate level. Bad trial court decisions affect the
25. The value of the judgment to the plaintiff may decrease significantly as the costs to him
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litigants; bad law at the appellate level affects the potential litigants to
whom the bad decisions may be relevant. A similar situation results
when the defendant is the "judgment winner."26
Perversely, then, both the possibility of easy review and its oppo-
site-limited review-create significant possibilities for abuse. These
possibilities are both obvious and well recognized.2 7 The greater the
likelihood every decision of the trial court can be appealed without
risk, the greater the risk that a judgment winner will be robbed of his
judgment (in whole or in part). The robbery will occur in one of two
forms: either the delay caused by the filing of the appeal will substan-
tially reduce the value or worth of the original judgment to the judg-
ment winner (he needed the relief sooner rather than later) or an
appellate court will substitute its own error (in reversing the judg-
ment) for the correct result reached at the trial level.' Conversely,
26. Thus, judgment in favor of a defendant leaves the plaintiff with no judgment to collect,
but with the power to threaten the finality of the judgment in defendant's favor by filing post-
trial motions or appeals, or both. To the extent the plaintiff takes any of those actions, he
reduces the value of the defendant's victory by increasing the cost of defense (at least by the
legal fees and costs thereof) and the risk that the judgment will be overturned. At some point in
the process, the costs may be significant enough to compel the defendant to settle (that is to pay
something to the plaintiff) in order to preserve the finality of the "victory." The less likely the
plaintiff will incur extraordinary costs for launching post-trial attacks on the judgment, the
cheaper such a strategy will be to him, and the greater the incentive to pursue it. Increasing the
cost of post-judgment attacks on finality, for example by requiring the posting of the anticipated
costs of appeal or by creating the possibility that the appellant can be sanctioned for filing what
the court will conclude to be a meritless post-judgment proceeding, creates a disincentive to
pursue this option. The weaker the anticipated arguments on appeal, the smaller the relief
sought, and the larger the attorneys fees, the less likely post-judgment action will be pursued.
27. See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, Zeal and Frivolity: The Ethical Duty of the Appellate Ad-
vocate to Tell the Truth About the Law, 6 HoiTRA L. REv. 729 (1978); J. Michael Medina,
Ethical Concerns in Civil Appellate Advocacy, Sw. Li. 677 (1989). Indeed, litigation decisions
that may be highly lucrative for lawyers may be extremely costly to the client, even when under-
taken in the zealous defense of the interests of the client in the litigation. See Earl Johnson,
Lawyers' Choice: A Theoretical Appraisal of Litigation Investment Decisions, 15 LAW & Soc'y
REv. 567, 575-76 (1980-1981).
28. Indeed, not even the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in crafting its certiorari rules has per-
mitted itself the indulgence that appellate decisions are always, or even substantially always,
error-free. But in recognizing the potential for error on appeal, it has also determined that the
volume of cases is potentially so great that litigants will have to live with the risk of erroneous
appellate decisions except under fairly exceptional circumstances. See Rules on Practice and
Procedure in the Court of Appeals and on Certiorari to that Court, Rules 3.13 (granting certiorari
only "when there are special and important reasons," some of which are listed in that rule) and
3.14(F) (requiring that certiorari petitions not reach merits of appeal); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
ch.15, App. 3 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); J. Michael Medina, Pitfalls In Oklahoma Appellate
Practice, 57 OmLA. BJ. 741, 744 (1986) ("The fact that the Court of Appeals erred will, by itself,
seldom convince the Supreme Court to grant certiorari."). Some commentators who advocate a
significant cutback in the scope of appeal from trial court decisions have made this same argu-
ment. See Dalton, supra note 14, at 92 ("Where the name of the game is to avoid reversal by
toeing the appellate court line, victory will bring juster justice only if the appellate court has
drawn the line in the right place.. . ."); Resnick, supra note 12, at 866 (noting that in systems
11
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the harder or more costly it is to obtain reconsideration of erroneous
judgments,2 9 the greater the likelihood that litigants with meritorious
positions will be locked out and judgments which ought not be exe-
cuted will be, since a greater number of erroneous judgments will re-
main unchallenged. 0 The abusive potential of stays of execution is
similar. The easier it is to put off the actual effectiveness of a judg-
ment without incurring additional expense, the greater the possibility
that the judgment winner will be deprived of some or all of his judg-
ment. The harder it is to suspend the effectiveness of judgments, the
more likely that the judgment loser will have to bear the expense of a
judgment that should not have been awarded in the first place.31
This manipulative potential inherent in regulating both frivolous
appeals and the effectiveness of judgments pending review creates
substantial difficulty for law makers seeking to minimize abuse of pro-
cedural rules (that is, for substantive advantage). Indeed, there does
not appear to be a point at which the manipulative potential of appel-
late procedure can be appreciably minimized, at least respecting effec-
tiveness and finality. Thus, in one sense, the issue of suspensions of
judgments and the "costs" of appeal can be better understood as a
function of risk allocation. Both the rules permitting suspension of
the effectiveness of judgments (as well as those making such suspen-
sions difficult or practically unlikely) and those determining the costli-
ness of appeals (especially of marginal appeals, appeals the purpose of
which is predominantly to delay finality of judgments) effectively allo-
cate risks between judgment winners and judgment losers by regulat-
ing the cost of obtaining judgment effectiveness and finality.
On a more fundamental level, the real issue of effectiveness and
finality revolves around the notion of the utility of appellate review
that permit appellate review, the risk increases that the problems making bad lower court judg-
ing (incompetence, bias, irrationality) may only be moved to the appellate level).
29. I am referring to difficulty in terms of the procedural hurdles which must be overcome
in order to obtain review, as well as the costs associated with such review. In this sense, the
greater the possibility that the loser of an appeal will be deemed to have filed a meritless appeal,
and that such a determination will increase the size of the payments which must ultimately be
made by the judgment loser, the costlier (and harder, for a judgment loser) will be the process
of appeal.
30. See, e.g., Paul Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeak A Late-Century View, 38
S.C. L. RFv. 411, 431 (1987) ("The idea of law is that the individual judge is accountable for the
principled exercise of power. Discretionary accountability may look to the skeptic very much
like no accountability at all.").
31. His costs, therefore, will include, not only the costs of defense, and of appeal, but also
the costs associated with the payment of a judgment that ultimately will have to be repaid to
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itself; the issues of frivolous appeals and suspensions of effectiveness
of judgments are those of the degree of deference which ought to be
due lower court determinations, writ small. The greater the general
mistrust of lower court determinations, the more likely that appeals
will be more freely (and cheaply) allowed;32 rules will tend to punish
the marginal appeal less often and less severely and provide for easier
means of suspending effectiveness pending review. On the other
hand, when lower court determinations are viewed as more uniformly
fair and just, procedural rules will be skewed to favor greater defer-
ence to such determinations and, appeals will tend to be treated more
like extraordinary matters. As such, a broader range of appeals will
appear to "waste the courts' time" and, on that basis, result in the
sanctioning of the appellant, and the appellant will have a heavier bur-
den to show that he is entitled to the suspension of a judgment.
The relationship between rules regulating effectiveness and those
regulating finality becomes clear. Because the driving force behind
rules of effectiveness and finality is the extent of the deference given
to trial court determinations, changes in the rules relating to effective-
ness and finality should, on the average, follow a predictable course.
Greater deference to lower court determinations result in more power
to sanction a larger variety of appeals, and more difficulty in staying
judgments pending appeals follow one from the other. From less def-
erence to lower court determinations should follow a narrowing of the
power of the court to sanction appeals and a broadening of the right
to suspend a judgment pending review.33 And note that consensus on
utility of appeal need not be monolithic; consensus can vary with the
32. Cf Dalton, supra note 14, at 92. However, a variety of other factors, some of which may
have nothing to do with the disputes to be resolved themselves, may well enter into the calculus
of the utility of appeal, including the perceived incompetence of lower court personnel, court
congestions, the cost of maintaining a freely available review apparatus, the value of the disputes
to be reviewed, and the identity of the likely litigants who would take advantage of the proce-
dure if made available, and the availability of alternative dispute resolution. A consideration of
these issues lies outside the scope of this article. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Questioning the Qual-
ity of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TuL. L. REv. 1, 19-24 (1987); Jethro K. Lieberman &
James F. Henry, Lessons From the Alternative Dispute Resolution 11 Movement, 53 U. Cni. L.
Rv. 424, 429 (1986); Resnick, supra note 12, at 845-70; Thomas B. Marvell, Appellate Capacity
and Caseload Growth, 16 AKRoN L. R-v. 43 (1982); Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and
the Courts of Appeals: The Threat To the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L.
REv. 542 (1969).
33. Likewise, changes in the rules regulating frivolous appeals and suspensions of judg-
ments are good evidence of a changing view of the deference to be given trial court determina-
tions-even in the absence of specific reference to this issue. The respect to be accorded lower
court determinations, on the average, is implicit in the arguments made to regulate the cost of
appellate review by the manipulation of the procedural rules thereof. See discussion at Part III,
Putting the Changes in Perspective.
1993]
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type of award sought, or the nature of the action or the identity of the
court making the initial determination.34
Minimizing the abusive potential of the appellate process is, of
course, implicit in the determination of the degree of deference owing
to trial court determinations on the average. Where trial court deter-
minations are not accorded much deference, the implication is that
impediments to appeal permit abuse by those seeking to maintain er-
roneous judgments. It follows that greater risk is allocated to judg-
ment winners since it is less likely than not that judgments will survive
appellate review. The identification of the more significant abuse, and
the method of its correction, therefore, follow from a consensus re-
specting the utility of review.
The rules of stays of execution and frivolous appeal, theoretically
at least, evidence the momentary balance between the risks of making
and enforcing erroneous decisions and the effects of the abuse of the
rules allocating such risks.35 They are both a manifestation and imple-
mentation of the consensus respecting the utility of appeal; they are
modified as the consensus on the utility of appellate review changes.
The rules governing the suspension of the effectiveness of judgments
and the "penalties" for frivolous appeals in effect before the changes
brought by House Bill 1468 represented the prior consensus; House
Bill 1468 represents the current consensus. I consider the nature of
the old and new consensus below. I save consideration of the ramifi-
cations of consensus for Parts III and IV.
II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEwoRK
A. The Changes to Suspensions of Effectiveness of Judgments
"As a general rule in Oklahoma, although finality always is, the
effectiveness of a judgment need not be, and most often is not, post-
poned by an appeal."36 Civil judgments and final orders, thus, can be
enforced immediately upon their rendering, even during the pendency
34. Professor Resnick has identified a number of possible views on utility of review which
might exist simultaneously in any jurisdiction. Determinations of a magistrate may be easily
reviewed de novo, while judgments of a district court may be accorded substantial deference, and
determinations of an appellate tribunal maybe reviewed only selectively by certiorari. See Res-
nick, supra note 12, at 845-70. A careful reading of the changes effected by House Bill 1468
would indicate that the consensus in Oklahoma shifts depending on the basis of the cause of
action to be determined, with money judgments easiest to review and divorce proceedings and
its ancillary actions harder.
35. Cf., Resnick, supra note 12, at 865-66, 867-69 (noting the costs and benefits to litigants
of systems in which lower court decisions are reviewed through some sort of appellate process).
36. Wilks v. Wilks, 632 P.2d 759, 762 (Okla. 1981).
[Vol. 29:65
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of an appeal. However, civil judgments can be suspended during the
pendency of an appeal in accordance with the provision of a number
of statutes. In addition, both the Oklahoma Supreme Court37 and the
trial courts38 have the inherent power to suspend execution of judg-
ment. Traditionally, a trial court's determination pending appeal may
be suspended by one of four methods: (i) automatically; (ii) by super-
sedeas, (ill) by stay, or (iv) by payment of the judgment. Automatic
stays refer to suspensions of judgments by operation of law, without
the requirement of any action on the part of the party in whose favor
suspension lies. Supersedeas denotes a suspension of the effectiveness
of judgments or final orders pursuant to an undertaking as a matter of
statutory right. Stays, on the other hand, refer to the suspension of
the effectiveness of judgments or final orders by the discretionary act
of a trial or appellate court.3 9
House Bill 1468 consolidated a number of the supersedeas and
stay provisions of prior law in new sections 990.3, 990.4 and in
amended sections 993, and 1006 of title 12. New Section 990.3 in part
codifies prior case law and court rules respecting automatic stays of
judgments, and in part significantly modifies prior practice." The pur-
pose of new section 990.4 is primarily to clarify and simplify prior law.
37. Mapco, Inc. v. Means, 538 P.2d 593, 595 (Okla. 1975)
38. Howe v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 8 P.2d 665, 667-68 (Okla. 1932); In re Epley, 64
P. 18 (Okla. 1905).
39. See Wilks, 632 P.2d at 763 n.12 (awarding attorney's fee in a divorce suit is not subject to
automatic postponement nor suspended as a matter of right).
40. The Committee Comments to new § 990.3 reinforce the sense that the purpose of the
law is clarification:
Section 990.3 provides for the automatic stay of judgments, decrees and final orders for
10 days after their filing. Section 990.3(A) mandates an automatic stay of money judg-
ments, codifying the rule set forth in Mapco, Inc. v. Means, 538 P.2d 593 (Okla. 1975).
An automatic 10 day stay is provided by section 990.3(B) for other types of judgments,
but the court has discretion to impose conditions on the stay as are appropriate. This is
meant to permit the court to exercise its discretion as to the matters subject to Section
990.3(B) in the manner courts had exercised their discretion under 12 O.S. § 974.1 of
the prior law, for the 10 day period specified in the section. Section 990.3(C) excepts a
number of types of action from the automatic stay so that judgments, decrees, and final
orders in those actions are immediately enforceable. The court, however, is empow-
ered to impose any conditions necessary to protect the interests of the parties. This will
permit the courts, sua sponte or at the request of a party, to stay or otherwise limit the
effectiveness of judgments, decrees, and final orders covered in Section 990.4(C) in the
exercise of its discretion. It understood that such discretion will be exercised in the
manner traditionally recognized in Oklahoma under statutes such as 12 O.S. § 974.1 of
prior law. For actions subject to Section 990.3(C), the trial court's authority to impose
conditions on the effectiveness of judgments commences at the time the judgment is
pronounced (and, therefore to that extent "final" and effective) even though such judg-
ments are not then final for purposes of appeal (see new 12 O.S. § 696.2(D)). It is,
therefore, intended that with respect to the cause of actions identified in Section
990.3(C), that the term judgment, decree or final order, as used in Section 990.3(C)
15
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The new provision, though, contains some departures from prior prac-
tice.41 Section 993 covers appealable interlocutory orders, and section
1006 (to be renumbered section 994) treats the stay of judgments
where there is more than one claim for relief or multiple parties.42
include any "issue... enforceable when pronounced by the court" as specified in the
new 12 O.S. 696.2(D).
House Bill 1468, § 20, codified as OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.3 (Committee Comments) (manu-
script, on file with the author).
41. The Committee Comments to new § 990.4 reinforce the sense that the purpose of the
law is clarification:
Section 990.4 provides for stays of judgments, decrees, and final orders that extend
beyond the automatic 10 day stays of Section 990.3. A supersedeas bond is required for
the stay of a money judgment. As under former law, the size of a supersedeas bond for
a money judgment would be twice the amount of the judgment for a property bond, but
only the amount of the judgment plus costs and interest on appeal for a surety bond.
Section 990.4(C) excepts a number of types of action from the provisions allowing a
stay upon the filing of an undertaking and the posting of a supersedeas bond, but the
trial court is given discretion to stay enforcement in these cases. The last sentence of
Section 990.4(C) authorizes either the trial or appellate court to restore or grant an
injunction during of an appeal, after the court has dissolved or denied a temporary or
permanent injunction. It is based on a similar provision in Fed.R.Civ.P.62(c). Section
990A(D) provides the trial court with the discretionary authority to stay the enforce-
ment of any judgment, decree or final order not otherwise covered in subsections (A),
(B), or (C). This is meant to carry over into new law, the traditional powers of the
court to order stays of effectiveness, which had been set forth under prior law at 12 O.S.
§ 974.1. The Committee notes that judgments, decrees, and final orders subject to new
Section 990A(D) include those issues which are enforceable when pronounced as pro-
vided under new 12 O.S. § 696.2(D), but which are not subject to the provisions of the
new Section 990A(C). These include (1) Probate proceedings, (2) special executions in
foreclosure, (3) conservatorship or guardianship proceedings, (4) mental health actions,(5) quiet title actions, and (6) partition proceedings. Section 990.4 is not intended to
modify or repeal the various special rules respecting stays or supersedeas applicable to
particular causes of actions or proceedings under other statutory or constitutional pro-
visions. Such special rules survive unmodified by this Section 990.4. The special stay
provisions include (but are not limited to) those relating to auto license suspensions (47
O.S. § 6-211), corporation (Okla. Const., art. 9, §§ 20, 21, 52 O.S. § 133) and banking
commission (6 O.S. § 207(C)) proceedings, unlawful detainer actions (12 O.S.
§ 1148.1(A), workers' compensation proceedings (12 O.S. § 696.2(E)) and the like.
House Bill 1468, § 21, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.4 (Committee Comments) (manuscript,
on file with the author).
42. The Committee Comments to the amendments to old title 12, section 1006, renumbered
as section 994 provide that:
The first part of Section 994(B) is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(h). Although
Section 994(A) permits a court to issue a final judgment as to fewer than all the claims
in the action, the court may provide under Section 994(B) that the judgment is not
enforceable. This may be desirable where a plaintiff and a defendant are asserting
claims against each other. Even though the court might decide to order that the claim
that was decided first should be appealed immediately, it might also decide that the first
claim should not be enforced until the other claim has been adjudicated so that the
award for one could be offset against the award for the other. See Fleming v. Baptist
Convention, 742 P.2d 1087, 1099 (Okla. 1987) (ordering stay of execution on main
claim until judgment was rendered on counterclaim). The language of Federal Rule
62(h) has been expanded to make it clear that the court can protect the interests of all
parties to the action. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 13
n.13 (1980).
House Bill 1468, § 23, amending OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1006 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
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With respect to each of the four categories identified above-(i) auto-
matically; (ii) by supersedeas, (iii) by stay, or (iv) by payment-I ex-
amine the scope of the right to suspend the effectiveness of judgments
under prior law, and then explore the ways in which House Bill 1468
modified prior practice.
1. Automatic Stays
Under prior law a number of judgments, decrees and appealable
orders were subject to automatic stays ranging from several days to
the duration of the review process. House Bill 1468 narrowed the
availability of automatic stays for a number of different types of ac-
tions in a number of ways.
a. Prior Law
Under prior law, automatic stays of the effectiveness of judg-
ments were strictly limited. Prior to 1991, the most comprehensive
provision for automatic stay was Oklahoma Civil Appeals Rule 1.13,
which effectively provided for an automatic ten day stay of the effec-
tiveness of a-judgment or order.43 The purpose of this automatic stay
was to give a party time to file a new trial motion, secure approval of a
supersedeas undertaking as of right as provided by statute or move for
a stay pending appeal, without the need of filing a motion to suspend
the effectiveness of the judgment at the time it was rendered.44 No
court action was necessary to stay a judgment subject to automatic
stay-compliance with the requisites for automatic appeal (for in-
stance, the filing of an appeal or motion for new trial)-was the only
requisite. 45 After the end of the ten day period following the render-
ing of a judgment, or following a denial of a new trial motion, the
43. OKLA. Civ. APP. RuLn 1.13 (West 1988) provided that:
If the party taking an appeal does not file a motion for new trial but desires to suspend
the effectiveness of the adverse decision pending appeal, such party shall file a superse-
deas bond or motion to stay within 10 days after the decision sought to be reviewed is
rendered. If a motion for new trial is filed, the time to file supersedeas or motion to
stay will begin to run from the date the motion is disposed of. This time limit may be
extended by the trial court for good cause shown. A motion to stay may be considered
and ruled upon by the trial court after the petition in error has been filed in this court.
44. Mapco, Inc. v. Means, 538 P.2d 593,595 (Okla. 1975) (concluding that "purpose of Rule
1.13 was to grant automatic stay of judgment, report or verdict during ten day period when
motion for new trial may be filed, unless trial court enters order to the contrary"). A judgment
is effective immediately upon its rendering, except as otherwise provided by case law, rule or
statute. Wilks v. Wilks, 632 P.2d 759, 761-62 (Okla. 1981) (providing an exception for divorce
decrees pending appeal). OKLA. Civ. APP. RuLE 1.13 thus provides such an exception.
45. See General Motors Corp. v. Cook, 528 P.2d 1110, 1115 (Okla. 1974) ("No action by any
court was necessary to stay the judgment. With the filing of the appeal, the judgment was stayed
1993]
17
Backer: Civil Wars: Stays of Execution, Appellate Sanctions and the Natur
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1993
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:65
judgment winner could again immediately seek execution of the judg-
ment. Suspension of effectiveness thereafter depended on the availa-
bility of another ground for automatic stay, or compliance with the
provisions permitting suspension of judgments as of right (by superse-
deas),' or by stay.47 Motions for new trial were especially favored
under prior law - the effectiveness of a judgment was stayed automati-
cally pending determination of the motion.48 Under prior law, only
new trial motions affected the timing of an appeal of the decision be-
low; motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and motions
to vacate the judgment neither affected the time to appeal or the ef-
fectiveness of the judgment.49 This system became somewhat con-
fused after the enactment and subsequent repeal of the OJAA,
creating problems for determining when the ten day automatic stay
provision commenced, 50 and for determining whether the automatic
pending that determination."). Of course, a party might be required to seek court action to
prevent the other party from seeking to execute judgment in violation of the automatic stay.
Moreover, a party ignores an automatic stay in non-money judgment (usually injunctive relief or
declaratory judgment) cases at its own peril, especially where the party's actions disturb the
status quo that a stay is meant to preserve. Thus, in General Motors, the Court explained that
acting on a judgment subject to automatic stay pending appeal is done at the peril of the judg-
ment winner. Id. ("If they now find themselves in a position of suffering damage by a stay, it is
because of their own acts. The municipality did not act to place them in such a position other
than to appeal. This the city had every right to do. The stay was automatic and allowed by
statute.").
46. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 968.1 (West Supp. 1993), and see discussion below at notes
85-139.
47. Id. § 974.1, and see discussion below at notes 156-185.
48. As a consequence, new trial motions were a substantially cheaper means of delaying the
payment of a judgment than was the filing of an appeal. But new trial motions are not a cost free
alternative because under Oklahoma law appeals following a denial of a new trial motion are
limited to the issues raised in the new trial motion itself. OKLA. Civ. APP. R. 1.13; Mapco, Inc. v.
Means, 538 P.2d 593, 595 (Okla. 1975) ("Also, motion for new trial stays execution of trial
court's judgment until disposition of motion for new trial.").
49. Under OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 991 (1991), the time for appeal is extended only upon the
filing of a new trial motion, and not for other post-trial motions, including motion for judgments
notwithstanding the verdict, or motions to vacate judgments. Because it is sometimes difficult to
distinguish motions for new trial from motions to vacate, automatic stays predicated on the filing
of a motion for new trial resulted in a substantial amount of uncertainty. See, e.g., Salyer v.
National Trailer Co., 727 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Okla. 1986) (holding that motions to reconsider
should be treated as motions to vacate); Horizons, Inc. v. KEO Leasing Co., 681 P.2d 757, 759
(Okla. 1984) (treating motion to vacate as a motion for new trial) and discussion in Adams &
Medina, supra note 2, at 503-05.
50. The OJAA substituted a 10 day bright line rule for that of OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 991
(1991), providing that any post-trial motion, however denominated, filed within 10 days after the
filing of a judgment would extend the time for appeal until the trial court ruled on the motion.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1004 (Supp. 1990) (repealed 1991). See also OKLA. Civ. APP. R. 1.12(c)
(West Supp. 1993). Under OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1007(B) (Supp. 1990) (repealed 1991) execu-
tion on judgments was automatically stayed while a post-trail motion (filed within 10 days of the
filing of the judgment) was pending and for 10 days after its disposition. Civ. APP. RULE 1.13
was thereafter amended, before the OJAA was repealed, to conform to new (now repealed)
§ 1007, providing a uniform rule automatically staying the effectiveness of all judgments while
18
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ten day stay applied to the period after the disposition of post-trial
motions.5'
While the Civil Appellate Rules, as well as case law, appeared to
indicate a fairly clear intention to allow a ten day automatic stay in all
cases, and a stay thereafter if such were provided by statute,52  there
were some exceptions to this general rule. The language of National
Collegiate Athletic Association v. Owens,53 indicates that any statutory
interference with the power of the court to issue, or refuse to issue,
injunctions would violate the state constitution's separation of powers
by interfering impermissibly with the court's "inherent discretionary
power to protect and preserve the respective rights of litigants in in-
junctive and co-related lawsuits" guaranteed by the state constitu-
tion. 4 Additionally, automatic stay of pendente lite arrangements for
custody, alimony, and child and wife support payments was not per-
mitted.5' Application of the automatic stay rules to such determina-
tions may violate public policy which vests the trial court with the
timely filed post-trial motions are being considered by the trial court, and for ten days thereafter.
See OKLA. Civ. APP. R. 1.13(A) (West Supp. 1993). The repeal of the OJAA without the subse-
quent revision of the Civil appellate rules has caused some confusion. See, e.g., discussion in 2
MucHMsORE & ELLIS, OKLAHOMA CIVIL PROCEDURE FomusS AND PRAcTICE, § 1305, at 932.1
(1992), where the authors argue that the provisions of the rule should be interpreted by consult-
ing analogous current statutes as surrogates for the repealed statutes referenced in the rule. See
also Clyde A. Muchmore & Harvey D. Ellis, The Intricacies of Post-Judgment Motion Practice, 1
OKLAHOMA APPELLATE PRACTIE AND PROCEDURE: PRACTIE IN THE OKLAHOMA AND
TENTH CIRcurr APPELLATE SYSTEMS 31 (Spring 1993)(sponsored by Oklahoma Bar Association
and the University of Oklahoma College of Law Continuing Legal Education Department).
51. Thus, some commentators have argued that although the intent of revised OKLA. Civ.
APP. R. 1.13 (West Supp. 1993) was to have a uniform rule that the automatic stay should not
expire until ten days after the post-trial motion was decided, there is no assurance that the court
would make good on this original intent, especially after the repeal of the OJAA. "This is [par-
ticularly] true.., since the court has given effect to other revisions of the statute after the repeal
of the [OJAA] even where the court rules were inconsistent with the revised law. The safe
practice for parties wanting a stay would be to assume the stay expires when the trial court rules
on the post-judgment motion, and to therefore contemplate that ruling by seeking a further stay
in advance." Clyde A. Muchmore & Harvey D. Ellis, The Intricacies of Post-Judgment Motion
Practice, 1 OKLAHOMA APPELLATE PRACrcE AND PROCEDURE: PRACTICE IN THE OKLAHOMA
Am TENTH CiRcurr APPELLATE SYsTEMS 31 n.41 (Spring 1993)(sponsored by Oklahoma Bar
Association and the University of Oklahoma College of Law Continuing Legal Education
Department).
52. This seems to be the teaching of Mapco., Inc. v. Means, 538 P.2d 593 (Okla. 1975); see
Muchmore & Ellis, supra note 51, at 31.
53. 555 P.2d 879 (Okla. 1976) (holding that the power to stay the injunction must, as a
constitutional matter, rest with the sound discretion of the trial court when NCAA sought man-
damus to prevent enforcement of temporary injunction).
54. 1L at 881; OKLA. CONsT. art. IV, § 1 (West 1988).
55. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 612 P.2d 266 (Okla. 1980) (stating trial court has authority to
entertain wife's post-decree application for alimony and counsel fees after husband's appeal
from divorce decree had been brought to Supreme Court); Blair v. District Court of Oklahoma
County, 594 P.2d 367 (Okla. 1979) (noting trial court retained jurisdiction pending appeal of
divorce to consider application for alimony pendente lite); Enyart v. Comfort, 591 P.2d 709
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"power necessary to provide for the welfare of minor children....
The Legislature... did not intend that there should be a period of
time in which the Trial Court could not act in the best interest of mi-
nor children."56
In addition, automatic stays of judgments in certain specialized
proceedings are governed by statute. Thus, a judgment against "any
county, municipality, or other political subdivision of this state is auto-
matically stayed without execution of supersedeas bond until appeal
has finally been determined."57 This applies to actions for which su-
persedeas is available to suspend the effectiveness of judgments as of
right,58 as well as all other types of judgments and appealable orders.5 9
The rationale for this exemption of local governmental units is said to
be that Oklahoma statutes already provide an effective means of col-
lecting judgments against local government.60 As such, the risk that
judgment creditors will not be paid is small, and the supersedeas re-
quirement superfluous. 61 Judgments in favor of political subdivisions
are not subject to the automatic stay provisions. In such cases, a stay
will be available to the other litigants only on the basis of that gener-
ally available to all litigants.
However, the power to stay injunctive relief against local govern-
mental units is not unlimited. Despite the broad language of section
974.1, courts, apparently, will not permit the automatic stay of prohib-
itory injunctions against political subdivisions of the state.62 In such
(Okla. 1979) (noting trial court has power to consider motion to modify child custody based on
changed conditions during the pendency of an appeal from the then current custody order);
Cochran v. Rambo, 484 P.2d 500, 501 (Okla. 1971) (explaining that stay provisions of OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, § 1282 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) does not divest the trial court of its right to
temporarily provide and care for children during pendency of appeal of a divorce decree).
56. Enyart, 591 P.2d at 711.
57. OKLA. STAT. Am. tit. 12, § 974.1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
58. Id. § 968.1 (West Supp. 1993). For a discussion of § 968.1, see notes 91-99, below.
59. Id. § 974.1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); General Motors Corp. v. Cook, 528 P.2d 1110,
1112-13 (Okla. 1974) (granting a variance for erection of oversized sign; city granted stay of
judgment pending appeal after appeal filed). For a discussion of § 974.1, see notes 106, 112, and
156, below.
60. See OKLA. CONsT. art. 10, § 28; see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 365.5 et seq.
61. City of Duncan v. Sager, 466 P.2d 956, 958 (Okla. 1970) ("Our statutes provide most
effective procedures for the collection of judgments against municipalities.").
62. Thus, in City of Del City v. Harris, 508 P.2d 264 (Okla. 1973), the Supreme Court re-
fused to permit the stay of an injunction pending appeal, which enjoined Del City from enforcing
its zoning ordinances on newly annexed property, the effect of which would have prevented the
owner from conducting his business there. This is in accord with the general rule that prohibi-
tory injunction may not be stayed, while mandatory injunctions may. See, e.g., City of Indianap-
olis v. Producers Realty, Inc., 166 N.E. 2d 648, 650 (Ind. 1960). This is also in accord with the
generally accepted rule in federal court. See, eg., SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA, USA, Inc., 936 F.2d
1096,1098-1100 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that preliminary injunctions that disturb the status quo,
that are mandatory rather than prohibitory, or that afford the litigants substantially all the relief
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cases, application for an order denying the stay ought to be made to
the trial court; if the trial court denies the motion, application can be
made to the Supreme Court for a writ prohibiting the stay.63 On the
other hand, mandatory injunctions are subject to'the automatic stays
provided under section 974.1. 4
b. House Bill 1468 Changes
House Bill 1468 has replaced the automatic stay provisions of
case law and the Oklahoma Civil Appellate rules with a more complex
set of rules which base the right to an automatic stay on three broad
classes of judgments which the new law creates. These rules are based
on the general finality rules enacted by House Bill 1468 which pro-
vides that, with some significant exceptions, a judgment is neither final
nor effective until a written judgment is filed with the clerk.65
The new automatic stay provisions distinguish money judgments
from other classes of judgments. Such judgments are subject to an
automatic ten day stay, commencing at the time the judgment is
filed.66 The stay granted thereby is unconditional and springs auto-
matically upon the filing of the judgment. This unconditional auto-
matic stay is limited to judgments, decrees and final orders.
Interlocutory awards and provisional remedies, even if appealable, are
not included, even if such relief is in the form of a money
"judgment."'67
Judgments other than money judgments, or judgments where re-
lief is granted in addition to the payment of money, make up the next
class of judgments for which a ten day stay is permitted. For this class
recoverable at the conclusion of trial are disfavored and require the movant to satisfy a heavy
burden to support issuance).
63. General Motors Corp. v. Cook, 528 P.2d 1110, 1111 (Okla. 1974); City of Del City v.
Harris, 508 P.2d 264, 265 (Okla. 1973).
64. See, eg., General Motors Corp., 528 P.2d at 1112-13. In General Motors, the Supreme
Court refused to overturn the automatic stay of a judgment permitting General Motors to erect a
sign prohibited by city ordinance. Id.
65. See House Bill 1468, §§ 9 and 21, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 696.2(C), (D), and
990A(C). Certain family law, real property and injunctive actions remain effective when an-
nounced, though, even in those cases, finality must await the filing of a written judgment with the
court clerk. For a discussion of the new finality rules enacted by House Bill 1468, See, Charles
W. Adams, Appellate Procedure: Amendments for the Oklahoma and Federal Courts, 29 TULSA
Li. 31 (1993).
66. House Bill 1468, § 20(A), adding OKcLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.3(A) which provides that
"[w]here only the payment of money is awarded, no execution or other proceeding shall be
taken for the enforcement of the judgment, decree or final order until ten (10) days after the
judgment, decree or final order is filed with the court clerk."
67. Such remedies may be stayed, if at all, only pursuant to House Bill 1468, § 21 adding
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 990.4(C) and (D), and id. § 22, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 993.
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of judgments, an automatic ten day stay of effectiveness is permitted,
commencing at the time the judgment is filed.68 However, the stay
granted in these cases is not unconditional. The statute permits the
court, in its discretion, to impose conditions on the parties "that are
necessary for the protection of the property or interests that are the
subject of the action," including distribution of part or all of the prop-
erty involved, where the court requires the payment of a
supersedeas 69
This represents a change from prior law. Under prior law the ten
day automatic stay following judgment was automatic and uncondi-
tional, irrespective of the nature of the relief accorded. New section
990.3(B), in effect, imports into the automatic stay period the obliga-
tion to impose conditions on a stay which are made as of course in
granting discretionary stays under section 974.1.70 With respect to
these judgments, the temporary stay is mandatory, but during the
mandatory stay period, the conditions which might have been im-
posed had the court exercised its discretionary authority to stay the
judgment will also apply. The statute, though it does not require the
imposition of particular conditions, limits the conditions which can be
imposed to those "necessary" for the protection of property or inter-
ests subject to the litigation. The availability of conditional automatic
stays under section 990.3(B) is limited to judgments, decrees and final
orders.
Suspensions of judgments and orders are not available in all
cases. New Section 990.3(C), for the first time, creates a class of judg-
ments and orders for which an automatic stay is not available.71 With
respect to this class of judgments and orders, no automatic stay is per-
mitted. However, the court, "in its discretion, may impose any condi-
tions that are necessary to protect the interests of the parties in such
actions."'72 This represents a codification and confirmation of the im-
plications of prior case law with respect to matrimonial proceedings
68. House Bill 1468, § 20(A), adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.3(B).
69. Id. § 20(C), adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.3(B).
70. See discussion, below, at notes 106, 112, and 156.
71. These include relief accorded in actions for divorce, separate maintenance, annulment,
post-decree matrimonial proceedings, paternity, custody, adoption, termination of parental
rights, juvenile matters, probate proceedings, habeas corpus proceedings, special executions in
foreclosure, conservatorship or guardianship proceedings, mental health, quiet title actions, and
partition proceedings or actions involving temporary or permanent injunctions. House Bill 1468,
§ 20(C), adding OK..A. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.3(C).
72. Id. § 20(C), adding OK.A. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.3(C).
[Vol. 29:65
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and the matters ancillary to such proceedings. 73 It represents ex-
panded protection, however, for a number of other proceedings. The
presumption in favor of an automatic stay, implicit in case law under
the inherent power doctrine of Mapco74 and in the rules of civil appel-
late procedure,"7 has been reversed. New section 990.3(C) presumes
against stays of the proceedings therein set forth. To that extent, espe-
cially in real property and injunctive actions, Mapco is either over-
turned or narrowed.76 Contrary to the intent of the old appellate
procedure rules, the intent of new section 990.3(C) is precisely not to
relieve parties of the necessity of filing motion to stay at time judg-
ment is entered.77 Indeed, the new consensus on stays now provides a
tremendous incentive to do precisely what the Mapco court insisted a
"more orderly administration of legal process" should prevent 74-the
necessity of plaguing the court with motions and petitions immedi-
ately at the time the judgment is rendered.
The codification of modified automatic stay rules presents some
interesting possibilities. First, it may permit the court to act sua sponte
to both impose conditions on the automatic stay of judgments other
than money judgments under new section 990.3(B) and to permit the
staying of those judgments otherwise exempted from the automatic
stay rules under section 990.3(C). The effect may be to allow a greater
number of stays in situations where, under prior law, stays would have
been more difficult to obtain. Indeed, the requirement that the court
impose conditions during the automatic stay period for judgments
otherwise subject to discretionary stays, may well make it harder for
judgment winners to argue that the discretionary stay should not be
extended during the pendency of the appeal. Since conditions have
already been imposed necessary for the protection of the property at
issue during the ten day automatic stay period, it may well constitute
73. See discussion above at notes 55.
74. Mapco., Inc. v. Means, 538 P.2d 593 (Okla. 1975).
75. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 15, App. 2 Rule 1.13 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
76. Mapco's rule has been especially narrowed with respect to injunctions. Mapco specifi-
cally held that temporary injunctions were stayed automatically for ten days pending the filing of
a motion for new trial or appeal, "unless trial court enters order to the contrary." Mapco, 538
P.2d at 595. However, a court is not prohibited from staying such judgments; the rule merely
presumes against entitlement to a stay.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 595-596.
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an abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse to permit the continu-
ation of the stay after the end of the ten day period.79
Moreover, the rules change the pace of post-trial practice in some
material respect. Since judgments in the actions subject to section
990.3(B) may be stayed conditionally during the ten day period after
judgment, litigants will have a substantial incentive to prepare, in ad-
vance of the filing ofjudgment, a motion or petition for the imposition
of conditions for stay in cases subject to section 990.3(B).80 Likewise,
since courts are permitted to impose conditions with respect to judg-
ments not subject to automatic stay under section 990.3(C), there will
be strong incentives for litigants in the proceedings described in sec-
tion 990.3(C) to prepare petitions to mitigate the effect of such judg-
ments for submission immediately upon the rendition of judgment.
The most significant casualty of new section 990.3 is new trial mo-
tions. The new statute changes the approach to the suspension of
post-trial motions by eliminating the automatic stay pending resolu-
tion of the new trial motion. For purposes of determining a right to
suspend the effectiveness of a judgment pending resolution of the new
trial motion, the new statute does not distinguish between suspensions
resulting from the filing of a notice of appeal or from filing a new trial
motion. In either case the power to suspend a judgment after filing
the appeal or motion for new trial will depend on the availability of
supersedeas as of right or discretionary stays.8'
79. The only basis, perhaps, for such a determination would be proof of changed circum-
stances which make it impossible to impose conditions which are sufficient to protect the prop-
erty or interests at issue, or a showing that the court's initial assumptions were substantially
incorrect in a material respect.
80. Litigants have such an incentive before either party knows the outcome of the litigation.
Why? Because the earlier a judgment winner can suggest conditions to impose on the judgment
loser to stay the effectiveness of the judgment, the more expensive such stays will be for the
judgment loser, and the less likely such judgments may actually be stayed. In addition, the peti-
tion can lay the groundwork for a motion to deny the extension of the § 990.3(B) stay beyond
the ten day as-of-right period.
81. House Bill 1468, § 21, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.4(A)(1). This rule applies
whether or not the post-trial motion tolls the timing of the period in which to file an appeal
under new OKLA. STAT. tit 12, § 990.2. The rule of Mapco., Inc. v. Means, 538 P.2d 593, 595
(Okla. 1975) ("Also, motion for new trial stays execution of trial court's judgment until disposi-
tion of motion for new trial."), appears, in this respect, to be substantially modified. However,
until the Supreme Court amends its civil appellate rules, the existing rules may still permit the
automatic stay of the effectiveness of all judgments pending the disposition of any new trial
motion, except, perhaps, the judgments in proceedings specified in new OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 990.4(C). Under OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1007(B) (Supp. 1990) (repealed 1991), execution on
judgments was automatically stayed while a post-trail motion (filed within 10 days of the filing of
the judgment) was pending and for 10 days after its disposition. OKLA. Civ. APP. R. 1.13 was
thereafter amended, before the OJAA was repealed, to conform to new (now repealed) § 1007,
providing a uniform rule automatically staying the effectiveness of all judgments while timely
filed post-trial motions are being considered by the trial court, and for ten days thereafter. See
24
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In contrast, the changes to the supersedeas provisions were not
meant to affect the automatic suspension of judgments against "any
county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the State of
Oklahoma," which was provided by prior law.8 However, it is not
clear whether the broad right to automatic suspension of judgments
accorded political subdivisions of the state under prior law has not
been substantially narrowed. New section 990.4(C) provides for a dis-
cretionary stay in a number of proceedings which are also not subject
to an automatic ten (10) day stay after judgment under new section
990.3(C). Among the proceedings covered are injunctions and quiet
title actions. In contrast to the provisions of prior law, neither section
exempts from its application political subdivisions of the state.83 As
such, absent a very broad reading of section 990.4(F), political subdivi-
sions may now be treated like other litigants with respect to the effec-
tiveness of judgments rendered against them, at least in this respect.
In any event, the new law does not overturn the case law prohibitions
of automatic stays of prohibitory injunctions against cities. 4
2. Supersedeas
House Bill 1469 does not materially alter litigants' options for
stay after the end of the ten day period following the rendering of a
judgment. Suspension of effectiveness thereafter depends on the
availability of another grounds for automatic stay, or compliance with
the provisions permitting suspension of judgments as of right (by su-
persedeas), s5 or by stay.s6 House Bill 1468 did, however, affect the
availability of the right to supersedeas at the margin.
a. Prior Law
Supersedeas applies when an appellant has a statutory right to
suspend the effectiveness of a judgment or final order. The right to
OKLA. Civ. App. R. 1.13(A) (West Supp. 1993). Courts, of course, retain their inherent power to
suspend their judgments in their discretion. Mapco, 538 P.2d at 595-96.
82. House Bill 1468, § 9, adding Oa.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 990.4(F), provides that "[t]he
execution of a supersedeas bond shall not be a condition for granting of a stay of judgment,
decree or final order of any judicial tribunal against any county, municipality, or other political
subdivision of the State of Oklahoma."
83. Contrast OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 974.1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) ("except that
execution of a judgment... against [any political subdivision of the state] is automatically stayed
without execution of supersedeas").
84. City of Del City v. Harris, 508 P.2d 264 (Okla. 1973), and discussion, above, at notes 61-
62.
85. House Bill 1468, § 21, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.4(A).
86. Id. at tit. 12, § 974.1, and see discussion below at notes 156-183.
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supersedeas is limited to judgments or final orders directing the pay-
ment of money,' the execution of a conveyance or other instru-
ment,88 the sale or delivery of possession of real property,8 9 and the
assignment or delivery of documents.90 The right to suspend in these
cases depends only on the appellants' ability to comply with the statu-
tory conditions for asserting the right.
Generally, the power to suspend a judgment as-of-right is condi-
tioned on the posting of a statutorily required undertaking, that is a
promise to pay or otherwise comply with the terms of the judgment or
order.91 The undertaking is executed on the part of the plaintiff in
error, with one or more sufficient sureties or guarantors of the under-
taking made by the plaintiff.' The form of the undertaking and the
sureties is not prescribed by statute.93
For money judgments, the plaintiff in error (the appealing party)
is required to undertake payment of the condemnation money and
costs, in the event the judgment or order is affirmed. The required
undertaking executed by the plaintiff in error must include one or
more "sufficient sureties," and must be for double the amount of the
judgment or order. However, the statute also provides that where the
undertaking is executed or guaranteed by a state licensed bonding
company, the bond need be only in the amount of the judgment and
costs, including costs on appeal.94
For judgments or final orders directing the execution of a convey-
ance or other instrument, the plaintiff in error is required to under-
take to abide by the judgment, if affirmed on appeal, and pay the costs
87. Id. § 968.1(1).
88. Id. § 968.1(2).
89. Id. § 968.1(3).
90. Id. § 968.1(4).
91. Id. §§ 968.1, 969.1. For discussion of the requirements for a valid undertaking, see dis-
cussion at notes 121-139 below.
92. Id. § 968.1. Most Oklahoma case law on the extent of the liability of sureties is of an-
cient vintage. The liability of a surety on a supersedeas bond is contractual and is determined by
provisions of the bond; liability, therefore, cannot exceed the terms thereof. Allen v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co., 123 P.2d 252 (Okla. 1942) (holding that surety not required to pay
damages for delay caused by appeal where bond only provided for payment of "condemnation
money and costs in case said judgment shall be affirmed"). As such, a surety is bound by all of
the terms of the bond, including the recitals. See Richardson v. Penny, 61 P. 584, 585 (Okla.
1900) ("Having executed their solemn obligation to pay to the plaintiff. . . , and recited in this
obligation that a suit was pending .... and that judgment was rendered against them, the law
says they shall not be permitted to contradict such recital, but shall be bound thereby."). And,
absent provisions to the contrary in the bond, the surety's liability is co-extensive with that of the
principal. Allen, 23 P.2d at 252 (discussing liability to third parties).
93. Ryndak v. Seawell, 102 P. 125, 126 (Okla. 1909) (holding bond valid even though it
contained technical errors and omissions).
94. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 968.1(1) (West Supp. 1993). See also notes 126-129, below.
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on appeal. The court has discretion to determine the amount of the
bond accompanying the undertaking.95 However, in lieu of the under-
taking required, the party seeking the stay may, instead, deposit the
executed conveyance or other instrument with the clerk of the court in
which judgment was rendered, pending the determination of the
appeal.96
For judgments directing the sale or delivery of possession of real
property,97 the petitioner in error is required to undertake that during
the possession of such property by the plaintiff in error, he will not
commit or cause to be committed any waste on the property. Further-
more, he will pay the value of the use of the property from the date of
the undertaking until delivery of the property pursuant to the judg-
ment. In addition, the petitioner in error is required to undertake to
pay all costs. If the judgment is for the sale of mortgaged premises
and the payment of a deficiency arising from the sale, the petitioner in
error must also undertake the payment of such deficiency. The court
has discretion to determine the amount of the bond accompanying the
undertaking.9"
For judgments and final orders directing the assignment or deliv-
ery of documents, the petitioner in error has two choices.99 He may
place the documents required to be assigned or delivered in the cus-
tody of the clerk of the court to await the determination on appeal.
Alternatively, the petitioner in error may deliver an undertaking ac-
companied by a bond in an amount to be determined by the court.
Special rules apply with respect to the suspension of a variety of
other judgments or orders. Thus, requirements for suspending the de-
nial, cancellation, revocation, or suspension of a motor vehicle license
are set forth in the Motor Vehicles Code.10° Except in cases where the
action is statutorily mandated, 01 orders suspending motor vehicle
95. Id. § 968.1(2).
96. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 969.1 (1992). It is unclear, however, whether deposit of the exe-
cuted conveyance or other instrument with the clerk of the court as permitted under § 969.1 also
relieves the petitioner in error from the obligation to post a bond to cover the cost on appeal
under O.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 968.1(2) (West Supp. 1993). However, the court may require
the payment of these costs as a matter of course even in such a case, and the adverse party may
always seek additional protection by motion for enlargement. That appears to be the practice in
Tulsa County, Oklahoma. Interview with Hon. John C. Reif, Oklahoma Court of Appeals, in
Tulsa, Oklahoma (July 1, 1993).
97. Oa. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 968.1(3) (West Supp. 1993).
98. But obviously, the amount of the bond will approximate the estimated cost or value of
the undertaking in the particular case.
99. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 12, § 968.1(4) (West Supp. 1993).
100. Id. at tit. 47, § 6-211 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
101. Id. § 6-211(A).
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licenses may be stayed, if at the time an appeal is filed, the petitioner
executes and files an appeal bond with the clerk of the court.1' 2 A
certified copy of the bond is to be served to the Department of Motor
Vehicles along with the notice of hearing.10 3 Once the certified copy of
the bond is served, the Department of Motor Vehicles must restore
the license suspended during the pendency of the appeal.1 4 Appeals
from the denial, cancellation, or revocation of motor vehicle licenses
do not appear to be covered by the supersedeas-as-of-right rules of
section 6-211(K), which speak only of an "order of suspension by the
Department."'" 5 These, then, may be suspended only under the gen-
eral discretionary authority of the court to suspend judgments and or-
ders conferred by statute."°
Supersedeas is also available for appeals by a defendant (the ten-
ant) from adverse decisions in forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases. Tenants are given three days after the date of judgment to post
a supersedeas bond, "conditioned as required by law."' 0 7 However,
the bond does not act to stay continuing obligations to pay rent (or
presumably other obligations under the lease). Such rent must con-
tinue to be paid pending appeal on a timely basis; the failure to make
such payment is considered an abandonment of the appeal. 08
Appeals from decisions establishing or refusing to establish con-
servancy districts require, apparently as a jurisdictional prerequisite,
the giving of a supersedeas bond in a sum to be determined by the
102. Id. § 6-211(K). Section 6-211(K) provides that the bond be in an amount between two
hundred and fifty and five hundred dollars, and along with the sureties presented, be approved
by the district court clerk. In Tulsa County, Oklahoma, the bond posted is usually $250.00. In-
terview with Clyde Sumter, Court Clerk (Traffic Division), Tlsa County, Oklahoma, in Tulsa,
Oklahoma (July 2, 1993). The petitioner must undertake to prosecute the appeal with due dili-
gence, to abide by state laws in the operation of the motor vehicle during the pendency of the
appeal, and to comply with the final judgment of the appellate tribunal. Failure to comply can
result in forfeiture of the bond. Oa". STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 6-211(K) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
103. Id. § 6-211(K).
104. Id. § 6-211(L). If the petitioner loses on appeal, the period of suspension will begin to
run at the time the license is surrendered. Id.
105. Id. § 6-211(K). In addition, appeals of the determination of the district court to the
Supreme Court, as provided under section 6-211(M) of title 47 are not accompanied by a
mandatory right to suspend the district court determination.
106. Id. at tit. 12, § 974.1 (West Supp. 1993). See also discussion below at notes 156-183,
107. Id. § 1148.10A (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). The reference to "conditioned as provided
by law" may be to the requirements for undertakings and the provisions of sureties as required
under section 968.1 of title 12. The court is permitted to extend the time for posting of the bond
to ten days after the date of judgment. Id. § 1148.10A.
108. Id. § 1148.10A. Such rent is to be paid to the court clerk's office, together with pound-
age (a tax or commission based on a percentage of the amount of the rent). where there is a
dispute as to the amount of rent, the court is permitted to determine how much is to be paid and
at what time intervals. Id.
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Supreme Court.10 9 However, such order establishing a district will not
be stayed unless appeal therefrom is made by at least 51% of the land-
owners affected." 0 Orders refusing to establish conservancy districts
under the Conservancy Act of Oklahoma,"' are subject to appeal
only upon the giving of a bond in a sum to be fixed by the Supreme
Court."
2
Supersedeas is mandatory in workers compensation cases appeal-
able to the Supreme Court." 3 Approval of the amount of the under-
taking and of the sureties is made by the Administrator of the
Workers' Compensation Court." 4 The Supreme Court has held that
the bonding requirement of the workers compensation statutes is a
jurisdictional prerequisite for appeal to the Supreme Court." 5
Supersedeas and appeals from determinations of the Corporation
Commission are partly mandatory and partly discretionary. Suspen-
sions as-of-right of determinations of the Corporation Commission ex-
tend only to orders made in the exercise of the Corporation
Commission's regulatory powers over public utilities and carriers."'
109. Id. at tit. 82, § 508 (West 1988). The Oklahoma Conservation Commission is empow-
ered to organize irrigation, flood control, reforestation, and/or soil erosion prevention districts
by petition to the district court. Id. § 502. Upon approval by the court, such districts are estab-
lished, the directors of such district to be the members of the Oklahoma Conservation Commis-
sion. Id. § 504.
110. Id. § 508.
111. Id. §§ 531-688.1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). See In re Conservancy District No. 5, Lin-
coln County, 471 P.2d 879 (Okla. 1970) (explaining the constitutionality of the Conservancy
Act).
112. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 545 (West 1988). Appeals from decisions establishing a
district do not appear to contain a jurisdictional bonding requirement. Such orders, presumably,
may be stayed pending appeal, in accordance with the discretionary power of the court to grant
stays under section 974.1 of title 12. Id. at tit. 12, § 974.1 (West Supp. 1993). See id. at tit. 82,
§ 545 (West 1988) ("After an order is entered establishing the district, such order shall, unless
appeal be taken within ninety (90) days, be deemed final and binding.. ").
113. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 3.6(B) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). The only exception is for
appeals by municipalities and other political subdivisions of the state. Id.
114. Id. § 1.3 (creating position of administrator); id. at § 3.6(B) (requiring the Administra-
tor to approve the sureties and the undertaking for appeals from the decision of the Workers'
Compensation Court).
115. See id. § 3.6(B); Elam v. Workers' Compensation Court, 659 P.2d 938 (Okla. 1983) (re-
quiring written undertaking for appeal of decision of Workers' Compensation Court did not
deny claimant constitutional right to appeal under either the state or federal constitution); Bled-
soe v. Munsingwear Corp., 579 P.2d 835, 837 (Okla. 1978) (holding that respondent's cross peti-
tion failed to show filing of required undertaking, cross petition dismissed); construing OKLA.
STAT. tit. 85, § 29 (1971) (repealed 1977).
116. OKLA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 20,21 ("Upon the giving of notice of appeal from an order of
the Corporation Commission, the Commission, if requested, shall suspend the effectiveness of
the order complained of until the final disposition of the order appealed, and fix the amount of
suspending or supersedeas bond"); see Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 214 P.2d 715, 718 (Okla.
1949) (citing state constitution, Supreme Court permitted supersedeas after denial of same by
the Corporation Commission).
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The bond must be approved and filed with the Corporation Commis-
sion, or approved, on review, by the Supreme Court.117 Determina-
tions of the Corporation Commission in orders issued under the Oil
and Gas Conservation Act,118 may be stayed at the discretion of the
Commission." 9 Orders of the Banking Board or the Bank Commis-
sioner may be stayed in the discretion of the Supreme Court. 20
As a condition of the effectiveness of any undertaking, both the
execution of the undertaking and the sureties must be approved by
the court in which the judgment was rendered or order made, or by
the judge or clerk thereof.'2 ' The judgment winner may participate in
the process by motion for enlargement, if he feels the amount of the
bond is too low. 22 On occasion a judgment winner can use this power
to substantially increase the cost to a judgment loser of staying execu-
tion. 2 On the affirmance of the trial court's judgment, the Supreme
Court may enter summary judgment against the sureties on the
bond. 24 A dismissal of the appeal acts like an affirmance, and as such
117. OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 21.
118. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 81-287.15 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
119. Id. § 113. Both the Corporation Commission and the Supreme Court are given discre-
tionary authority to permit the suspension of the order of the Corporation Commission on the
terms set by either body. See id.; Bray v. Cap Corp., 571 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Okla. 1977) (citing
statute which states that the Corporation Commission has the power to stay effectiveness of an
order in a "forced pooling" case pending appeal, but the Commission is not required to stay its
order).
120. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 207(C) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). The party seeking the stay
must meet a "cause shown" standard. Id. As such, stays in these cases are likely harder to
obtain than in the case of discretionary stays of private disputes.
121. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 971.1 (West Supp. 1993) ("Before an undertaking shall op-
erate to stay execution of a judgment or order, the execution of the undertaking and the suffi-
ciency of the sureties must be approved by the court in which the judgment was rendered or
order made, or by the judge or clerk thereof...."). In Tisa County, Oklahoma, the court clerks
are generally responsible for the approval of supersedeas bonds and undertakings guaranteed by
a bonding company or when a cash deposit is made. Otherwise, the trial judge approves the
bond and undertaking. Also the judge is expected to approve bonds posted in cases involving
injunctions and receivers. The amount of the supersedeas is equal to the amount of the judg-
ment plus costs plus attorneys' fees (if the judgment winner has requested they be included) and
three years' interest at the current statutory rate. Interview with Charlene Voss, Court Clerk,
ilsa County, Okla., in Tulsa, Okla. (June 30, 1993).
122. That is the standard procedure in Tulsa County, Oklahoma. Interview with Hon. John
C. Reif, Oklahoma Court of Appeals, in Tulsa, Okla. (July 1, 1993).
123. For a recent spectacular example of the effect of this power in an analogous context, see
Grand River Dam v. Eaton, 803 P.2d 705 (Okla. 1990), discussed below at notes 194 and 210-
214.
124. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 971.1 (1991) ("[I]n the event that the judgment of the court to
which such appeal is taken is against the appellant, judgment shall, at the same time it is entered
against the appellant, be entered against the sureties on the said undertaking to stay execution,
and execution, and execution shall issue thereon against said sureties the same as against their
principal, the appellant, and no stay of such execution shall be permitted.").
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warrants judgment on the supersedeas.'25
The supersedeas undertaking is a statutory bond, the conditions
and operation of which are set by statute. 26 The bond, a written in-
strument, may be given directly by the petitioner in error or by such
sureties as he can supply. The sureties on the bond may be individuals
and are not required to be in the business of guaranteeing bonds in
judicial proceedings. Indeed, the use of individuals as sureties seems
to have been the common method of bonding an appellate undertak-
ing in Oklahoma in the early part of the twentieth century. 27 Today,
the usual form of undertaking is by bond, "executed or guaranteed by
a corporation incorporated under the laws of the United States or of
any state authorized to do business in this State of Oklahoma and
having power under the statutes of this state to execute and guarantee
bonds and undertakings in judicial proceedings .... t12s I generally
may be purchased from a bonding company.' 29
125. See Thrk Bros. v. Brewer, 11 P.2d 926, 927-928 (Okla. 1932) (dismissing appeal as frivo-
lous on judgment on a promissory note); Jordan Furniture Co. v. Graham, 10 P.2d 394, 396
(Okla. 1932) (dismissing appeal as frivolous on a breach of employment contract); Jacobs v.
National Bank of Commerce of Tulsa, 288 P. 953 (Okla. 1930) (dismissing defendant's appeal of
a judgment on a loan for noncompliance with appellate briefing rules); Dymond Drilling Co. v.
Morris, 198 P.93 (Okla. 1921) (dismissing appeal voluntarily for failure to file briefs within time
required by Supreme Court rules); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Frenton, 153 P.
1130 (Okla. 1916) (dismissing action for damages on death of appellee pending appeal and
revivor not accepted).
126. See Allen v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 123 P.2d 252, 253 (Okla. 1942); Na-
tional Surety Co. v. Craig, 220 P. 943 (Okla. 1924).
127. See, e.g., National Surety Co. v. Craig, 220 P. 943, 944 (Okla. 1923) (noting individual
sureties on second bond); Richardson v. Penny, 61 P. 584 (Okla. 1900) (noting each of three
plaintiffs in error served as surety for the undertaking bond of the others). This practice is rare
today, and court personnel may be unaware that supersedeas may be guaranteed by individual
sureties or entities other than licensed bonding companies. Interview with Charlene Voss, Court
Clerk, TUlsa County, Oklahoma, in Tlsa, Oklahoma (June 30,1993). However, in Tulsa County,
Oklahoma, judges continue to accept personal sureties as a matter of course. In such cases, the
judge requires the petitioner prove that his net worth is about five times the amount of the
judgment. Interview with Hon. John C. Reif, Oklahoma Court of Appeals, in Tulsa, Oklahoma
(July 1, 1993).
128. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 968.1(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
129. Currently, bonding companies in Tulsa County, Oklahoma, generally require 100% col-
lateral as a condition of guaranteeing a supersedeas bond. The preferred collateral is an irrevo-
cable letter of credit from a bank or other financial institution. Bonding companies will rarely
accept a security interest in property as collateral (second mortgages on homes or business prop-
erty) because of the difficulties and expenses encountered when the bonding company must look
to the security for payment. The premium for supersedeas bonds in Tulsa, Oklahoma, is 1% of
the value of the fully collateralized bond, but increases to 2% of the amount of the bond when
security other than an irrevocable letter of credit is accepted as collateral. Generally, in Tulsa
County, Oklahoma, the attorney for the party seeking to stay execution drafts the form of super-
sedeas bond, for execution by the bonding company. Upon payment to the bonding company,
the instrument is executed and presented to the court clerk. Interview with Brad McCrory,
executive of American Bonding Company, Tulsa, Oklahoma, a subsidiary of Robert C. Bates &
Associates, in Tulsa, Oklahoma (July 2, 1993).
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As a technical matter, supersedeas cases require no written appli-
cation to the trial court.130 However, if the judge or the clerk refuses
to accept a tendered bond, the preferred practice in Oklahoma is to
retender the supersedeas bond by written application. The purpose of
this retender is to secure a judicial hearing and an order refusing the
tender thereby creating a record upon which the aggrieved party may
base an appeal.' 3' Likewise, if the party for whose benefit the bond is
given is dissatisfied with the bond, the proper practice is to seek modi-
fication of bond conditions or to seek a new bond by motion to the
trial court. 32
Failure to comply with the requirements of statutory supersedeas
is sufficient cause to vacate the stay, but not to dismiss the appeal. 33
Not surprisingly, the failure to file a timely petition in error also voids
the suspension of the judgment or order. Vacation of stays on su-
persedeas bonds is usually effected by motion to the trial court for an
order vacating or setting aside the supersedeas bond and permitting
execution of the judgment. Unless the stay is vacated, a party cannot
seek execution, even if the bond is facially defective. 35 Once the stay
is vacated, of course, the judgment is immediately effective and may
be executed. 36
Orders relating to staying execution of judgments are reviewable
by the Supreme Court on motion by the aggrieved party, whether or
130. See Howe v. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank, 8 P.2d 665, 668-669 (Okla. 1932) (stating
approved undertaking may be filed without court order after filing of petition in error, appeal
being undetermined and the judgment being unexecuted).
131. Hon. Marion P. Opala, What Temporary Relief Can You Get Pending Appeal, paper
delivered at a Program entitled Oklahoma Civil Appellate Procedure, sponsored by the
Oklahoma Bar Association, Department of Continuing Legal Education, 1982 in OKLAHOMA
CIVIL APPELLATE PROCEDURE, at IV-52. Generally, the only bonds or supersedeas which are
not approved are those which involve "non-standard" forms of security, such as bank certificates
of deposit or other collateral. Bonding company guarantees are rarely disapproved. Interview
with Hon. John C. Reif, Oklahoma Court of Appeals, in Tuilsa, Oklahoma (July 1, 1993).
132. Kirk v. Leeman, 18 P.2d 1088 (Okla. 1933) (holding that aggrieved party successfully
sought a new supersedeas bond).
133. Id. at 1089 (denying motion to dismiss appeal for failure to comply with conditions for
new supersedeas bond).
134. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 971.1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
135. Venator v. Edwards, 259 P. 596, 599 (Okla. 1927) (holding proper procedure for judg-
ment winner was to move to vacate facially defective supersedeas whose filing stayed execution
of judgment rather than to file a writ of mandamus), approved in Kirk v. Leeman, 18 P.2d 1088,
1089 (Okla. 1933) (staying money judgment pending filing of supersedeas which was timely ten-
dered and approved by the court, granting thereafter motion to file an amended or new superse-
deas bond, vacating supersedeas upon the failure to comply with this motion); In re Epley, 64 P.
18, 22 (Okla. 1901). See Civ. App. RULE 1.31 (a)(4); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, ch. 15, App. 2,
Rule 1.31 (a)(4) (West Supp. 1993).
136. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 731 et seq. (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
32
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 29 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol29/iss1/3
1993] CIVIL WARS: APPELLATE REVIEW
not the trial court has considered the matter.137 The Supreme Court's
power, though, is limited to cases properly before it on appeal. Defec-
tive appeal divests the Supreme Court of all power over the superse-
deas bond.13 Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated that, with
respect to motions relating to supersedeas bonds, it will not as a gen-
eral rule consider any issue that might have been considered by the
district court in the first instance, even if it has the power to do so.1 3
9
b. House Bill 1468 Changes
The statutory right to suspend judgments under prior law has
been substantially recodified in new section 990.4, but with some po-
tentially interesting new twists. That section makes clear that stays of
execution, to the extent permitted in the statute, may be obtained (i)
while a post-trial motion is pending, (ii) during the time in which an
appeal may be commenced, and (iii) while an appeal is pending. 140 It
provides the basis for obtaining a stay as of right and a discretionary
stay with respect to the judgments identified therein. It also carries
over the provisions of prior law section 971.1 regarding the require-
ment of court approval of the sufficiency of the undertaking and the
137. See Mapco, Inc. v. Means, 538 P.2d 593, 595 (Okla. 1975) ("This Court has statutory
authority, as well as inherent power, to grant supersedeas or stay of execution in all cases pend-
ing before it wherein the particular statutes are silent on the subject."); Kirk v. Leeman, 18 P.2d
1088 (Okla. 1933); Grant v. Harris, 22 P.2d 56 (Okla. 1933); see Hon. Marion P. Opala, What
Temporary Relief Can You Get Pending Appeal, paper delivered at a Program entitled
Oklahoma Civil Appellate Procedure, sponsored by the Oklahoma Bar Association, Depart-
ment of Continuing Legal Education, 1982 in OKLAHOMA CIVIL APPELLATE PROCEDURE, at IV-
52. As a general matter care must be exercised in preserving the record on appeal. E.g., Robert
L. Wheeler, Inc. v. Scott, 818 P.2d 475 (Okla. 1991) (refusing to review pretrial conference order
in garnishment proceeding overruling motion to stay execution of judgment because it was not
part of record).
138. MidWest Life Ass'n v. Rivers, 16 P.2d 561 (Okla. 1933) (holding that where Supreme
Court did not acquire jurisdiction by attempted appeal, it had no jurisdiction to render judgment
on supersedeas bond).
139. Mapco., Inc. v. Means, 538 P.2d 593,595 (Okla. 1975) ("However, trial court is certainly
more familiar with factual circumstances of case[,] and we prefer it rule upon merits of Mapco's
motion in the first instance."). See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 15, App. 2, Rule 1.31(a)(4)
(West Supp. 1993) (noting trial court retains jurisdiction pending appeal to decide motions in
regard to staying the enforcement of judgments or of interlocutory orders appealable by right).
The Supreme Court does periodically act without the benefit of a determination by a trial court.
E.g., Kirk v. Leeman, 18 P.2d 1088, 1089 (Okla. 1933) (vacating supersedeas entered by trial
court rather than remanding). In light of Mapco, however, the better practice today might be to
seek first by motion in the trial court the vacation of the supersedeas and, thereafter seek review
by the Supreme Court in the event the trial court denies the motion. See also Hon. Marion P.
Opala, What Temporary Relief Can You Get Pending Appeal, paper delivered at a Program enti-
tled Oklahoma Civil Appellate Procedure, sponsored by the Oklahoma Bar Association, De-
partment of Continuing Legal Education, 1982 in OKLAHOMA CIVIL APPELLATE PROCEDURE, at
IV-52.
140. House Bill 1468, § 21, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.4(A).
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time during which suspensions are effective. 141 The form of the un-
dertaking, and the sureties required for a supersedeas bond also re-
main unchanged.
Under Section 990.4, supersedeas as of right remains available
when the judgments or final orders direct the payment of money,'142
the execution of a conveyance or other instrument, 43 the sale or de-
livery of possession of real property,144 or the assignment or delivery
of documents. 45 No other judgment or final order is subject to sus-
pension by undertaking as of right. The new statute does provide liti-
gants seeking to suspend a money judgment a new alternative-in lieu
of a supersedeas bond, the judgment loser can deposit cash, U.S.
Treasury Notes or Oklahoma State bonds with the court clerk in the
amount of the judgment plus costs and interest on appeal.146
The new statutes leave substantially untouched the special rules
regarding suspension of judgments under prior law. Thus, require-
ments for suspending the denial, cancellation, revocation, or suspen-
sion of a motor vehicle license are set forth in the Motor Vehicles
Code.147 The rules respecting the extent and nature of suspensions as
of right from adverse decisions in forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases have not been modified."4' Appeals from decisions establishing
or refusing to establish conservancy districts continue to require, as a
jurisdictional prerequisite, the giving of a supersedeas bond in a sum
to be determined by the Supreme Court. 49 Orders refusing to estab-
lish conservancy districts under the Conservancy Act of Oklahoma,
141. Id.
142. Id. § 21, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.4(B)(1), corresponding to OUA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 968.1(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
143. Id. § 21, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.4(B)(2), corresponding to OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 968.1(2) (1992). Additionally, new section 990.4(B)(2) incorporates old OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 969.1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993), allowing the appellant, in lieu of filing a bond, to execute
the conveyance and deposit it with the clerk of the court during the pendency of the appeal.
144. Id. § 21, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.4(B)(3), corresponding to OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 968.1(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
145. Id. § 21, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.4(B)(4), corresponding to OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 968.1(4) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
146. House Bill 1468, adding § 21, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.4(B)(1)(b). This option
presents new opportunities and frustrations for litigants attempting to suspend the effectiveness
of a judgment and simultaneously discharge a judgment lien.
147. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 6-211 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) and discussion above at
notes 100-106.
148. Id. at tit. 12, § 1148.10A (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) and discussion above at notes 107-
108.
149. Id. at tit. 82, § 508 (West 1988). The Oklahoma Conservation Commission is empow-
ered to organize irrigation, flood control, reforestation, and/or soil erosion prevention districts
[Vol. 29:65
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are still subject to special rules.150 Supersedeas is mandatory in work-
ers' compensation cases in cases appealable to the Supreme Court. 5 '
The new legislation specifically exempts workers' compensation cases
from the new judgment filing provisions. 52 Supersedeas and appeals
from determinations of the Corporation Commission continue to be
governed by provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution5 3 and statutory
law.154  Suspension of the effectiveness of orders of the Banking
Board or the Bank Commissioner lies within the discretion of the
Supreme Court. 55 Arguments that the general suspension of judg-
ment provisions of new section 990.4 have implicitly repealed or modi-
fied these specific statutes should not carry much weight; there is no
evidence that the Legislature intended to repeal any of the specific
provisions by implication, and it certainly was not the conscious intent
of the Interim Advisory Committee on Judgments and Post-Judgment
Procedure.
3. Stays
House Bill 1468 has resulted in a broadening of the discretionary
power of courts to grant (or deny) requests for stays of effectiveness
of judgments. To that extent, that is, to the extent that the need to
seek permission to stay effectiveness (rather than to comply with re-
quirements which might secure a suspension of effectiveness automat-
ically or by right) increases the uncertainty of suspending
effectiveness, the greater the possibility for deference to lower court
by petition to the district court. Id. § 502. Upon approval by the court, such districts are estab-
lished, the directors of such district to be the members of the Oklahoma Conservation Commis-
sion. Id. § 504.
150. Id. §§ 531-688.1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); see In re Conservancy District No. 5, Lincoln
County, 471 P.2d 879 (Okla. 1970) (constitutionality of the Conservancy Act).
151. OKLA. STAT. ANNm. tit. 85, § 3.6(B) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). The only exception is for
appeals by municipalities and other political subdivisions of the state. Id.
152. House Bill 1468, § 9, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 696.2(E).
153. OKLA. CONsT. art. 9, §§ 20,21 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) ("Upon the giving of notice of
appeal from an order of the Corporation Commission, the Commission, if requested, shall sus-
pend the effectiveness of the order complained of until the final disposition of the order ap-
pealed, and fix the amount of suspending or supersedeas.").
154. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 133 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). Both the Corporation Commis-
sion and the Supreme Court are given discretionary authority to permit the suspension of the
order of the Corporation Commission on the terms set by either body. Id. See also Bray v. Cap
Corp., 571 P.2d 1224, 1226-1227 (Okla. 1977) (Corporation Commission has the power to stay
effectiveness of an order in a "forced pooling" case pending appeal, but the Commission is not
required to stay its order), and discussion above at notes 116-119.
155. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 207(C) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). The party seeking stay
must meet a "cause shown" standard. Id.
1993]
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determinations, or put another way, the greater the cost (or risk) of
review.
a. Prior Law
The effectiveness of judgments and appealable orders not subject
to automatic stay or to suspension as of right may still be suspended,
pending appeal, by securing a stay of execution of judgment.156 In
contrast to suspensions-as-of-right, stays are discretionary. 5 7 Stays
are available for judgments and final orders which are not subject to
suspension as of right, except to the extent that such judgments and
orders are subject to other provisions regarding suspension pending
appeal. 8  Traditionally, discretionary stays have been available to
suspend the effectiveness of injunctions, 5 9 child support, child cus-
tody, alimony and counsel fees granted in a divorce decree,160 garnish-
ment,161 guardianship, 162 or return of property.'
63
156. Id. at tit. 12, § 974.1 (West Supp. 1993). Section 974.1 provides that "execution of the
judgment or final order of any judicial tribunal, other than those enumerated in this article, may
be stayed on such terms as may be prescribed by the court or judge thereof, in which the pro-
ceedings in error are pending."
157. See Wilks v. Wilks, 632 P.2d 759, 763, n. 12 (Okla. 1981) (holding that stay "means
suspension of the effectiveness [of a [judgment as] a] discretionary act of a trial or appellate
court."); Mapco, Inc. v. Means, 538 P.2d 593,595 (Okla. 1975) ("Where no provision for superse-
deas is made by statute, allowance thereof is left to the discretion of trial court, and trial court
may, in exercise of its discretion, allow supersedeas or stay on such terms as it may prescribe for
protection of parties pending appeal to appellate court."). Generally, judges in Tblsa County,
Oklahoma, base their discretionary determination on the clear weight of the evidence. When
the judge feels that any potential appeal would be frivolous, they tend to deny the motion to
stay. The bonding guidelines used by judges in discretionary stays is approximately the same as
for stays as-of-right (judgment plus costs plus attorneys' fees plus three years' interest). Inter-
view with Hon. John C. Reif, Oklahoma Court of Appeals, in Tulsa, Oklahoma (July 1, 1993).
158. The courts retain a "statutory as well as [an] ... inherent power to grant supersedeas or
stay of execution in all cases where the particular statutes are silent on the subject." 1942 Chev-
rolet Automobile v. State, 128 P.2d 448, 449 (Okla. 1942).
159. Mapco., Inc. v. Means, 538 P.2d 593 (Okla. 1975), City of Del City v. Harris, 508 P.2d
264 (Okla. 1973).
160. Wilks v. Wilks, 632 P.2d 759,763-764 (Okla. 1981); Jones v. Jones, 612 P.2d 266,268-269
(Okla. 1980) ("Applications for relief pending disposition of appeal are to be likened to proceed-
ings in which the terms of stay are sought to be arranged and imposed in any ordinary civil case
in which supersedeas is not statutorily available."); but see Ford v. Ford, 696 P.2d 1027 (Okla.
1985) (explaining that an award in spousal property division, as distinguished from child support,
alimony, etc. is subject to suspension as of right).
161. E.g., Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Housley, 148 P.689 (Okla. 1915) (allowing stay of
judgment in pending action for damages to prevent double recovery where out-of-state garnish-
ment proceeding was potential defense).
162. E.g., New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Scott, 234 P. 181 (Okla. 1925) (discussing action
against bondsman on guardian's bond in action for misappropriation by the guardian).
163. E.g., Tisdale v. Wheeler Bros. Grain Co., 599 P.2d 1104, 1106-1107 (Okla. 1979) (up-
holding trial court's impounding of amount of attorneys' fees in dispute because trial court re-
tained authority over such matters ancillary to issues on appeal); 1942 Chevrolet Automobile v.
State, 128 P.2d 448, 449 (Okla. 1942) (explaining procedure for the forfeiture of auto).
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The initial request for discretionary stays are made to the trial
court; otherwise, the appellate court will not entertain a motion for a
discretionary stay. Under Oklahoma Civil Appellate Procedure Rule
1.13, applications for discretionary stays must be made within ten days
after the judgment is rendered or the order made.164 However, a
staight be sought by motion after the expiration of the ten day period,
and even an extension of the automatic stay might be obtained by
motion.165 An order denying a request for a discretionary stay can be
reviewed by the Supreme Court by motion and without amendment of
the petition in error.166
In addition to judgments and final orders of the trial court not
subject to suspension as-of-right through supersedeas, discretionary
stays are available in a number of other circumstances. Foreign nation
money judgments are subject to stay in accordance with the terms of
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act ("UFM-
JRA") as enacted in Oklahoma. 67 The UFMJRA as enacted in
164. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 15, App. 2, Rule 1.13 (West Supp. 1993).
165. This option was made explicit in the Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases before
the enactment of the OJAA. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 15, App. 2 R. 1.13 (West 1988) ("If a
motion for a new trial is filed, the time to file a supersedeas or motion to stay will begin to run
from the date the motion is disposed of. This time limit may be extended by the trial court for
good cause shown. A motion to stay may be considered and ruled upon by the trial court after
the petition in error has been filed in this court."). See Mapco., Inc. v. Means, 538 P.2d 593, 596
(Okla. 1975) ("The phrase 'such party shall file a supersedeas bond or motion to stay within ten
days after the decision sought to be reviewed is rendered' means only that the judgment will not
automatically be stayed beyond the ten day period unless a motion to stay or motion for new
trial is filed within the ten day period"); Howe v. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank, 8 P.2d 665, 668
(Okla. 1932) ("We see nothing in our statutes at all indicating that the right to a stay is lost until
the final determination of the appeal, the judgment remaining unexecuted.").
166. Issues involving stays are considered ancillary matters, that is, not issues going to the
merits of the appeal. The suggested approach, therefore has been to file a motion directly with
the Supreme Court, to which is attached a certified copy of the trial court's order denying the
stay. See Hon. Marion P. Opala, What Temporary Relief Can You Get Pending Appeal, paper
delivered at a Program entitled Oklahoma Civil Appellate Procedure, sponsored by the
Oklahoma Bar Association, Department of Continuing Legal Education, 1982 in OKLAHOMA
CIVIL APPELLATE PROCEDURE, at IV-52. The Supreme Court has advised the local bar about its
rules in this respect from time to time. E.g., Blair v. District Court of Oklahoma County, 594
P.2d 367 (Okla. 1979) (explaining that trial court retained jurisdiction pending appeal of divorce
to consider application for alimony pendente lite). The Blair Court stated "Bench and Bar
should note that it is the express holding of this opinion that all issues ancillary to an appeal in a
domestic relations case be first presented to and determined by the trial court, and if a party feel
aggrieved by the ruling of the trial court, it may be part of the principal appeal." Id at 369.
Appellate court judges tend to defer to the determination of the trial court in matters of discre-
tionary stays. Interview with Hon. John C. Reif, Oklahoma Court of Appeals, in ThIsa,
Oklahoma (July 1, 1993).
167. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 710-718 (Vest 1988 & Supp. 1993). Section 710 defines a
foreign state as "any governmental unit other than the United States, or any state, district, com-
monwealth, territory, insular possession thereof or [certain territories of or areas administered
by the United States]." See Vicki E. Lawrence and Stephen D. Milbrath, Note, Conflict of Laws,
2 OKLA. Crr U. L.REv. 98, 107 (1977).
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Oklahoma gives the courts discretionary power to stay execution of
foreign money judgments where the defendant satisfies the court
either that an appeal is pending or that he intends to file a valid ap-
peal.168 District courts apparently have less discretion under the Uni-
form Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ("UEFJA").'6 9 Upon a
showing that an appeal from the foreign judgment is pending or will
be filed, or that a stay of execution has been granted, the district court
is required to stay enforcement of the foreign judgment until the ap-
peal is concluded, the time for appeal has expired or the stay of execu-
tion expires or is vacated. 70 The protections of the UEFJA are
available only if the judgment creditor elects to register the foreign
judgment in accordance with its terms. However, "the right of a judg-
ment creditor to bring an action to enforce his judgment instead of
proceeding under this act remains unimpaired.' 171
Enforcement of agency decisions are subject to discretionary
stays during the pendency of proceedings for review, "upon such
terms as it deems proper."7 Such stays may be granted by the
agency itself or the reviewing court.' 73 A narrow exception to the dis-
cretion of the reviewing court or agency in connection with the sus-
pension of agency decisions is provided when the enforcement of the
agency's determination would "result in present, continuous and ir-
reparable impairment of the constitutional rights of the applicant.'1 74
168. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 715 (West 1988). Execution of such judgments can be sus-
pended until the appeal is determined or until the period for perfecting a valid appeal has ex-
pired. Id. The UFMJRA does not prevent recognition of foreign judgments in situations not
covered. Id. § 716.
169. Id. §§ 719-726 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). The UEFJA deals only with the judgments of
courts of the United States and of sister states (that is courts whose proceedings are entitled to
full faith and credit in Oklahoma). Id. § 720. Thus, the scope and purpose of the UEFJA is
substantially distinct from that of the UFMJRA; the former was designed to decrease the bur-
den of enforcing judgments entitled to full faith and credit, the latter was enacted to expedite the
recognition of foreign nation money judgments in most instances. See Willhite v. Willhite, 546
P.2d 612 (Okla. 1976) (discussing the differences between the two uniform laws). For a discus-
sion of the UEFJA, see Lawrence & Milbrath, supra note 167, at 98-106.
170. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 723(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
171. Id. § 725. As such, the remedies under the UEFJA are both optional and cumulative.
Hudson v. Hudson, 569 P.2d 521, 523 (Okla. 1976). There are, thus, two methods of enforcing
foreign judgments in Oklahoma, by registration pursuant to the UEFJA and by a common-law
action on the foreign judgment. See First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. Riggs, 692 P.2d 1358,
1361-1362 (Okla. 1984) (holding that a money judgment obtained in Colorado filed in Oklahoma
under UEFJA is subject to Oklahoma statute of limitations on enforcement). In support actions,
a further remedy is afforded under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, OKLA.
STAT. ArNN. tit. 43, §§ 301 et seq. (West 1990). See Hudson, supra, at 523.
172. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 319(1) (West 1987).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 319(2). This exception may be ordered either by the reviewing court or the agency
itself. Id. § 319(1).
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In such a case, suspension of the agency determination is mandatory
upon the filing of a supersedeas bond in amount sufficient to cover
injuries to adverse parties and the public resulting from the stay.175
Suspension of the effectiveness of orders of the Banking Board or the
Bank Commissioner lies within the discretion of the Supreme
Court.176
Thus far, only suspension of judgments and final orders have
been considered. However, appealable interlocutory orders are sub-
ject to stay pending appeal under certain circumstances.177 If the or-
der appealed discharges or modifies an attachment or temporary
injunction and it becomes operative, then the undertaking originally
given at the time of the granting of the attachment or temporary in-
junction automatically stays the enforcement of the order until the
effective date of a final order of discharge. 78 Statutory law also ap-
pears to permit suspension as-of-right of orders granting temporary
injunctions during the pendency of an appeal thereof, upon the post-
ing of an undertaking approved by the court. 7 9 The Supreme Court,
however, has interpreted the statute as permitting only discretionary
stays of the effectiveness of temporary injunctions. 80 Likewise, stays
of pendente lite arrangements for custody, alimony and support pay-
ments, for which no automatic stays are allowed, are permitted only in
the discretion of the court.' 8' For receivership proceedings, a bond is
required for suspension but not to appeal the order approving or re-
fusing to approve appointment of a receiver. 82 Not all orders relating
175. Id. § 319 (2). The statute provides for an automatic stay if the application for stay is not
acted upon within 45 days, the application was accompanied by a proposal for a supersedeas
bond, and the application was commenced at the time the bond proposed is filed.
176. Id. at tit. 6, § 207(C) (West 1988). The party seeking stay must meet a "cause shown"
standard. Mf
177. See id. at tit. 12, § 993 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
178. Id. § 993(B).
179. Id. § 993(C).
180. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Owens, 555 P.2d 879, 881-882 (Okla. 1976).
181. See Jones v. Jones, 612 P.2d 266 (Okla. 1980) (holding that in a matrimonial action in
which no alimony was allowed, trial court has the authority to entertain wife's post decree appli-
cation for alimony and counsel fees after husband's appeal from divorce decree had been
brought to the Supreme Court); Blair v. District Court of Oklahoma County, 594 P.2d 367
(Okla. 1979) (holding that trial court retained jurisdiction pending appeal of divorce to consider
application for alimony pendente lite); Enyart v. Comfort, 591 P.2d 709 (Okla. 1979) (ruling that
trial court has power to consider motion to modify child custody, based on changed conditions,
during the pendency of an appeal from the then-current custody order); Cochran v. Rambo, 484
P.2d 500, 501 (Okla. 1971) (noting that stay provision of [OKaA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1282 (West 1988
& Supp. 1993)] does not divest the trial court of its right to temporarily provide and care for
children during pendency of appeal of a divorce decree).
182. OKa. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 993(D) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); Cameron v. White, 262
P. 664, 670-671 (Okla. 1928) ("Therefore, the failure to give supersedeas bond in such a case as
1993]
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to the appointment of a receiver are appealable. The Oklahoma
courts have made clear that they will not broadly read the statute per-
mitting appeals of such orders. Only orders of the trial court refusing
to appoint or refusing to vacate the appointment of a receiver are ap-
pealable. Appeals directly from an order of appointment are not im-
mediately reviewable, and supersedeas is unavailable in such cases. 183
b. House Bill 1468 Changes
Parallelling its approach to the automatic stay provisions of sec-
tion 990.3, House Bill 1468 creates a complex framework for deter-
mining the availability of discretionary stays. This framework is based
on the creation of two distinct classes of judgments for which such
stays may be available. Like its counterpart in section 990.3(C), new
section 900.4(C) identifies a number of proceedings for which the stat-
ute creates a presumption against the availability of automatic stay,
but with respect to which the trial court retains discretionary authority
to stay the effectiveness of the judgment. The section represents an
attempt to clearly identify the proceedings which are not subject to
stays as of right. The result, however, may be additional complexity.
The actions identified consist of some, but not all of the actions identi-
fied in new section 990.3(C) and for which a statutory presumption
against automatic stay is created."s While many of the proceedings
identified have traditionally been categorized as proceedings where
this-the only effect would be to permit the receiver to act, to take possession of the property
and to perform the duties of his office."). See also Commerce Bank of Kansas City v. Chadwell,
635 P.2d 609, 610 (Okla. 1981) (dismissing appeal, court confirms that case law from prior to
enactment of OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 993 is still good law; the court reapplies old case law
interpreting now-repealed OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1558 (1961) to the receivership provisions of
§ 993(D)).
183. See Commerce Bank of Kansas City v. Chadwell, 635 P.2d 609, 610 (Okla. 1981) (dis-
missing appeal from order of appointment where no evidence in record of denial of motion to
vacate appointment).
184. Compare OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 990.3(C) (enumerating 17 causes of action), with Ou..A.
STAT. tit. 21, 990.4(C) (enumerating 11 of the same 17 causes of action). While an argument can
be made that discretionary stays are unavailable for the causes of action omitted from § 990.4(C)
but included in § 990.3(C), the better argument is that such actions may be stayed pursuant to
the catch-all discretionary stay power of courts under § 990.3(D). In light of the broad language
of § 990.3(D), it would be difficult to argue that the legislature meant to eliminate the court's
power to stay its judgments in certain cases by mere implication. See Committee Comments to
§ 990.4, at note 41, above. Moreover such an action would be beyond the power of the legisla-
ture under the separation of powers doctrine. See National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Owens, 555 P.2d 879 (Okla. 1976). The result, of course, is odd, because while §§ 990.3(C) and
990.4(C) created a class of judgments for which stays ought to be difficult to obtain, some of the
causes of action for which automatic stays are presumptively unavailable will be presumptively
entitled to discretionary stay upon a filing of a notice of appeal or motion for new trial.
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there is no right to a stay.185 But the enumerated proceedings also
appear to include actions not traditionally subject to the discretionary
stay rules. Thus, under prior law, an award in a spousal property divi-
sion, as distinguished from child support or alimony was subject to a
stay of execution by a supersedeas bond as a matter of right.'86 Under
new section 900.4(C) such awards might conceivably come under "ac-
tions for divorce" or "post-decree matrimonial proceedings," in con-
nection with either of which only discretionary stays are available.
Likewise, the new statute overturns old case law which held that the
appellant had the right to suspend judgment in a paternity action.'1 7
In addition to the proceedings for which limited discretionary
power to stay judgment is provided, new section 990.4(D) creates a
second class of judgments for which discretionary stays are available.
This section acts, like its prior law counterpart, as a catch-all provi-
sion. In all actions not specified in any of the previous sections of the
provision, any judgment, decree or final order may be stayed in the
discretion of the court, and upon the terms set by the court.'8  In
other respects, the law of discretionary stays accords with prior case
law which held that the courts have inherent authority to control their
judgments and to suspend their effectiveness. 8 9 While the catch-all
provision under the new law might seem to cover all other actions, it is
unlikely to be so broadly construed. Like its predecessor, this section
will not disturb the special stay rules currently in effect. Thus, the
amendment leaves undisturbed the manner specified for the stay of
enforcement of out-of-state judgments under the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act ("UFMJRA") as enacted in
Oklahoma, and the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
("UEFJA"). 190 Enforcement of agency decisions is subject to discre-
tionary stays during the pendency of proceedings for review by the
agency or the reviewing court, "upon such terms as it deems
185. Thus, for instance, the cluster of money payments and child custody determinations
which are ancillary to the determination of a divorce have been subject to discretionary stay, not
stays as of right. E.g., Wilks v. Wilks, 632 P.2d 759 (Okla. 1981) and discussion above at notes 36,
39, 157, and 160. Under prior law there was no right to a stay of temporary injunctions. Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Owens, 555 P.2d 879, 881-882 (Okla. 1976).
186. Ford v. Ford, 696 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985).
187. Ex parte Lowery, 231 P. 86, 87 (Okla. 1924); but see State v. McCain, 637 P.2d 72, 74
(Okla. 1981) (holding that trial court has continuing jurisdiction to determine matters respecting
support which are ancillary to paternity claim during appeal).
188. Prior law worked substantially the same way. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 974.1 (West
1988 & Supp. 1993).
189. Mapeo., Inc. v. Means, 538 P.2d 593, 595 (Okla. 1975).
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proper."'191 Suspension of the effectiveness of orders of the Banking
Board or the Bank Commissioner lies within the discretion of the
Supreme Court. 9' Stays of appealable interlocutory orders, other
than temporary injunctions (already discussed) remain substantially
unchanged, 93 as do the provisions governing stays of pendente lite ar-
rangements for custody, alimony and support payments.
4. Discharge of Lien and Suspension by Payment of
Judgement
The relationship between judgment liens and suspensions of judg-
ments has had a somewhat confusing history in Oklahoma. The ex-
tent to which a judgment lien actually acts to suspend the effectiveness
of a judgment, muddled under prior law, has been clarified by House
Bill 1468, making it easier for judgment debtors in money judgment
cases to simultaneously discharge a judgment lien and obtain a stay of
execution. Unfortunately, the new law retains the foibles of prior law
with respect to the effect of accepting the benefits of a judgment (the
loss of the right to appeal) versus paying the judgment creditor during
the course of an appeal (the loss of the right to appeal depends on the
state of mind of the appellant at the time payment is made).
a. Prior Law
Judgments can be inconvenient, even during the pendency of an
appeal, and even after a stay has been obtained (whether or not as-of-
right). They are especially so to a solvent judgment debtor contem-
plating transactions in real property who is faced with a filed judgment
lien. 194 Oklahoma permits judgments of state courts of record to be
liens on the real estate of the judgment debtor upon the filing of a
191. Id. at tit. 75, § 319(1) (West 1987).
192. Id. at tit. 6, § 207(C) (West 1988). The party seeking stay must meet a "cause shown"
standard. Id.
193. House Bill 1468, § 22, amending OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 993.
194. The Supreme Court in discussing the effects of a pre-judgment attachment of real prop-
erty, succinctly described the effects of attachment in words equally applicable to judgment liens:
For a property owner.. ., attachment ordinarily clouds title; impairs the ability to sell
or otherwise alienate the property; taints any credit rating; reduces the chance of ob-
taining a home equity loan or additional mortgage; and can even place an existing
mortgage in technical default where there is an insecurity clause.
Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (1991); see Grand River Dam Auth. v. Eaton,
803 P.2d 705, 707 (Okla. 1990) (describing the potential for seizing property even after a judg-
ment lien is discharged). The judgment lien attaches only to real property; personal property is
unaffected. See First National Bank of Healdton v. Dunlap, 254 P.2d 729, 731-732 (Okla. 1972)
(holding that an oil and gas lease not real estate subject to judgment lien provisions); cf. Burch-
field v. Bevans, 242 F.2d 239, 241 (10th Cir. 1957) (interpreting Oklahoma law).
[Vol. 29:65
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certified copy of the judgment in the office of the county clerk.195
And, this right to file a judgment lien may not be abridged by order of
the trial court.196 Judgment liens, however, do not establish a security
interest in the personal property of the judgment debtor. Such a lien
is usually established by execution.197 Most importantly, for our pur-
poses, the filing of the required undertakings and the giving of ade-
quate supersedeas does not discharge the lien of judgment, it merely
tolls the period during which execution must be issued in order to
preserve the lien itself.198
While the power to lien real property may appear substantially
justified (fair) in cases where the liened property is the subject, either
directly or collaterally, of the dispute between the parties,199 it might
195. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 706 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). The purpose of the lien is to
secure the judgment debtor's obligation to pay the judgment much in the same way as a mort-
gage secures a mortgagor's obligation to pay a note. Judgment liens are especially useful where
a judgment debtor is subject to a number of judgments or other claims. The judgment lien, by
creating a security interest in property out of which the judgment might be satisfied before other
creditors (other than those with superior rights to the property) may resort to the property for
satisfaction. See Anita M. Moorman, Judgments: Getting Your Judgment and Keeping Your
Judgment, in COLLECrING JUDGMENTS IN OKLAHOMA 99, 109 (1992) (Paper presented on Sep-
tember 11, 1992, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma). The lien arises only if the certified copy of the
judgment is filed with an affidavit of judgment (a form generally available from the court clerk)
in the manner provided in the statute. The lien is effective only in the county in which it is filed.
Where a judgment creditor owns real property in several counties, multiple filings will have to be
made in order to place a lien on all of the property. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 706 (West
1988 & Supp. 1993) (judgment liens are liens within a county if properly filed); Moorman, supra,
at 110. Preservation of the lien priority of the judgment lien is subject to other requirements as
well. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 801 (West 1988) (stating judgment lien ineffective unless
an execution on the judgment is issued within one year from the date of the rendition of the
judgment); id. § 735 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (stating judgment loses its effect and ceases to
operate as a lien on real estate if execution is not issued by court clerk within five years).
196. See Farris v. Cannon, 649 P.2d 529, 530-531 (Okla. 1982) (ordering injunction of judg-
ment creditors from placing judgment of record in office of county clerk or in any other such
office within the state unauthorized by law).
197. Thus, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 734 (West 1988) provides that all real estate, not
otherwise bound by a judgment lien, and all items of personal property of a judgment debtor are
bound from the time they are seized in execution. Pursuant to section 759(A) of that title, a
certified copy of the execution must be filed in the office of the county clerk in the county or
counties to which the writ was directed and indexed like judgments. See generally, Mac D. Fin-
layson, Getting Your Money-Possessory Actions, in COLLECtinG JUDGMENTS iN OKLAHOMA
177, 193 (1992) (Paper presented on September 11, 1992, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma).
198. E.g., Jarecki Mfg. Co. v. Fleming, 64 P.2d 659, 660 (Okla. 1937) (holding that for recov-
ery in replevin action for possession of drilling tools, five year period for executing judgment
tolled during time action is appealed and judgment stayed; construing [OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 735 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993)]). In any case, because of the security requirements of bonding
companies, obtaining a supersedeas bond to suspend effectiveness may require permitting the
bonding company to secure its claim with an interest in the judgment debtor's real property. The
net effect, of course, is to leave the judgment debtor's property burdened with liens.
199. After all, it is, in those cases, the interests of the disputants in particular real property
which is the subject of the dispute. As such, that particular property ought to be made especially
available for execution.
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appear substantially less justified, given its collateral effect, where
there is no relation between the dispute and the property. Where the
judgment loser can provide other security for the payment of the judg-
ment during the pendency of an appeal the power is especially unjusti-
fiable. Oklahoma has traditionally recognized this lack of
justifiability, to a certain extent, by permitting the lien of a money
judgment to be discharged, pending appeal, by deposit of "cash suffi-
cient to cover the whole amount of the judgment, including interest,
costs, and any attorneys' fees, together with costs and interest on the
appeal."200 This cash payment must be accompanied by a written
statement indicating that the payment is made to discharge the lien of
such judgment and any lien by virtue of an attachment issued and lev-
ied in the action.20 1 Thereafter, the judgment will be paid out of the
deposit in the event it is affirmed.2° Where remedies other than
money judgments are awarded, the statutory right to discharge the
lien is not available.203
The discharge of the judgment lien in a money judgment has the
effect of suspending any execution and levy of the judgment on real
property.2 4 It thus serves as a supplement to the general rules of su-
persedeas for suspending the effectiveness of a money judgment,
again, at least as against real property. 0 5 The primary difference be-
tween them is that a supersedeas does not discharge the lien of judg-
ment against the judgment debtor's real property, the discharge of lien
200. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 706.2 (West 1988). Judgment creditors may, at any time, by mo-
tion, request that the court order the deposit of additional cash, if the judgment creditor can
show that the cash deposited is insufficient to cover the whole amount of the judgment, "includ-
ing interest, costs, and any attorneys' fees, together with costs and interest on the appeal." Id.
§ 7063.
201. Id. § 706.2; see, eg., Farris v. Cannon, 649 P.2d 529, 532 (Okla. 1982) (permitting judg-
ment creditor to secure this statutorily authorized lien discharge and explaining the nature and
scope of the discharge).
202. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 706.2 (West 1988).
203. Resort to OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 706.2 (vest 1988), which is limited, on its face, to
money judgments. Cf. R. Clark Musser, 1982 Decisions of Interest Pertaining to Real Property,
54 OKLA. BJ. 507, 512, 514 (1983).
204. Grand River Dam Auth. v. Eaton, 803 P.2d 705, 710 (Okla. 1990) (Opala, V.CJ., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); Farris v. Cannon, 649 P.2d 529, 532 (Okla. 1982); see
Steven L. Barghols, Judgment Enforcement Against Real and Personal Property: Practical Con-
siderations, 61 OKLA. B-J. 3402, 3403 (1990). However, it is hard to see, in the black letter law,
any substantial justification for this position, other than perhaps the unfairness of a contrary
result. The statutes, thus, appear to permit execution on personal property even after a judg-
ment lien on real property has been discharged. But it appears grossly unfair since in order to
obtain the discharge, the judgment creditor had to deposit the amount of the judgment with the
court clerk. Execution, even limited execution, in this context, would amount to double
payment.
205. See Grand River, 803 P.2d at 710 (Opala, V.CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
[Vol. 29:65
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provisions does.2' For a judgment debtor seeking transactions in real
property, and whose contractual obligations may be jeopardized by
the continued existence of a lien of record on real property, superse-
deas provides illusory relief and real danger; discharge of the lien by
cash deposit provides the better alternative. Where no money judg-
ment lien is filed, however, supersedeas remains the primary means of
suspending the effectiveness of money judgments. However, since
judgment liens are an effective tool for a judgment creditor, and as a
practical matter, judgment creditors are advised, and it is normal prac-
tice, to perfect their judgment liens whenever they receive judgment
in their favor, a judgment debtor will more often than not face the
prospect of having his real property liened.207 Consequently, many
judgment debtors will have a choice respecting the manner in which
they will suspend the effectiveness of adverse money judgments
against real property.
The relationship between supersedeas and discharge of judgment
liens in money judgment cases presents certain problems for practi-
tioners and the potential for sharp practice. First, discharges of judg-
ment liens do not, as a theoretical matter, apply to personal property.
As such, a judgment creditor might be able to execute against per-
sonal property even as execution is stayed as against the judgment
debtor's real property discharged from the judgment lien.2 °8 Second,
and more serious for a judgment debtor, are the problems which can
part) ("The Legislature has provided but two specific methods by which a judgment's effective-
ness may be suspended pending appeal to afford a judgment debtor protection from mid-appeal
execution and from the operation of the judgment lien law-one is by supersedeas bond and the
other is by cash deposit." (footnotes omitted)).
206. Funk v. First National Bank of Miami, 95 P.2d 589,589-590 (Okla. 1939) ("The taking of
the appeal and filing of the supersedeas bond, did not suspend or devitalize the lien of a plain-
tiff's judgment, but merely prevented the enforcement thereof against the property of [the] in-
tervenor pending determination of the appeal.") approved in Farris v. Cannon, 649 P.2d 529, 532
(Okla. 1982). Other differences exist respecting the form of undertaking, and the manner and
amount of payment necessary to make the undertaking in supersedeas or to discharge the judg-
ment lien. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 968.1 (Supp. 1993).
207. See, eg., Anita M. Moorman, Judgments: Getting Your Judgment and Keeping Your
Judgment, in COLLECrING JUDGMENTS iN OKLAHOMA 99, 109-110 (1992) (Paper presented on
September 11, 1992, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma).
208. See discussion at note 204 above. A common sense approach to this problem might be
to permit the judgment debtor to stay execution automatically upon the discharge of a judgment
lien as against all of the judgment debtor's property. The rationale for this result would be that
the judgment creditor's interest is secured by the cash deposit made to discharge the judgment
lien. However, since the effectiveness of the judgment itself has not been suspended, the pru-
dent judgment debtor might still seek a stay of execution from the court, offering the cash de-
posit in satisfaction of the required undertaking. Under prior law, though, even this was
problematical, since the required undertaking in money judgment cases was for double the
amount of the judgment and the discharge of the judgment lien was made by the deposit of the
amount of the judgment plus costs. Securing the stay with a bond might rob the judgment
:1993]
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arise from the fact that the judgment debtor is not permitted to antici-
pate the filing of a judgment lien, and seek a stay (at least as against
his real property) by seeking a discharge. It is, thus, possible to wait
until the judgment debtor has secured a supersedeas bond to stay the
effectiveness of a judgment before actually filing a judgment lien. In
order to discharge the lien (if that were necessary to effect a transac-
tion in the real property affected), the judgment debtor would be
forced to deposit an additional amount of cash with the court clerk in
accordance with the requirements of the statute or seek permission of
the court to discharge the bond and substitute a sufficient cash pay-
ment with the court in accordance with the lien discharge require-
ments. Having diverted financial resources to the procurement of the
supersedeas bond, the judgment debtor might be unable to raise suffi-
cient cash to make the required deposit. The judgment debtor, in any
case, might not have sufficient cash readily available. For a judgment
debtor needing to effect real property transactions in this context, the
cost of appeal might become large enough that abandonment or set-
tlement prior to the conclusion of the appeal might become a more
attractive alternative-even where the merits of the appeal are strong.
In this sense, at least, the appellate rules could work for the benefit of
judgment creditors irrespective of the legal merits of their position.
Another serious problem for judgment debtors arises when pay-
ment of a judgment is made directly to the judgment creditor (and not
to the clerk of the court) in order to discharge the lien of judgment.
This approach has the benefits of effectively removing a liability from
the accounting records of corporate judgment debtors, stopping the
accrual of post-judgment interest and saving the expense of securing a
surety bond. However, this type of action can have serious effects on
the viability of an appeal for the careless appellant. Traditionally,
where a contrary intent is not evidenced by the posting of a superse-
deas bond, payment of a judgment moots the appeal of the payor °9
However, in Grand River Dam Auth. v. Eaton,210 the Supreme Court
narrowed the traditional rule by holding that the payment of the judg-
ment will not moot the appeal unless it can be shown that the payment
debtor of his goal, to free real property from liens, since the bonding company might require a
lien on real property in order to guarantee the undertaking.
209. Pixley Lumber Co. v. Woodson, 556 P.2d 596, 597-98 (Okla. 1976) (explaining acquies-
cence in judgment implied where partial payment made and no supersedeas procured); see also
Grand River Dam Auth. v. Eaton, 803 P.2d 705,709 (Okla. 1990); cf, Wallace v. Boston Mutual
Life Insurance Co., 172 P.2d 629 (Okla. 1946) (explaining that payment of judgment implies
acquiescence on part of judgment debtor);
210. 803 P.2d 705 (Okla. 1990).
[Vol. 29:65
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was made with the intent to settle the case, or that the payment effec-
tively made reversal of the judgment impossible.21' While this holding
might well result in a number of disputes concerning the intent of the
judgment debtor in making the payment,212 it serves to eliminate a
trap for the careless or unwary appellant without harming the ultimate
interests of the appellee.21 3 However, the holding of Grand River
does not protect the appeal right of judgment winners who accept the
payment of a judgment. The Supreme Court carefully distinguished
from its holding, those cases mooting the appeal of litigants who had
accepted the benefits of a judgment below. 21 4
b. House Bill 1468 Changes
House Bill 1468 substantially amends the rules relating to dis-
charging judgment liens,215 but does not change prior case law rules
regarding the effect of the payment of judgments directly to judgment
211. Id. at 709-710 ("We therefore hold that unless the payment of a final judgment by a
judgment debtor is shown to be made with the intent to compromise or settle the matter and,
thus, to abandon the right to appeal or the payment in some way, not involved here, makes relief
impossible in case of reversal, the payment will not be deemed to either waive the right to appeal
or moot the controversy."). For a discussion of the case, see Charles W. Adams and J. Michael
Medina, Recent Developments in Oklahoma Civil Appellate Procedure, 26 TULSA L.J. 489, 515-
517 (1991). Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Opala suggested that the holding
be narrowed to provide for protection against dismissal in these circumstances only if the judg-
ment debtor indicated that the payment was being made "under protest," and the funds were to
be placed in an interest bearing account. Grand River, supra, at 713.
212. Grand River, 803 P.2d at 710-712 (Okla. 1990) (Opala, V.C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("The new rule has the potential of generating needless factual disputes in
every appeal in which the judgment is paid rather than being secured by one of the two author-
ized statutory methods.").
213. For a discussion of the benefits of this approach to litigants, see Adams & Medina,
supra note 211, at 516.
214. The Supreme Court has held unanimously that acceptance of the benefits of a part of a
judgment favorable to an appellant constitutes a waiver of that appellant's right to appeal as to
the other parts of the judgment. Tara Oil Co. v. Kennedy & Mitchell, Inc., 622 P.2d 1076, 1077-
78 (Okla. 1981) (discussing that appellant lost his right to appeal a pooling order by accepting a
cash bonus in lieu of a participation in the drilling of a unit well). See Robert J. Emery, Appeals
From the Corporation Commission, paper delivered at a Program entitled Oklahoma Civil Ap-
pellate Procedure, sponsored by the Oklahoma Bar Association, Department of Continuing
Legal Education, 1982 in OKLAHOMA CML APPELLATE PROCEDURE, at VI-17-18 (discussing
Tara). The Supreme Court in Grand River, in approving this rule, explained that "[w]hen the
appealing party accepts the benefits of a judgment and at the same time seeks to reverse detri-
mental parts of it the inconsistency of such conduct is generally apparent. Normally, in such a
situation the appeal should be dismissed because such acts are fatally inconsistent with proper
appellate procedure." Grand River Dam, 803 P.2d at 709 n. 2. However, commentators have
argued that the logic of Grand River might be as compelling for the recipient of the payment as
for the maker. See Adams & Medina, supra note 211, at 517.
215. See House Bill 1468, §§ 13-15, amending OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 706-706.3 (West
1988 & Supp. 1993). Amended OLa. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 706 substantially rewrites the old law
prescribing new procedures for the handling of judgment liens. A discussion of those changes is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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winners.2 16 Judgment liens are to be created by the filing of a "State-
ment of Judgment" in the office of the county clerk where the real
property is located.217 However, the new law does not substantially
alter the power of a judgment loser to discharge the lien of judgment,
or the types of judgments which are subject to the lien discharge
rules.218 The provisions have been amended to make it clear that dis-
charge is permitted on appeal to the appellate courts as well as to the
Supreme Court and that the judgment creditor may petition the trial
court (and not the appellate courts) for an increase in the amounts
deposited to discharge the lien in the event the judgment creditor can
show that the amount is insufficient.219
The amendments also seem to imply that a discharge of judgment
liens acts essentially as a stay of execution of a judgment, and that its
reimposition may act to void an existing stay of execution. 220 The new
act may make it possible to fuse supersedeas and lien discharge pro-
ceedings by making a single payment to the court clerk. The practical
merger of these two methods of staying enforcement of money judg-
ments-by supersedeas and by discharge of judgment lien-is tricky.
216. See discussion above at notes 209-214.
217. House Bill 1468, § 13, amending OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 12, § 706(A) (West 1988 &
Supp. 1993). This "Statement of Judgment" is to be prescribed by the Administrative Director
of the Courts. Id. The filing of papers other than the Statement of Judgment will not operate to
create a valid lien; although they can serve as "notice of its contents, whether or not recording is
required by law." House Bill 1468, § 13, amending OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 706(E) (new).
218. The new rules require the court clerk to place the cash deposit in an interest bearing
account, absent contrary instructions from the court. It provides the judgment creditor with a
fifteen (15) day period in which to object to the discharge of the judgment lien. It also conforms
the manner of discharge to the new judgment lien provisions of section 706. House Bill 1468,
§ 14, amending OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 706.2 (West 1988).
219. House Bill 1468, §§ 14-15, amending OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 706.2-706.3 (West
1988 & Supp. 1993).
220. Referring to the reimposition of a judgment lien upon the failure of the judgment loser
to increase the amount of his deposit, the new provision states that the "creditor may thereafter
file a Statement of Judgment, which shall create a lien effective upon its filing with the county
clerk as provided in Section 706 of this title, and may enforce the judgment against the property
of the judgment debtor including the cash previously deposited with the court clerk." House Bill
1468, § 15, amending OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 706.3 (West 1988). This language could be
interpreted to mean that the reimposition of a judgment lien permits execution of judgment even
if there exits a valid undertaking given in accordance with new OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 900.4(B).
On the other hand, the language implies that the discharge of the lien of judgment effectively
prevents execution of a judgment at least against real property. But, the purpose of judgment
liens is not to permit execution, but to preserve priority upon execution where more than one
creditor seeks satisfaction of its or their obligation from out of the real property of the judgment
debtor. Consequently, courts should interpret the language in context, despite any future temp-
tation to use the language as an excuse to modify (broaden) the effect of the judgment lien
provisions or to modify (narrow) the effect of the supersedeas provisions in a money judgment
case.
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It is possible, but only when the judgment debtor pays with cash. Pay-
ment by cash equivalent, U.S. Treasury Notes or Oklahoma General
Obligation Bonds, permitted to satisfy supersedeas requirements, re-
main ineffective means of discharging a judgment lien. Both practi-
tioners and the courts will have to exercise some care in distinguishing
one from the other in order to prevent an ineffective discharge of
judgment lien or stay of execution.221
B. The Changes to The Power to Sanction Frivolous Appeals
Traditionally, Oklahoma courts have been reluctant to adopt an
aggressive approach to the sanctioning of frivolous appeals. Holders
of the ultimate sanctioning power, affirmance or reversal of a lower
court judgment on the merits, the appellate courts have had less need
to resort to additional "punishments" of those who unnecessarily re-
sorted to the appellate process for questionable purposes. Further,
and significant in the view of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the par-
ties' right to appeal must be preserved. The power to sanction appeals
could thwart the right to appeal by unnecessarily adding to the poten-
tial cost of seeking review, and Oklahoma appellate courts have con-
sciously refrained from using the sanction power to diminish the
statutory right to appeal in this backhanded manner.22 z Thus, the re-
luctance to impose sanctions reflects the traditional consensus that the
cost of appeal ought not generally to increase because of a determina-
tion respecting the weightiness of the arguments raised on appeal.
223
However, this reluctance has not prevented the imposition of sanc-
tions, at least in the most extreme cases. As such, the possibility of
221. See Grand River Dam v. Eaton, 803 P.2d 705, 710-711 (Okla. 1990) (Opala, V.CJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
222. Thus, the TRW/REDA Pump court went out of its way to
make it plain [that] it is not our purpose to chill the filing of arguably meritorious
appeals in workers' compensation cases or any other type of litigation[,] and it would
be improper for us to attempt to do so. However,... patently frivolous appeals .... are
those which have absolutely no legitimate legal or factual basis and should not be mis-
taken for those having some arguable merit, though ultimately unsuccessful. Thus, such
appeals cannot be said to be protected by the statutory right of appeal without the
additional probability attorney fees will be extracted upon a determination of patent
frivolity.
TRW/REDA Pump v. Brewington, 829 P.2d 15, 22 (Okla. 1992).
223. Similar concerns have resulted in the substantial modification of the sanctioning rules
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under rules changes effective December
31, 1993. The Committee Comments explain that among the purposes of the revisions was the
effort to decrease the resort to the rule "to emphasize the merits of a party's position, to extract
an unjust settlement, to intimidate an adversary into withdrawing contentions that are fairly
debatable, to increase the costs of litigation, [or] to create a conflict of interest between attorney
and client .... ." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (Committee Notes 1993 Amendment).
1993]
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sanctions retains its effect as a potentially costly element of any ap-
peal. And the uncertainty of the size of this risk of imposition of this
cost increases to the extent that meritlessness depends on a post facto
characterization by the court reviewing the lower court's determina-
tion. -4 House Bill 1468 provides the judiciary with a potentially pow-
erful new weapon to use against what it may consider frivolous
appeals. It remains to be seen to what extent the appellate courts will
actually utilize this new authority. I first consider traditional sources
of the appellate sanctioning power. I then examine the new authority
to sanction frivolous appeals provided by House Bill 1468.
1. Prior Law
Traditionally, Oklahoma has recognized both a common law and
a statutory source for the power to "punish" litigants interposing friv-
olous appeals. 2 The common law source of the power to sanction
litigants bringing meritless appeals derives from a well established ex-
ception to the "American Rule," 6 that recognizes that a court has
the inherent equitable power to award attorneys' fees whenever over-
riding considerations make such an award just. Generally, these over-
riding equitable considerations have been limited to findings that the
sanctioned party acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for op-
pressive reasons.' Monetary awards are not the only means of deal-
ing with meritless appeals under the common law authority of courts.
224. See Harlan Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J.
62 (1985).
225. See, e.g., Melinder v. Southlands Dev., Inc., 715 P.2d 1341 (Okla. 1985) (taxing as costs
attorneys' fees in favor of appellee for defending frivolous and vexatious appeal brought in bad
faith and for delay only under court's inherent powers and pursuant to [OKLA. STAT. AN. tit.
20, § 15.1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993)]).
226. The American Rule provides that attorneys' fees are not allowed as costs to a prevailing
party in the absence of statutory or specific contractual authority or where such fees are consid-
ered part of the damages suffered by a party. See, e.g. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Society, 421 U.S. 240,257-259 (1975); City National Bank and Trust Co. v. Owens, 565 P.2d 4,7-9
(Okla. 1977) (awarding attorneys' fees against plaintiff who dismissed case without prejudice
after the presentation of all of the evidence at trial); TRW/REDA Pump v. Brewington, 829 P.2d
15, 22 (Okla. 1992) (awarding attorneys' fees for frivolous appeal pursuant to statute). "The
American Rule where each litigant bears the cost of his/her legal representation is firmly estab-
lished in Oklahoma and courts are without authority to award attorney fees in the absence of a
specific statute or contract." Id. See also Kay v. Venezuelan Sun Oil Co., 806 P.2d 648, 650
(Okla. 1991) (dicta, but see cases cited therein in support of the proposition).
227. See, eg., Best v. State, 736 P.2d 171 (Okla. App. 1987) (noting costs may be awarded
against party making frivolous appeal); Melinder v. Southlands Dev., Inc., 715 P.2d 1341 (Okla.
1985) ("The Court agrees with appellee's suggestion that this appeal is brought in bad faith and
only for the oppressive purpose of delay .... The Court therefore taxes as costs attorneys' fees
in favor of appellee and against appellant."); City National Bank and Trust Co. v. Owens, 565
P.2d 4,7 (Okla. 1977) ("Courts have long recognized that attorney fees may be awarded when an
[Vol. 29:65
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The appellate courts also have inherent authority to dismiss frivolous
appeals." The standard on which appeals are dismissed for frivolous-
ness is broader than that used to assess common-law monetary sanc-
tions. Thus, appellate courts have dismissed appeals not only when
they found the appeal undertaken for delay, oppression, vexation or
in bad faith, but also when the court determined that the appeal was
meritless.1 9 Generally, dismissals of frivolous appeals have been
granted on motion by the appellee.230
The American Rule limitations (and its exceptions) do not apply
when the courts are given statutory authority to award attorneys fees.
Oklahoma has provided such statutory authority in connection with
opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reason."). This stan-
dard is subjective, permitting analysis of the motives and intent of the sanctioned litigant. Con-
trast the objective standard under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, U.S. Industries,
Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1244 (10th Cir. 1988) (using objective standard to
impose sanctions under FED. R. APP. P. 38), and Oklahoma statutes permitting the imposition of
appellate sanctions. TRW/REDA Pump v. Brewington, 829 P.2d 15,23 (Okla. 1992) (using ob-jective standard to impose sanctions under [OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 15.1 (West 1988 & Supp.
1993]).
228. Strode v. Abshire, 283 P.2d 842,843 (Okla. 1955) (granting motion to dismiss appeal on
grounds that appeal "frivolous and without serious merit" where the only issue presented was
the prejudice of the judge at the trial court level and the petition was filed late); Edmonds v.
White, 225 P.2d 359 (Okla. 1950 (holding that a motion to dismiss appeal on grounds that the
appeal was without merit and for delay will only be granted where the appellant failed to abide
the judgment of the Supreme Court on remand to the trial court); Christner v. Christner, 224
P.2d 594 (Okla. 1950) (granting motion to dismiss appeal on frivolousness grounds where the
appellant appealed from the effects of a prior judgment which became res judicata in the case at
bar). See also Scaggs v. Barker, 256 P.2d 428 (Okla. 1953) (dismissing as frivolous appeal on
supersedeas bond where court found no meritorious defense at trial or appellate level);
Whelchel v. Hembree, 205 P.2d 279 (Okla. 1949); Skirvin v. Goldstein, 137 P. 1176, 1177 (Okla.
1914) (dismissing appeal on frivolousness grounds where only error assessed went to sufficiency
of evidence).
229. See Baker v. Marcus, 228 P.2d 633 (Okla. 1951) (holding appeal was without merit
where cursory examination of record, motion to dismiss, and brief presented no grounds for
appeal); Edmonds v. White, 225 P.2d 359 (Okla. 1950) (finding appeal meritless and only for
delay where appellant failed to abide Supreme Court's judgment remand); Christner v. Christ-
ner, 224 P.2d 594 (Okla. 1950) (precluding issues on appeal because of prior final judgment and
meritless appeal filed for delay only); Turk Bros. v. Brewer, 11 P.2d 926, 927-928 (Okla. 1932)
(dismissing appeal as frivolous where judgment was on a promissory note); Jordan Furniture Co.
v. Graham, 10 P.2d 394, 396 (Okla. 1932) (dismissing breach of employment contract appeal as
frivolous); Skirvin v. Goldstein, 137 P. 1176, 1177 (Okla. 1914) (dismissing appeal as frivolous
where only error raised went to sufficiency of evidence and failure to grant new trial).
230. See Strode v. Abshire, 283 P.2d 842 (Okla. 1955) (dismissing appeal); Scaggs v. Barker,
256 P.2d 428 (Okla. 1953) (dismissing as frivolous appeal from judgment on supersedeas bond
where no meritorious defense presented at trial or on appeal); Berry v. Crutchmer, 239 P.2d 402,
403 (Okla. 1952) (dismissing appeal of order garnishment because error raised ignored well es-
tablished law); Christner v. Christner, 224 P.2d 594 (Okla. 1950) (dismissing appeal as frivolous);
Whelchel v. Hembree, 205 P.2d 279 (Okla. 1949) (noting it was not court's duty to search for
theory supporting and court could dismiss appeal as taken for delay only). See also Howe v.
Farmers' and Merchants' Bank of Eufaula, 19 P.2d 961 (Okla. 1933) (stating an appeal should be
dismissed where it appears from record that appeal is frivolous and for delay only).
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frivolous appeals. "On any appeal to the Supreme Court, the prevail-
ing party may petition the court for an additional attorney fee for the
cost of the appeal. In the event that the Supreme Court or its desig-
nee finds that the appeal is without merit, any additional fee may be
taxed as costs."'' 1 As the statute makes clear, the only monetary
sanction the court is permitted to make is the taxing of attorneys'
fees.P 2 Additionally, the courts must await a petition for fees under
the statute in order to impose this sanction, the statute makes no pro-
vision for sua sponte action by the courts. 3
The standard for determining whether an appeal is frivolous
enough to warrant the imposition of statutory sanctions has been at
once both fairly ambiguous and strictly applied. 4  Traditionally, no
standard or general rule had been articulated for determining when an
appeal lacked "merit." 5  Instead, the older decisions imposed sanc-
tions on a case by case basis and in a conclusory manner. Thus, ap-
peals were characterized as "without merit" when no material fact or
issue was in dispute," 6 when no law or theory of law supported the
claims made,2 7 when the appeal sought a reweighing of evidence
which must be accorded substantial deference on appeal,238 when the
231. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 15.1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). An additional statutory
provision for the imposition of sanctions permits the trial court, on motion in certain cases (dam-
ages for personal injuries or to personal rights), to assess up to an additional $10,000 in damages
for reasonable costs, including attorneys' fees, when it determines that the non-prevailing party
acted in bad faith, or failed to ground the claim or defense on existing law, or on a good faith
argument for the modification thereof. Id. at tit. 23, § 103 (West 1987).
232. See, e.g., Hervey v. American Airlines, 720 P.2d 712, 713 (Okla. 1987); Local Federal
Savings v. Burkhalter, 735 P.2d 1202, 1206 (Okla. App. 1987) (holding meritless appeal of sum-
mary judgment entitled defending party to attorneys' fees under § 15.1).
233. The result, of course, is that appellees have an incentive to seek imposition of attorneys'
fees under OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 15.1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) even in marginal cases.
Such a motion for attorneys' fees increases the potential cost to the appellant of pursuing appeal
and alerts the court that the appeal may be meritless.
234. "[W]e recognize statutes allowing a prevailing party to recover attorney[s'] fees are
strictly applied by this Court." TRW/REDA Pump v. Brewington, 829 P.2d 15,22 (Okla. 1992).
235. See, eg., Melinder v. Southlands Dev., Inc., 715 P.2d 1341 (Okla. 1985); Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Co. v. Pratt, 795 P.2d 115, 116-117 (Okla. App. 1990); Local Federal Savings v.
Burkhalter, 735 P.2d 1202, 1205 (Okla. App. 1987).
236. Burkhalter, 735 P.2d at 1205. "We agree with Plaintiff that Defendants' arguments con-
stitute an attack on the commercial banking system utilized by the financial institutions of this
nation, by the United States Government itself, and by virtually every individual and business in
this country. Defendants contend the system is unlawful and, for the most part, is unconstitu-
tional. We hold such arguments to be without merit." Id.
237. Hervey, 720 P.2d at 712. (Okla. 1987) (characterizing as patently frivolous and vexatious
theory that air carrier had legal duty to warn purchasers of air travel vacation packages of
weather conditions during time tickets sold).
238. TRW/REDA Pump v. Brewington, 829 P.2d 15, 25-27 (Okla. 1992) (holding appeal is
not invitation to reweigh evidence and substitute judgment of appellate court for that of lower
court); Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Pratt, 795 P.2d 115 (Okla. App. 1990) (awarding attor-
neys' fees for employer's challenge of substantially unreviewable finding of lower court); Tyson
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appeal sought review on a theory not presented or preserved below,239
or when the appeal seeks review on immaterial grounds, 40 or where
the appeal sought to ignore well established law.241 Appeals were also
adjudged "meritless" when they fell within the common law exception
to the American Rule, and found to be brought in bad faith, vexa-
tiously, wantonly or for oppressive purposes.242
With TRW/REDA Pump v. Brewington decision,243  the
Oklahoma courts substantially amplified their frivolous appeals juris-
prudence, providing a substantial amount of guidance on a genera-
lized level. In crafting this guidance, the Oklahoma Court
demonstrated a willingness to borrow significantly from the sanctions
jurisprudence of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. An ap-
peal is "meritless" within the meaning of the statute when it has "no
reasonable or legitimate legal or factual basis to support it."'  To
determine the meritlessness of an appeal, the court must look to the
appeal as a whole to make its determination. Applying an objective
test, the court can impose sanctions only "if there are no debateable
issues upon which reasonable minds might differ and the appeal is so
totally devoid of merit that there is no reasonable possibility of rever-
sal. ' 245 The court emphasized that the standard enunciated for pun-
ishing meritless appeals was not the same as the standard for imposing
common law sanctions under the exception to the American Rule.246
The TRW/REDA Pump Court explained that the the purpose of
Foods, Inc. v. Guthrie, 773 P.2d 769,771 (Okla. App. 1989) (dismissing as frivolous appeal based
on sufficiency of evidence); Thompson v. Duke Const. Co., 681 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Okla. App.
1984) (stating factual determinations of Worker's Compensation Court could not be disturbed
when supported by competent evidence).
239. TRWIREDA Pump, 829 P.2d at 24-25.
240. Thompson v. Duke Const. Co., 681 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Okla. App. 1984) (holding immate-
rial appellant's contention that order of trial court was "vague and uncertain" for requiring reim-
bursement to claimant for extra pair of work boots).
241. TRWIREDA Pump, 829 P.2d at 27-28. ("TRW cannot simply ignore the law without the
probability a determination will be made that arguments which do ignore well established law
will be deemed patently frivolous.").
242. See, e.g., Hervey v. American Airlines, 720 P.2d 712, 713 (Okla. 1986) (holding appeal
vexatious, frivolous, and wholly without merit); Melinder v. Southlands Dev., Inc., 715 P.2d 1341
(Okla. 1985) (holding appeal brought in bad faith and for oppressive purposes only).
243. 829 P.2d 15, 22 (Okla. 1992).
244. Id. at 22.
245. Id. at 23.
246. "We note [OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 15.1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993)] as it concerns the
allowance of appellate attorney fees is not coextensive with the bad faith or oppressive conduct
exception to the American Rule found in cases like City National Bank and Trust Co. v. Owens,
565 P.2d 4 (Okla. 1977), although there may often be overlap between the statutory basis for an
award under § 15.1 and the common law exception found in Owens." TRW/REDA Pump, 829
P.2d at 23.
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this provision is to eliminate appeals which "have no place in the legal
or appellate system. Rather than benefitting the public or the judicial
system, such appeals merely take valuable resources and time away
from those cases having some arguable merit, which should be the
ones given detailed study by the appellate bench."'247 But, the real
cost to the appellate courts may be the time devoted to responding to
an increasing number of sanctions motions for the filing of allegedly
frivolous appeals, most of which will (ought to be) denied.24 s Such
sanctions, even when imposed, are generally imposed on the litigant.
To the extent the attorney could be punished, it would be perhaps in
an action for malpractice, and for violation of the rules of professional
conduct. 249
247. TRWIREDA Pump v. Brewington, 829 P.2d 15, 23 (Okla. 1992). In this respect, the
courts have clearly identified a significant cost in terms of judicial resources of liberal anti-final-
ity rules, such as those which create incentives to appeal trial court determinations, especially
those that appellate courts would not consider worth their time or trouble. This attitude mirrors
the attention of some commentators. See, eg, RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRI-
ss AND REFORm 59-166, 317-320 (1985) (asserting quantity endangers quality of federal justice);
Michael Vitiello, The Appellate Lawyer's Role in the Caseload Crisis, 58 Miss. L.J. 437, 470-479
(1988) (urging lawyers to more actively police themselves); Howard, Query: Are Heavy
Caseloads Changing the Nature of Appellate Justice? 66 JUDICATURE 57 (1987); John A. Martin
& Elizabeth A. Prescott, The Magnitude and Sources of Delay in Ten State Appellate Courts, 6
Jusr. Svs. J. 305 (1981) (arguing for strict rule enforcement and case management on theory that
court organization and process more important than volume in explaining delays). On the other
hand, appellate court judges already minimize the risk of poor judicial resource use by summa-
rily disposing cases deemed meritless. Even the real judicial cost of diversion of support person-
nel may be minimal. The same courts that exhort the bar against the evils of frivolous appeals
make clear that such appeals, at least those egregious enough to warrant sanctions, are fairly
rare. See, e.g., TRW/REDA Pump, at 22-23.
248. Courts and commentators have noted the increasing burden of this type of ancillary
motion practice in appeals. See, e.g., J. Michael Medina, Ethical Issues in Appellate Litigation-
A Survey, in 1 OKLAHOMA APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: PRACTICE IN THE
OKLAHoMA AND TENTH CIRcurr APPELLATE SYSTEMs 5 (sponsored by Oklahoma Bar Associa-
tion and the University of Oklahoma College of Law Continuing Legal Education Department)
(Spring 1993); William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look,
104 F.R.D. 181, 183 (1985) (fearing increasing ancillary FED.R.Civ.P. 11 litigation); cf. Stephen
B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U.
PA. L. REv. 1925, 1955-1962 (1989) (FED. R. Crv. P. 11 context). To the extent that the courts
increase the possibility that an opponent will be sanctioned for filing a losing appeal, the courts
increase a cost (or the risk) of appeal. Such a risk (and its inherent costs) can be approximated
and applied to determine the value of pursuing appellate remedies. The cost to the judgment
winner of the bringing of an appeal may be greater than the additional cost that sanctions hold
for those who bring the appeal.
249. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, App. 3-A, Rule 3.1 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993) ("A lawyer
shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a
basis for doing so that is not frivolous... "); State v. Elrod, 780 P.2d 696 (Okla. 1989) (sus-
pending a lawyer for 90 days for failing to reveal that lawsuit was groundless). See DAVID J.
MEISELMAN, ATroRmv MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 15.4 (1980); Ronald E. Mal-
len, The Litigation Attorney-Areas of Liability in PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF TRIAL LAW-
YERs: THE MALPRACnCE QUESTION 22, 27 (A.B.A. Section on Insurance, Negligence and
Compensation Law 1977); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1992) ("A law-
yer shall not bring or defend a proceeding or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is
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2. House Bill 1468 Changes
House Bill 1468 does not change prior law respecting a court's
response to frivolous appeals. Rather, it has added a new statutory
basis for the imposition of appellate sanctions.250 The Committee
Comments to new Section 995 indicate that the statute is modeled
after Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,251 and that
the new statute is consistent with current Oklahoma law.252 The most
significant impact of the new legislation should be to expand the reach
of the sanctioning powers of the appellate courts and the flexibility of
the courts to assess sanctions, permitting the imposition of such sanc-
tions in appropriate cases,2 3 where under old law the courts might
a basis for doing so that is not frivolous."); MODEL RuLE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC
7-8 (1980). Other states following the MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT have im-
posed a variety of sanctions on lawyers interposing frivolous actions. See, e.g., People v. Kane,
655 P.2d 390 (Colo. 1982) (3 year suspension); In re Jafree, 444 N.E. 2d 143 (Ill. 1982) (disbar-
ment for bringing more than 40 frivolous and defamatory suits); In re Paauwe, 654 P.2d 1117
(Or. 1982) (30 day suspension); In re Cairo, 338 N.W. 2d 703 (Wis. 1983) (revocation of license
for bringing frivolous action); In re Lauer, 324 N.W. 2d 432 (1982) (reprimand for advancing
unwarranted claim).
250. House Bill 1468, § 24, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 995.
251. FED. R. App. P. 38 provides: "[I]f a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is
frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee." The Committee
comments to the rule indicates that the finding of frivolousness under the rule does not depend
on a showing that the appeal resulted in delay, and that "damages are awarded by the court in its
discretion in the case of a frivolous appeal as a matter of justice to the appellee and as a penalty
against the appellant." FED. R. APP. P. 38 (Notes of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules,
1967 Adoption).
252. The Committee comments are quite instructive and are reproduced in full here:
This Section is derived from Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, and it is consis-
tent with prior Oklahoma law authorizing the dismissal of frivolous appeals. Berry v.
Crutchmer, 205 Okla. 528,239 P.2d 402 (1950) ("[W]here a motion to dismiss has been
filed on the ground that the appeal is ... without merit such appeal will be dis-
missed."); Thlsa Defense Houses, Inc. v. Copeland, 206 Okla. 581, 243 P.2d 696 (1950).
This Section reinforces the authority of appellate courts to dismiss frivolous appeals
and also provide appellate courts with authority to impose sanctions for frivolous ap-
peals. See also Okla. Stat. tit. 20, § 15.1 (1991) (authorizing an appellate court that
finds an appeal to be without merit to tax an additional fee as costs). Like trial courts,
appellate courts should exercise restraint in imposing sanctions in order not to chill the
adversary process. Sanctions should not be imposed on account of an honest mistake
or where an appeal is filed and prosecuted in good faith. Sanctions may be appropriate
where an appeal is filed solely for delay or for the purpose of disrupting proceedings in
the trial court. The last sentence is intended to make it clear that the same remedies of
dismissal and imposition of sanctions are available for the filing of frivolous cross-ap-
peals and original proceedings in the appellate courts as are available for the filing of
frivolous appeals.
House Bill 1468, § 24, codified as OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 995 (Committee Comments) (manu-
script, on file with the author).
253. "[A]s a matter of justice to the appellee and as a penalty against the appellant." FED. R.
App. P. 38 (Notes of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, 1967 Adoption). See Robert J.
Martineau, Frivolous Appeals: The Uncertain Federal Response, 1984 DuKE LJ. 845 (suggesting
a standard for imposition of sanctions under FED. R. Ap. P. 38 and a revision of the rule). Like
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have been unable to reach. 54
First, to the extent that Oklahoma courts choose to import fed-
eral case law interpreting FED. R. APP. P. 38 to interpret new section
995, the standard for determining frivolousness may be relaxed, at
least a bit. The Committee comments to section 995 encourage the
use of federal case law for purposes of interpretation. The federal
rule of frivolous appeals has been extensively considered by the fed-
eral courts. While there exists some inconsistencies in the application
of FED. R. APP. P. 38 between the circuits,2 5 some general patterns
have emerged. Under the federal rules, an appeal is deemed frivolous
if the result is obvious or the arguments of error are wholly without
merit.5 6 A federal court in Oklahoma has held that the test for deter-
mining whether an action is frivolous is whether the plaintiff can make
a rational argument on the law or the facts to support his claim.257
FED. R. APP. P. 38 has been applied in a variety of contexts, especially
in the First, Seventh and Ninth Circuits. Examples of meritless ap-
peals or appeals with obvious results include claims precluded by prin-
ciples of claim preclusion,1 8 by the running of the statute of
limitations,259 claims which in the appellate court's opinion, quibbled
the Oklahoma courts, the federal courts determine appropriateness by reference to the wasteful-
ness (of time and resources) of conduct sought to be sanctioned. See Asberry v. United States
Postal Service, 692 F.2d 1378, 1382 (Fed. 1982) (stating frivolous appeals waste taxpayer money,
diminish opportunity for careful consideration of meritorious appeals, and delay access to
courts); TRW/REDA Pump v. Brewington, 829 P.2d 15, 23 (Okla. 1992).
254. See House Bill 1468, § 24, codified as OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 995 (Committee Comments)
(manuscript, on file with the author), reproduced above at note 252.
255. For an early discussion of the different approaches to sanctions taken by the federal
courts of appeals, see Robert J. Martineau and Patricia A. Davidson, Frivolous Appeals in the
Federal Courts: The Ways of the Circuits, 34 AM. U. L. Rv. 603 (1985).
256. See, e.g., Autorama Corps. v. Stewart, 802 F.2d 1284,1287-88 (10th Cir. 1986) (consider-
ing sanctions both under the bad faith exception to the American Rule and the federal appellate
rules and noting the standards are are different); FDIC v. Van Laanen, 769 F.2d 666, 667 (10th
Cir. 1985) (dismissing as frivolous appeal where result was obvious or arguments of error wholly
without merit). Federal and state courts have held that they have the inherent power to impose
sanctions on litigants and their attorneys as a consequence of their authority to regulate their
docket, promote judicial efficiency, and control against the filing of frivolous appeals. See, e.g.,
Clark v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 744 F.2d 1447, 1448 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding claim
legally frivolous because arguments were timeworn and were advanced in spite of well estab-
lished law). In this respect, the federal standard for the determination of the frivolousness of an
appeal is substantially similar to the standard traditionally enunciated in Oklahoma.
257. See, e.g., Davis v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections, 516 F.Supp. 5, 7 (W.D.Okla.
1980) (dismissing as frivolous prisoner's action for damages for injuries resulting from ingestion
of substance smuggled into prison because court determined prisoner could not make a rational,
supporting argument on law or facts).
258. Garza v. Westergren, 908 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1990); Ellingson v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,
653 F.2d 1327, 1332 (9th Cir. 1981).
259. Casagrande v. Agoritsas, 748 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 1984); McConnell v. Crithlow, 661
F.2d 116, 118 (9th Cir. 1981) (failing to omit individual defendants against whom claims barred
by statute of limitations).
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too much with the trial court findings, especially findings of fact,260 or
where a litigant's brief misrepresented facts or the law.261 However,
the federal courts have refused to construct any per se rules respecting
what may constitute a frivolous appeal. Imposition of such rules
might tend to cause too great a chill on advocacy.262 The federal
courts have also looked to the evolving standards of Rule 11 for gui-
dance with respect to the appropriate sanctions for a frivolous
appeal.263
Second, new section 995 may permit the appellate courts to act
sua sponte.2 1 While the language of the new statute does not explic-
itly provide for sua sponte action, neither does it condition the power
to impose additional costs or sanctions on the actions of the parties to
the appeal.2 65 As such, it is reasonable to assume that, at least in egre-
gious cases, the appellate courts may act without waiting for a party to
260. U.S. v. Santa Fe Eng'rs, Inc., 567 F.2d 860, 861 (9th Cir. 1978).
261. Medina v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 737 F.2d 140,145 (1st Cir. 1984). See also Burlington
N. R.R. Co. v. City of Superior, 962 F.2d 1619,1620 (7th Cir. 1992); Commonwealth Electric Co.
v. Woods Hole, 754 F.2d 46, 47-48 (1st Cir. 1985).
262. See, e.g., White v. General Motors, 908 F.2d 669, 674-75 (10th Cir. 1990) (explaining that
an appeal is not necessarily frivolous per se simply because the presentation of the issues in the
district court was bad enough to be sanctionable). The federal court's reticence in this regard is
in accord with the intent of the Legislature in enacting OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 995, to "exercise
restraint in imposing sanctions in order not to chill the adversary process." House Bill 1468, § 24,
codified as OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 995 (Committee Comments), reproduced above at note 252. It
is also in accord with the results reached by courts in other states. See, e.g., Bowman v. Fire
Investigations & Analyses, Inc., 502 So.2d 773, 775 (Ala. 1987) (explaining standard of frivolous-
ness is not defined by the Rule but is determined by the court, and court prefers dismissals on
merits).
263. See, e.g., Mullen v. Household Bank-Federal Say. Bank, 867 F.2d 586, 588 (10th Cir.
1989) (determining that a court may look to the principles that have evolved in the interpreta-
tion of Rule 11 in assessing the amount of the sanction awarded pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 38
and 28 U.S.C. § 1912). 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1988) provides that "where a judgment is affirmed by
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, the court in its discretion may adjudge to the
prevailing party just damages for his delay and single or double costs." For discussion of evolv-
ing case-law under FED. R. Civ. P. 11, see GREGORY JOSEPH, SANCTIONS AND THE FEDERAL
LAW OF LrIGATIoN ABUSE (1989); GEORGENE VAIRo, RULE 11 SANCrIONS: CASE LAW PER-
SPECrTvES AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES (1991); Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of
American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925 (1989); William W.
Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985);
William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1013 (1988). Some states have also
adopted the flexible approach of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See TEN. CODE ANN. § 27-9-114(b)(3)
(1992) ("In any appeal pursuant to this section deemed by the court to be frivolous, the sanctions
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 may be applied by the chancellors.").
264. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 995 permits the appellate court to impose sanctions "if it deter-
mines that an appeal is frivolous." For the federal analogue, see, United States v. Rayco, Inc.,
616 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1980) (award of double costs and attorneys fees apparently on court's
own initiative); Searcy v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 907 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 438, reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 718 (on pro se appeal).
265. However, the specific limitations of other Oklahoma statutes, some of which provides
for the taxation of costs only on petition of the prevailing party. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 15.1
(West 1991 & Supp. 1993)
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move for sanctions or dismissal of the appeal. The courts of other
states have the power to impose sanctions sua sponte for frivolous
appeals.266
Third, new section 995 may also expand the court's discretionary
power to impose sanctions against parties. New section 995 specifi-
cally permits the appellate court to impose sanctions on "the appel-
lant, the appellant's attorney, or both. '267 Under existing law, courts
have generally imposed sanctions for frivolous appeals on the liti-
gants.268 While the court retained inherent authority to discipline at-
torneys for pursuing frivolous appeals as a breach of the Rules of
Professional conduct,269 statutory sanctions were routinely imposed
on appellants. The new statute reinforces the power of the court to
266. See, eg., In re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 654 (Cal. 1982) (explaining that
penalties for prosecuting frivolous appeals may not be imposed without notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard); Mission Denver Co. v. Pierson, 674 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1984) (holding that sanc-
tions for frivolous appeals cannot be imposed sua sponte until appellant is afforded notice and an
opportunity to respond); Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 405 S.E.2d 774,776 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)
(notifying appellant to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed after appellant brought
more than 20 appeals in one case); S.C. CODE RULEs OF APPELLATE PRAc. Rule 240 (1991)
(allowing court to impose sanctions on its own motion after notice for frivolous appeal).
267. House Bill 1468, to be codified as OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 995. The Oklahoma stat-
ute, at least in this regard, is broader than the analogous power of the courts under FED. R. App.
P. 38. The federal rule extends only to parties. The federal courts, however, have imposed costs
on attorneys who unreasonably and vexatiously "multiply the proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 1927
(1988 & Supp. 1993). See Robert J. Martineau & Patricia A. Davidson, Frivolous Appeals in the
Federal Courts: The Ways of the Circuits, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 603 (1985). For federal cases con-
struing FED. R. ApP. P. 38 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to permit sanctioning both litigants and counsel,
see, e.g., Romala Corp. v. United States 927 F.2d 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Kellerman v. United
States, 871 F.2d 1363 (8th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1109 (1989); N.C.N.B. Nat'l Bank of
North Carolina v. Tiller, 814 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1987); McConnell v. Critchlow, 661 F.2d 116 (9th
Cir. 1981). In addition, the federal courts have inherent authority to sanction counsel. Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
268. See, eg., Melinder v. Southlands Dev., Inc., 715 P.2d 1341 (Okla. 1985) (taxing as costs
attorneys' fees in favor of appellee); Best v. State, 736 P.2d 171 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
costs may be awarded against party bringing frivolous appeal).
269. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, App. 3-A, Rule 3.1 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993). See State
v. Elrod, 780 P.2d 696 (Okla. 1989) (imposing 90 day suspension on lawyers for failing to reveal
groundlessness of lawsuit); J. Michael Medina, Ethical Concerns in Civil Appellate Advocacy, 43
Sw. U. L. REv. 677, 681-84 (1989); MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmiLIT DR 7-
102(A)(2)(1980) (imposing a subjective test for compliance with rule; lawyer may not knowingly
advance a claim unwarranted by existing law, unless good faith argument can be made for exten-
sion, modification, or reversing existing law); MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
3.1 and comment (1983) (imposing objective test); 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAw OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr 329-35 (1985).
Other jurisdictions also sanction attorneys for violations of state professional responsibility rules
for filing frivolous appeals. See, eg., In re Matter of Wade, 814 P.2d 753 (Ariz. 1991); In re
Cook, 526 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 1988) (disbarring attorney in part for bringing appeal in bad faith
and to harass and injure opponent). The federal courts have also sanctioned attorneys for viola-
tions of state professional responsibility rules. See United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 626-27
(10th Cir. 1990) (interpreting Oklahoma rules of professional conduct and revoking pro haec
vice admission to practice before court for filing frivolous suit).
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tailor the sanction imposed for a frivolous appeal to the parties
deemed most at fault.27 0 For example, the Seventh Circuit has used its
sanctioning authority to impose liability on counsel where counsel is
determined to be the real moving force behind the frivolous action, or
where the frivolous contention is one that only a lawyer would be ex-
pected to know.271 While the theoretical power of the Oklahoma ap-
pellate courts may not be significantly expanded, the practical effect
of the statute should give the courts more impetus to use their inher-
ent and traditional powers in this respect.
Fourth, the new law may expand the power of the courts to deter-
mine the amount and nature of the sanctions imposed on appellant or
appellant's counsel. While both the new statute and title 20, section
15.1 speak of attorneys' fees as costs which may be taxed to the parties
interposing a frivolous appeal,27 2 the new law makes clear that sanc-
tions may include, but need not be limited to attorneys fees. Appel-
late courts may now feel more free to impose monetary penalties in an
amount more closely related to the cause of the frivolousness of the
appeal and the likelihood of deterrence, and not merely tax attorneys'
fees as costs. The new statute makes clear that punitive sanctions may
be assessed in appropriate cases, especially where the interposing of
the frivolous appeal may have increased the damages suffered by ap-
pellee. In this respect, the Oklahoma courts may follow the lead of
the Tenth Circuit273 and look to the rules which have been evolving
respecting the imposition of sanctions under FED. R. Civ. P. 11, as
well as under FED. R. Apr. P. 38.274
270. This power to taller the object of the sanctions imposed is also in accord with the sanc-
tioning power of the federal courts under FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and FED. R. App. P. 38. See, e.g.,
William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D.
181, 200-04 (1985). Judge Schwarzer notes in interpreting the sanctioning power under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11:
In assessing fees, a determination must also be made who is to pay them. Where the
violation is primarily a professional dereliction, it is appropriate to impose the sanctions
on the attorney and prohibit reimbursement by the client. Where, on the other hand,
the violation may reflect deliberate litigation strategy, at least some part of the sanc-
tions can fairly be imposed on the cient....
Id. at 203.
271. Reid v. United States, 715 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1983); Thorton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151
(7th Cir. 1986); Maneikis v. Jordan, 678 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1982) (imposing sanctions because of
dereliction too technical for client to understand). See generally Linda R. Hirshman, Tough
Love: The Court of Appeals Runs the Seventh Circuit the Old Fashioned Way, 63 Cm.-KnirNr L.
REv. 191, 204-05 (1987).
272. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 15.1 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993) and discussion above at note
268.
273. Mullen v. Household Bank-Federal Savings Bank, 867 F.2d 586, 589 (10th Cir. 1989).
274. William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181 (1985). See Mark S. Stein, Of Impure Hearts and Empty Heads: A Hierarchy of Rule
1993]
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Fifth, the statute also appears to empower the court to rid itself of
frivolous appeals in a manner somewhat broader than under prior law.
Appellate courts generally dispose of appeals by opinion. Frivolous
appeals can be disposed of by summary opinion.275 However, frivo-
lous appeals can be dismissed on motion, if the court determines that
the appeal was frivolous and for delay only.276 By permitting the ap-
pellate court to dismiss the appeal, the new statute may serve to en-
courage appellate courts to dismiss frivolous appeals cases, even
where the standard of "solely for delay" might not have been met.
Nor should the court be required to wait to entertain a motion to dis-
miss before it can dismiss a patently frivolous appeal. In this respect,
the new law represents a codification with some expansion of the pow-
ers of the court to dispose of frivolous appeals.
At a minimum, then, new Section 995 should provide the appel-
late courts with a substantial amount of flexibility in determining the
"costs" of frivolous appeals, a flexibility is unavailable under current
common-law or statutory rules. Flexibility means departing from the
all-or-nothing conception of frivolousness built into case law and stat-
utory conceptions of that term. Appeals need not be classified as friv-
olous or not frivolous, the former meriting a severe penalty, the later
nothing. There exists a more subtle range of frivolousness which
ought to form the basis of a more sophisticated approach to appellate
sanctions, an approach encouraged by the new provision. This expan-
sive reading of the new statutory authority, however, may be problem-
atic, an issue I take up in Part III in the context of the search for
consensus on the cost of appeal, and more generally on the utility of
appellate review and the value of (cost of defending) particular sub-
stantive rights.
11 Violations, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 393 (1991) (defining a hierarchy of perniciousness of
violations of Rule 11 and arguing that several of these are unnecessary); Edward D. Cavanaugh,
Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HoF-
sRA L.REv. 499 (1986) (analyzing emerging Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 case law); Judith A. McMorrow,
Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 959 (analyzing the shift by state
courts to regulation based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 11); Note, A Uniform Methodology For Assessing
Rule 11 Sanctions: A Means to Serve the End of Conserving Public and Private Resources, 63
S.CAL. L. Rav. 1855 (1990).
275. The summary affirmance rules are set forth at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.12, ch. 15, Rule
1.202 (West 1988).
276. Whelchel v. Hembree, 205 P.2d 279 (Okla. 1949) (noting it was not the court's duty to
search for a theory supporting the appeal and that it could dismiss appeal as taken for delay
only); Scaggs v. Barker, 256 P.2d 428 (Okla. 1953); Skirvin v. Goldstein, 137 P. 1176, 1177 (Okla.
1914). See also Howe v. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank of Eufaula, 19 P.2d 961 (Okla. 1933)
(explaining that an appeal that appears, from an examination of the record, frivolous and for
delay only should be dismissed).
[Vol. 29:65
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III. CONSENSUS, COMPLEXITY AND HOUSE BILL 1468'S CHANGES
The rules of supersedeas and frivolous appeals evidence the gen-
eral consensus on the deference due lower court determinations.
277
House Bill 1468's changes indicate a modification of that consensus in
a variety of little ways. By little, I mean that the general consensus
respecting the availability of appeal has not changed, but the utility of
appealing certain types of actions is now perceived to be less useful
(and consequently is more costly). A greater complexity results from
this lack of uniformity respecting the deference to be given lower
court determinations. The cost of appeal, that is, the practical mani-
festation of the deference accorded trial court decisions, is increas-
ingly a function of the nature of the dispute, the basis on which review
is sought, and the manner in which an appeal is made. I explore this
new complexity in this Part III. In Part IV, I attempt a preliminary
exploration of the more fundamental questions raised by the manipu-
lation of the of supersedeas and frivolous appeals which drive the
persistent search by Oklahoma (and other states) for refinement of
the rules of civil appellate procedure and by which our choices of "re-
finements" are limited.
A. Suspensions of Judgments
The amendments to the effectiveness of judgments rules in
Oklahoma have brought clarity, and perhaps a measure of certainty as
well. The vagaries of case law and its mutability in the face of future
precedent have been mitigated, at least to the extent that the courts
cannot (absent a finding of constitutional defect) repudiate statutory
law as easily as they might repudiate precedent. But the clarity and
certainty the statutory amendments have effected have not substan-
tially changed the state's approach to the suspension of the effective-
ness of judgments. Perhaps this is a good thing; there may be nothing
wrong with the current approach, especially if it reflects a consensus
among lawyers, judges and legislators.278 Let's explore the ramifica-
tions of the new rules in the context of the ease (or difficulty) of re-
viewing lower court determinations.
277. See previous discussion in paper, Part I., Supersedeas, Frivolousness and the Perceived
Utility of Appeal.
278. This, of course, depends on the extent to which procedural rules reflect value judgments
about disputes, their resolution and the overall value (to society and the litigants, especially) of
finality and effectiveness of lower court judgments. As the practical manifestation of value judg-
ments, such rules are not immutable; nor does there exist a combination of such rules which
1993]
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1. The Price of Reform
Oklahoma's "clear" and "certain" new law of suspension of judg-
ments remains complex. Although the statutes reduce the reliance of
the bar on lore and the esoterica of experience by codifying many of
the understandings and practices under old law, the statutes have not
simplified the system for suspending judgments in the context of civil
appellate procedure. Judgments are final (for purposes of appeal) and
effective and amenable to post-trial motions upon the filing of a writ-
ten judgment, but not always. Sometimes judgments are effective
when rendered, but not final for purposes of appeal until a written
judgment is filed. Likewise, judgments are automatically stayed for
ten days after the filing of the written judgment, but not always; some
judgments may be conditionally stayed automatically, others may not
be stayed automatically at all, absent action by the court during the
ten day period and beyond. All judgments of certain types are subject
to stays as of right from the time a written judgment is filed, but this
does not apply to judgments in other proceedings, in which case, the
right to suspend effectiveness is not only discretionary, but arises at
the time of the rendition of the judgment. Additionally, a variety of
specialty statutes govern the suspension of judgments in a number of
other contexts. Added to this are the peculiarities of stay practice in
particular courts, which may have a substantial impact on the customs
surrounding approaches to approval of undertakings and sureties, and
for the understanding of what might constitute necessary conditions
for the discretionary suspension of judgments.
Indeed, in one area in particular, the new law adds a complexity
to the prior law worth emphasizing. The major undertaking of the
amendments to the rules of civil appellate procedure was to bring cer-
tainty to the determination of the giving of judgments and to have the
timing of a judgment's appealability and effectiveness start at the
same time.27 9 One of the criticisms of prior law was that it separated
might bring procedural perfection. As values change about the nature of access to dispute reso-
lution devices provided by the state to litigants, the worthiness of disputes (that is, the value to
the state of providing a means of resolving them) and courts, so too will the process for resolving
such disputes be transformed. Professor Resnick nicely describes the array of values and proce-
dural choices currently jostling for preeminence in American jurisprudence. See Judith Resnick,
77ers, 57 S. CAi. L. REv. 837, 845-70 (1984) (identifying 12 of what the author describes as
"valued features" which underlie American approaches to civil procedure).
279. "The primary purpose of the Judgments Act was to change the date of finality for judg-
ments from the date of the judge's oral pronouncement of the decision to the date of filing of a
written judgment with the court clerk." House Bill 1468, § 9, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 696.2
(Committee Comment). See Charles W. Adams & J. Michael Medina, Recent Developments in
Oklahoma Civil Appellate Procedure, 26 TuLSA L.J. 489, 491-95 (1991).
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the timing of initial effectiveness, for purposes of execution, from ini-
tial finality, for purposes of appeal."' House Bill 1468 attempts to tie
finality and effectiveness to one event-the filing of the judgment.281
However, a large group of proceedings are exempted from these sim-
plifying rules 2 For those exempted proceedings, the time within
which to commence an appeal begins with the filing of a judgment.
However, the time for the effectiveness of such judgments begins at
the time the judgment is "pronounced by the court." 3 Presumably,
the time for filing a motion for new trial under section 653, as
amended, and the time for filing post trial motions under new section
990.2 also begin to run from the time of the filing of the judgment in
those cases; however, that is not entirely clear?' The results, in any
case, create new traps for unwary litigants who either fail to anticipate
the immediacy of the effectiveness of a judgment or fail to anticipate
280. See Adams & Medina, supra note 279, at 494-95. Thus, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 990A(A) (West Supp. 1993) provides for the commencement of appeal "within thirty (30) days
from the date the final order or judgment is filed." See Harvey D. Ellis, Jr., The 1991 Repeal of
the 1990 Judgments and Appeals Act, 62 OKLA. BJ. 2793, 2794 (1991). The time for filing post-
trial motions, however, remains tied to the time of rendition. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 653,
698 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). A judgment's effectiveness is also tied to rendition. Wilks v.
Wilks, 632 P.2d 759, 761-762 (Okla. 1981).
281. House Bill 1468, § 8, amending OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 653 (West 1988 & Supp.
1993) (stating that the ten day period for filing a motion for new trial commences on the filing of
the judgment); id. § 9, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 696.2(C) (filing of judgment is jurisdictional
prerequisite for appeal) and 696.2(D) (noting judgment ineffective until filed); id. § 19, adding
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.2 (period to file post trial motions which stay the period for filing
appeals determined by reference to filing date of judgment).
282. House Bill 1468, § 9, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 696.2(D) (listing the following ac-
tions: divorce, separate maintenance, annulment, post-decree matrimonial proceedings, pater-
nity, custody, adoption, termination of parental rights, mental health, guardianship, juvenile
matters, habeas corpus proceedings, proceedings for temporary restraining orders, temporary
injunctions, permanent injunctions, conservatorship, probate proceedings, special execution in
foreclosure actions, quiet title actions, partition proceedings or contempt citations). A number
of policy reasons have been advanced to support this exemption. At least with respect to the
family law proceedings subject to the exemption, the rationale rests on case law. See, e.g.,
Cochran v. Rambo, 484 P.2d 500, 501 (Okla. 1971) (using public policy to vest the court with
power to provide and care for minor children in connection with divorce proceedings).
283. House Bill 1468, § 9, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 696.2(D). In effect, for this group of
proceedings, and for purposes of effectiveness, but not finality, the old rules and confusions re-
specting the actual timing of pronouncements of judgments continue to apply. See, e.g., Grant
Square Bank & Trust Co. v. Werner, 782 P.2d 109, 111 (Okla. 1989) (holding that pronounce-
ment was effective); Carr v. Braswell, 772 P.2d 915, 917 (Okla. 1989) (stating that order was
pronounced at time it "was pronounced from the bench and communicated to the parties");
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. McBroom, 526 P.2d 509, 511 (Okla. 1974) (pronouncing order at
time of jury verdict).
284. House Bill 1468, § 9, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 696.2(D) speaks only of the time for
appeal running from the time of the filing of the judgment. However, the exception carved by
this section appears only to be aimed at accelerating the effectiveness of the judgments specified.
Consequently, in all other respects, such judgments should be treated like all other judgments
under the modified rules. Of course, the other major exception from the generally applicable
new rules involves the ability to obtain stays of judgments rendered in the specified proceedings.
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the start and end of the time permitted for filing post-trial motions or
appeals. This, obviously, does not simplify appellate procedure. More
importantly, it shifts the cost of judgments more effectively to judg-
ment losers, who are faced with an accelerated effectiveness of judg-
ments, a presumption against staying such judgments, and potential
delay (at least relative to the time of the effectiveness of the judg-
ment) in commencing an appeal from the judgment.8 5
Other potential new difficulties exist as well. House Bill 1468
may have created another (inadvertent) anomaly between the judg-
ment lien provisions and the provisions relating to the effectiveness of
judgments. Additionally, it may have created traps for the unwary as
a result of the rendering/filing rift. New OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, section
696.2(D) provides that a judgment is ineffective until filed in accord-
ance with that section, unless the judgment arises from a proceeding
identified therein, in which case the judgment is effective when pro-
nounced. The exceptions include most real property actions-special
executions in foreclosure actions, quiet title actions and partition pro-
ceedings.0 6 On the other hand, judgment liens are ineffective if exe-
cution is not issued within a year from the date the judgment is
rendered.8 7 Assuming that section 801 is not deemed amended by
implication to provide for ineffectiveness one year after the date the
judgment becomes effective, which, in any case is unlikely, a number
of problems arise. First, if the time of a judgment's rendering is the
same as that of its pronouncement, then, with respect to the actions
excepted by the provisions of new section 696.2(D), both the effec-
tiveness and the running of the one year period commence at the
same time. This makes sense in light of the language of prior cases. 288
If the courts chose to give different meanings to these terms, then the
285. Recall that under the new scheme, the judgment loser must await the filing of the judg-
ment in order to appeal. The timing of such filing is dependent on the time the trial court
provides for the preparation of the written judgment, and the time between preparation of the
draft of the judgment and that of the approval of all of the parties and the court to the form of
judgment. House Bill 1468, § 9, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 696.2(A). A judgment winner
with an effective judgment and a case with a significant possibility of reversal might now find it
expedient to delay the judgment preparation timetable as long as possible, to enjoy the fruits of
the litigation longer and to increase the economic pressure on the judgment loser to settle and
minimize the cost of the litigation.
286. See House Bill 1468, § 9, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 696.2(D).
287. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 801 (West 1988). But note that in the event a case is ap-
pealed, or subject to proceedings in error, the one year period commences after the resolution of
those matters. Id.
288. See, e.g., Carr v. Braswell, 772 P.2d 915, 917 (Okla. 1989) (holding that order was judg-
ment-effective when pronounced from the bench and communicated to the parties).
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periods will not match and the possibility of overlooking the com-
mencement of one or the other increases significantly (as does the
possibility of malpractice liability). But the matching of the com-
mencement of the effectiveness of a judgment and the commencement
of the one year period for lien effectiveness applies only to those pro-
ceedings constituting an exception to the general rule of new section
696.2(D). For run-of-the-mill cases, including most money judgments,
the commencement of the effectiveness of the judgment (and the time
after which a judgment lien can be filed) will not be the same as the
commencement of the one year lien effectiveness period of section
801. Indeed, in such instances, the effect of the new section might be
to significantly shorten the period within which execution must be
taken out, in order to preserve the lien, since a judgment may actually
be filed a significant period of time after its "rendering." And, of
course, the consequences of ignoring these timing rules can be
significant.289
Moreover, the growing similarity between the requirements for
superseding money judgments and for discharging a lien of judgment
in money judgment cases presents a variety of traps and opportunities
for litigants. The new legislation permits the superseding of money
judgments by "depositing cash with the court clerk in the amount of
the judgment or order plus an amount that the court determines will
cover costs and interests on appeal,' '290 in addition to the usual under-
taking required to suspend the effectiveness of a judgment.291 Liens
of judgment can be discharged by deposit of substantially the same
sum with the court clerk, along with a statement of purpose for the
deposit.292 In addition, the deposit made in both instances may be
modified by the trial court.2 93
289. E.g., Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Hague, 798 P.2d 641, 643-44 (Okla. Ct. App.
1990) (loss of lien priority).
290. House Bill 1468, § 21, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.4(B)(1)(b).
291. House Bill 1468, § 21, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.4(A).
292. Judgment liens can be discharged by depositing with the court clerk, "cash sufficient to
cover the whole amount of the judgment, including interest, costs, and any attorneys fees, to-
gether with costs and interest on appeal" and a written statement seeking discharge. House Bill
1468, § 14, amending OKLA. STAT. AN. tit. 12, § 706.2 (West 1988). But, unlike deposits in
connection with the suspension of judgments, a judgment debtor cannot deposit U.S. Treasury
securities or general obligation bonds of the state of Oklahoma to effectively discharge a judg-
ment lien. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990.4(B)(1)(b) (new). A judgment debtor must deposit cash.
House Bill 1468, § 14, amending OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 706.2 (West 1988).
293. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 703.3 (West 1988) (judgment liens) and OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 990.4(E) (new) ("The trial court shall have continuing jurisdiction during the pendency of any
post-trial motion and appeal to modify any order it has entered regarding security or other con-
ditions in connection with a stay.").
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However, discharges of judgment liens and stays of execution are
not the same thing, and seeking one will not automatically permit the
other. Thus, judgment losers seeking both a stay and a discharge of a
judgment lien will have to comply with the requirements of both pro-
visions, the amount deposited being equal to the highest sum required
under either statute. Failure to request both (if both are sought) or to
provide the necessary sureties, undertakings or written statements will
result in the potential for the discharge of a judgment lien when the
stay of execution is ineffective, or a stay of execution with an ineffec-
tive discharge.294 Judgment winners seeking to increase the amount of
the deposit during the pendency of an appeal will also have to exercise
care where the deposit has served to suspend the effectiveness of the
judgment and discharge the lien of judgment. An increase in the de-
posit under the judgment lien statute, even if granted, and even if not
performed by the judgment debtor should not void the stay of judg-
ment, unless the court specifically orders the increase for purposes of
maintaining the discharge and the stay of execution.295 Consequently,
under House Bill 1468's reformations, both judgment winners and
losers will have to exercise care in cases where the judgment debtor
seeks to stay execution of judgment or discharge the judgment lien, or
both.
Is all this really necessary? The overall effect of the modification
to the suspension of judgment provisions may be to decrease the in-
centive to appeal the marginal case. However, for well-off judgment
losers in money judgment cases, the incentive might just be the oppo-
site. The new law makes it easier to both stay execution and discharge
a judgment lien with a single deposit, and it creates some potential
pitfalls for judgment winners seeking to object to either. Moreover,
294. The new language of OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 706.3 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) as amended
by House Bill 1468, § 15, should not lead to a different result. Certainly, had the Legislature
intended to allow for the simultaneous discharge of judgment lien and suspension of judgment, it
would have so provided; indeed, the new legislation continues the practice of strictly separating
the procedures for the obtainment of discharge and supersedeas. What the modifications have
attempted, however, is to reduce the actual cost of obtaining both a discharge of judgment lien
and a stay by setting equivalent cash requirements in both cases.
295. Thus, the new language in OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 706.3 (vest 1988 & Supp. 1993)
should not be interpreted to result in the automatic voiding of a stay of execution under new
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 990A(A) & (B), despite the "may enforce" language of the former.
Rather, that language makes sense only if meant to express the obvious-that absent a valid stay
of execution as permitted by statute, the reimposition of a lien of judgment permits the judgment
creditor to enforce the judgment against all of the property of the judgment debtor.
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political subdivisions may have fared badly under the new law. Bene-
ficiaries of automatic stays under prior law may now be allowed super-
sedeas as-of-right cases, but they may no longer have the benefit of
automatic stays in proceedings where such was required under prior
law-particularly in cases involving injunctive relief. On the other
hand, the judgment winners in equitable, real estate and family law
proceedings have effectively had the costs of those judgments reduced
by making it more difficult to prevent immediate execution of judg-
ments, and splitting the timing of effectiveness from the process of
appeal.
The new statutory scheme has certainly changed the balance of
costs and risks of judgments as between litigants. Stays as of right
minimize the cost of suspending judgment to the appellant and act as
an incentive to seek the stay, and thus to engage in activities which
give rise to the right to stay the judgment-post-trial motions and ap-
peals. Discretionary stays increase the cost of suspending judgment,
by increasing both the risk that the stay will not be granted, and that
the conditions to the granting of the stay will be beyond the means of
the litigant seeking the stay (or at least substantially more onerous
than those which have had to have been paid under the suspension as
of right rules). The tendency of prior case law, confirmed in the new
statutes, is to favor discretionary stays over stays as of right. In this
sense, the value of judgments have increased even as the cost of sus-
pending judgments (and therefore decreasing its value) has risen.
And, of course, the cost of staying judgments impacts directly on the
value of and therefore the incentive, to appeal the trial court
determination.
Discretion also increases risk in the sense that litigants may not
count on the application of a rule, especially a procedural rule, with
any degree of certainty. Discretion, then, tends to increase unpredict-
ability.2 9 6 And unpredictability may be the most troubling aspect of
the nature of procedural rule consensus building of the kind currently
296. Better stated, it increases the perception of the potential for unpredictability. Because
it is clear that while discretion makes for uncertainty of result, the quantum of that uncertainty
diminishes as the extent of consensus of notions on acceptable and unacceptable actions in-
creases. what the complaining about the deficiencies of discretion may well indicate, therefore,
is not so much arbitrariness as the existence of substantial disagreement respecting acceptable
and unacceptable procedural conduct, and the utility of certain substantive rights. This com-
plaint is implicit in the writings of both traditionalist critics of discretion, who see in the exercise
of discretion courts acting capriciously in accordance with political agendas, see Donald L.
Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983
Durr LJ. 1265 (1983), and of non-traditionalists who complain of the use by the courts of
procedural devices to effectively limit the ability of litigants to assert certain rights, see Carl
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practiced and evidenced by Oklahoma's changes in its appellate pro-
cedural rules. Unpredictability of this kind, or at least the perception
of the existence of this kind of unpredictability, if doled out in large
enough (or erratic enough) doses, may well convey to the risk averse
or resource poor that litigation may not be worth the risk.297
B. Frivolous Appeals
The addition of a new weapon in the fight against "frivolous" ap-
peals invariably affects the calculus of parties contemplating an at-
tempt to seek reversal of a lower court determination. At a minimum,
the very passage of such a provision indicates a legislature more will-
ing to impose costs on appeals at the margin. But such a willingness
may well raise the costs of all appeals because there is never an assur-
ance that an appeal pressed will not be characterized by a court as
marginal, and therefore worthy of sanctions. The extent of the
marginalization of potential appeals depends, to some degree, on the
manner in which court weild their new powers. However interpreted,
by increasing the unpredictability of the application of the rules, the
new sanctions provision invariably increases the deference accorded
the determination of the lower court, and narrows the real effective-
ness of the option to seek review of that determination.
1. The New Sanctioning Power, Traditional Sanctions
Jurisprudence, and the Effect of the Federal Rules
Commentators have identified a number of different categories
of frivolous appeals; they differ from each other in the quantum of
detrimental effect or damage to the opposing party and the functioning
of the court.29 And courts have begun to recognize these categories
Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 485 (1988189); Georgene Vairo,
Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988).
297. Cf. RULE 11 iN TRASrnON: Ti REPORT OF THE THiRD CIRCurr TASK FORCE ON
FEDERAL RULE OF CML. PROCEDURE 11 43-44 (1989); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and
TriaL" A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 55, 63-69 (1982) (discussing the disparate impact that changes on the economic
incentives to settle have on litigants with different financial resources in the context of the settle-
ment rules of FED. R. Civ. P. 68).
298. See, e.g., J. Michael Medina, Ethical Concerns in Civil Appellate Advocacy, 43 Sw. L.J.
677, 681-684 (1989); J. Michael Medina, Ethical Issues in Appellate Litigation-A Survey, 1
OKLAHOMA APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: PRACTICE IN THE OKLAHOMA AND TENTH
CIRCurr APPELLATE SYSTEMS 2-5 (sponsored by Oklahoma Bar Association and the University
of Oklahoma College of Law) (identifying nine categories of frivolous appeals: (i) the issue
raised on appeal was not raised or preserved at the trial court level, (ii) the appellate briefing
was inadequate as a result of inadvertence or by design, (iii) the appeal seeks to relitigate prior
cases, (iv) the appeal merely seeks to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, (v) the appeal
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or indicia of frivolousness as well.2 11 Oklahoma courts have, however,
for the most part hesitated to impose sanctions on the basis of these
categories alone.
TRW/REDA Pump illustrates the increasing recognition by
Oklahoma courts of the differences between the various categories of
frivolousness, the hesitance with which the courts have imposed sanc-
tions for frivolousness other than in the most egregious cases, and the
reluctance with which the courts approach the possibility that sanc-
tions for frivolousness are not limited to dismissal or the imposition of
attorneys' fees.3c° But, one can question whether a case such as TRW!
REDA Pump ought to be read as a policy case. More likely, that case
is properly interpreted as a self-conscious exercise in statutory con-
struction giving effect to the limitations inherent in the statutory or
common law grant of sanctioning authority. Why? It is clear from the
cases that Oklahoma courts recognize that they are without power to
award attorneys' fees as a sanction absent specific authority. Second,
it is also clear that they have recognized that where the sanctioning
authority permits the award of attorneys fees, doubtful cases should
involves review on an abuse of discretion or other deferential standard, (vi) the appellant seeks
rehearing or reargument, (vii) the party's brief ignores controlling authority, (viii) the appeal
clearly was filed to delay the effectiveness of the judgment below, and (ix) the issue on appeal is
illogical, crazy or wild); Linda R. Hirshman, Tough Love: The Court of Appeals Runs the Sev-
enth Circuit the Old Fashioned Way, 63 C-n.-K r L. Rnv. 191, 199-207 (1987).
299. See, eg., TRW/REDA Pump v. Brewington, 829 P.2d 15, 22 (Okla. 1992); F'mch v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 926 F.2d 1574, 1578, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting appeals may be frivolous
as filed, that is, no arguments exist that are non-frivolous, or frivolous as argued, either of which
can provide the basis for sanctions)). See also discussion, above, at notes 222, 227,234, and 238-
247.
300. The TRWIREDA Pump court identified four different types of conduct which could
result in the imposition of sanction for pursuing a meritless appeal. These include (i) the failure
to raise the alleged errors in the court below, (ii) appeal on a factual issue when the record is
devoid of evidence to support the claimed factual error, (ii) challenging factual findings of the
lower courts when there is clearly sufficient evidence to sustain the findings, and (iv) making
legal arguments on appeal that ignore clearly established law. TRWIREDA Pump, 829 P.2d at
23-31. But on the basis of the traditional conception of the sanctioning power, these criteria
were not viewed as independent bases, each standing alone, for the imposition of sanctions.
Rather, the court determined that there must exist some combination of these categories of
frivolousness to permit a court to arrive at a determination that the appeal is frivolous and
sanctions justified. Under the statute construed, this approach may well have had some intuitive
appeal: the only sanction permitted under OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 15.1 (West 1988 & Supp.
1993) was attorneys' fees. With a more modulated approach to sanctions under House Bill 1468,
§ 24, adding OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 995, each of the "indicators" of frivolousness might itself
provide the basis for a finding of a frivolous appeal, meriting sanctions commensurate with the
severity of the offense. In the past, Oklahoma courts have found an appeal which merely chal-
lenges a factual determination in the trial court may well be frivolous. See Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Pratt, 795 P.2d 115 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (holding employer challenged substan-
tially unassailable trial court finding). Oklahoma courts have also sanctioned appeals where the
court has determined that the arguments advanced were wholly unsupported by existing law.
Hervey v. American Airlines, 720 P.2d 712, 713 (Okla. 1986).
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be resolved against sanctions because the sole sanction permitted is a
severe one, so that only conduct which takes "valuable resources and
time away from cases having some arguable merit," ought to be de-
terred.30 1 But, there exists no policy in Oklahoma which limits sanc-
tions only to appeals the deficiencies of which include some
combination of the various categories or sources of frivolousness. 3°
Nor is there a need to provide merely one (fairly severe) form of sanc-
tion for different conduct which results in a meritless appeal.3 "3 And,
Oklahoma courts have never determined that they are prohibited
from imposing sanctions other than attorneys' fees and that, as a gen-
eral matter, they may never exercise any statutory sanction power
where a portion (but not all) of an appeal is frivolous. As a result,
current jurisprudence does not preclude a more subtle approach to an
interpretation of the new sanctions statute.
This becomes clearer when one considers that the Oklahoma
courts have said, that it is appropriate to look to federal law for an
interpretation of analogous sanctioning authority. The federal courts,
in interpreting their sanctioning power under FED. R. APP. P. 38 and
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 permit both the assessment of sanctions other than
attorneys' fees and the imposition of sanctions even where one or
more non-frivolous issues are raised on appeal.304 The federal courts
301. TRW/REDA Pump v. Brewington, 829 P.2d 15, 22 (Okla. 1992). Thus, the policy the
Oklahoma courts seek to further is analogous to that set forth in FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("The rules
are to be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.").
302. Indeed, the TRW/REDA Pump court's discussion of the value of sanctions would indi-
cate that Oklahoma policy would tend to favor an approach which deters frivolous conduct but
does not chill the adversary process or the ability of counsel to effectively represent his or her
clients. See TRW/REDA Pump, 829 P.2d at 22-3. Modulated sanctions are said to serve that
purpose, to further the policy of the sanctioning authority of the federal rules "to deter rather
than to compensate," FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (Committee Notes, 1993 Amendment). In this sense, at
least, modulated sanctions for all kinds of frivolous conduct is more in keeping with Oklahoma
policy than is the reservation of significant sanctions for particularly egregious conduct, and is in
harmony with current federal sanctions rules, including, especially the rationale behind the
amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Cf. Granado v. Comm'r, 792 F.2d 91, 94-95 (7th Cir. 1986)
(imposing sanctions for one non-frivolous issue raised among several frivolous ones); Dodd Ins.
Serv. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 935 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating complaint containing both
frivolous and non-frivolous claims can violate Rule 11 and that sanctions should deter undesir-
able behavior).
303. The only need, perhaps, would be the largely unarticulated one of restricting the power
of the courts to sanctions appeals. But, in the face of the statutory mandate, such a construction
of the statute might well amount to judicial law making of an unfortunate sort.
304. See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 948 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing amount of damage award for frivolous appeal is within discretion of appellate court); Finch v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 926 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding sanctions may be imposed for
frivolous argument of nonfrivolous issues); Granado, 792 F.2d at 94-5 (holding sanctions may be
imposed for frivolous issue appealed with several nonfrivolous ones); In re Bithony, 486 F.2d 319
(1st Cir. 1978) (suspending attorney). Contrast Oklahoma case law under Om.A. STAT. tit. 20
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have recognized, in the context of FED. R. Civ. P. 11, that:
The court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose for
violations, such as striking the offending paper; issuing admonition,
reprimand, or censure; requiring participation in seminars or other
educational programs; ordering a fine payable to the court; referring
the matter to disciplinary authorities .... 305
As such, there appears to be no absolute need, for purposes of impos-
ing sanctions, to treat an appeal which is meritless because the issue
was not raised or preserved below in the same way as a court might
treat an appeal clearly interposed solely for delay. Nor is there a need
to refrain (for fear of chilling that appellate process) from sanctioning
an appeal merely because one of a number of issues raised is not frivo-
lous.3" Under the new provision, both types of appeals ought to be
sanctionable as frivolous on the basis of analogous federal practice.
However, the sanctions in each case ought not be the same, the for-
mer perhaps subject to significantly lighter sanctions than the latter,
and the sanctions ought to apply irrespective of the existence of an
arguably non-frivolous portion of the appeal." 7 In the same manner,
the courts ought to be free to target sanctions on the more culpable
party-either the litigant or the litigant's counsel.
The Oklahoma courts ought to be especially open to the idea of
flexibility under the new statutory sanction power for a number of
reasons. First, new section 995 constitutes a departure from the com-
mon law American rule which gave Oklahoma courts inherent power
§ 15.1 (WVest 1988 & Supp. 1993) as interpreted by the Court. TRW/REDA Pump Court, 829
P.2d at 23-31.
305. FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (Committee Notes, 1993 Amendments). This concept is well known
to the federal judiciary, see William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A
Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181,183 (1985), and has survived the substantial changes to the applica-
tion of Rule 11 scheduled to go into effect on December 1, 1993 (The Rule retains the principle
that attorneys and pro se litigants have an obligation to the court to refrain from conduct that
frustrates the aim of Rule 1.).
306. For a federal case applying this notion at the appellate level, see, Granado v. Comm'r,
792 F.2d 91, 94-95 (7th Cir. 1986) (imposing sanctions for one nonfrivolous issue raised among
several frivolous issues); see also White v. General Motors, 908 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1990) (declin-
ing to impose sanctions for one nonfrivolous issue among several frivolous ones, but leaving
open possibility of future sanctions in such a situation). This notion of modulated sanctions is
basic to the approach to the 1993 modifications to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, see FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (Committee Notes, 1993 Amendments), and has been applied in this
manner by the Tenth Circuit. See Dodd Ins. Serv. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 935 F.2d 1152 (10th
Cir. 1991) (noting complaint containing frivolous and non-frivolous claims can violate Rule 11
and sanctions should deter undesirable behavior).
307. The courts of other jurisdictions have begun to apply their sanctions statutes in this
manner. See, e.g., Imperial Palace v. Dawson, 715 P.2d 1318, 1321 (Nev. 1986) (noting court
could award attorneys' fees, double costs and damages of two percent interest per month on all
sums improperly withheld for unacceptable dilatory tactics on appeal).
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to impose attorneys' fees in frivolous appeals or cases brought in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons.30 It is also a
departure from prior statutory sanctioning rules.3 0 9 As such, the stan-
dards for assessing sanctions need no longer rest on (and be limited
by) either basis for grounding the power of the court over sanction-
able appeals. Further, statute-based power to sanction meritless ap-
peals is not co-extensive with the bad faith or oppressive conduct
exception to the American Rule. 10 Indeed, that would seem to be a
fundamental teaching of TRW/REDA Pump Co. v. Brewington.3 1'
The new statute is not, nor ought it be, burdened with the juris-
prudence of the "meritless appeal" statute, as refined by cases such as
TRW/REDA Pump (an appeal is either entirely without merit, and
therefore frivolous, or it is not). For Oklahoma courts to rely on their
fairly well developed common-law rules or rules interpreting current
statutory authority for taxing costs in meritless appeals to limit the
flexibility which lies at the heart of the new statute would render the
new provision merely redundant. It follows, then, that under new sec-
tion 995, frivolousness should not have to depend on a determination
that the appeal was brought in bad faith or for the purpose of delay.
Nor need the standard for determining whether an appeal is frivolous
under new section 995 be limited to the standard for determining
whether an appeal is "without merit" under section 15.1 of title 20. It
is not unreasonable to conclude that an appeal can be "frivolous" and
yet not be "without merit." For instance, an appeal can be character-
ized as frivolous if the briefing on appeal was incomprehensible or
failed to comply with court rules.312 But such an appeal may not be
308. See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Owens, 565 P.2d 4 (Okla. 1977), and discus-
sion, above at notes 225-229.
309. OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 15.1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993), and discussion above at notes 222-
223, 227, 231-234, 238-247, and 299.
310. TRW/REDA Pump v. Brewington, 829 P.2d 15,23 n.5 (Okla. 1992) (construing OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 15.1 (West 1991)).
311. 829 P.2d 15, 22 (Okla. 1992); see also City Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 565 P.2d at 7-8.
Thus, Oklahoma courts have insisted that the authority to sanction must be statutorily based, or
grounded in the inherent power of the court. Since House Bill 1468 adds a new statutory basis
for the imposition of sanctions, and one which does not track either the language of the common
law exception to the American Rule, or that of the provision allowing the court to tax attorneys'
fees for "meritless" appeals, it is possible for the court, without doing damage to its precedents,
to significantly soften the standard under which frivolousness may be found, at least to the ex-
tent that the standard parallels that used by the federal courts. This concept has been recognized
by the federal courts as well. See, e.g., Autorama Corps. v. Stewart, 802 F.2d 1284, 1287-88 (10th
Cir. 1986).
312. See Smith v. Eaton, 910 F.2d 1469, 1470, 1473 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1587 (1991) (fining lawyer for almost totally incomprehensible brief); Tyler v. Hartford Ins.
Group, 780 P.2d 755, 756-757 n.5 (Ore. 1989), reh'g denied, 784 P.2d 1102 (Ore. 1989) ("The
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"without merit. 313
Likewise, a finding of frivolousness need not result in limited
sanction options for the court. The statute does not require the court
to tax attorneys' fees as costs and nothing else, nor does it limit the
power to sanction appellant and not counsel, or vice versa. Likewise,
the court need not be limited to sanctioning only the absolutely most
egregious cases in this uniform manner.3 14 Rather, the standard which
has been evolving in the federal courts, based on the modulated ap-
proach of FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and FED. R. APP. P. 38 sanctions, and in
other states may (ought to) provide the basis for the frivolousness
standard in Oklahoma, as well as the standard for assessing sanc-
tions.315 These sanctions can range from public reprimand, to mone-
tary sanctions, to other sanctions tailored to suit the offense, coupled
quantity of paper filed, coupled with the confusing and almost invariably nonsensical legal argu-
ments in them, forced defendants to expend more time than the merits deserve.").
313. The Committee Comments to the Illinois frivolous appeal rule, modelled on Federal
Rule 38 is instructive in this regard:
However, this paragraph relates not only to frivolous appeals, i.e., those without merit
and no chance of success, but also to appeals which are conducted in a frivolous man-
ner, i.e., those whose primary purpose is to delay enforcement of the judgment, to
cause a party to incur unnecessary expense, or which are generally prosecuted in bad
faith. The determination that the appeal is frivolous or the conduct is improper is
based on an objective standard of conduct, viz., an appeal will be found to be frivolous
if a reasonable prudent attorney would not in good faith have brought such an appeal,
or the appeal conduct will be found to be improper if a reasonable prudent attorney
would not have engaged in such conduct. If an appeal is found to be frivolous, or the
conduct improper, the subjective nature of the conduct is then important to determine
the appropriate nature and amount of the sanction.
ILL ANN. STAT. Sup. CT. RuLEs Art. m, Part F., Rule 375 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
314. The Committee Comments suggest that "[s]anctions may be appropriate where an ap-
peal is filed solely for delay or for the purpose of disrupting proceedings in the trial court." See
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 995 Committee Comments (West Supp. 1993) at note 252 above.
However, the Legislature did not intend by this language to limit the imposition of sanctions
solely to appeals filed solely for delay or to disrupt proceedings, or to limit the flexibility of the
courts in fashioning suitable sanctions for particular examples of frivolousness. Rather, the
Committee Comments indicate that such appeals certainly ought to be sanctioned. Other types
of conduct might also be sanctioned, see, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pratt, 795 P.2d 115
(Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (awarding attorneys' fees for employer's challenge of substantially unre-
viewable finding of lower court); City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Owens, 565 P.2d 4 (Okla. 1977)
(dismissing action after trial but before judgment). The only limitation reasonably intended by
the statute on sanctioning power is that sanctions not chill the adversary process. See OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 995 Committee Comments (West Supp. 1993) at note 252 above. The
Oklahoma courts have recently confirmed this rule, TRW/REDA Pump v. Brewington, 829 P.2d
15, 22 (Okla. 1992), and most other jurisdictions generally subscribe to it. See, e.g., Price v. Price,
654 P.2d 46 (Ariz. App. 1982) (noting power to punish attorneys or litigants for prosecuting
frivolous appeals should be used most sparingly); Mission Denver Co. v. Pierson, 674 P.2d 363
(Colo. 1984) (noting sanctions for frivolous appeals should be directed toward penalizing egre-
gious conduct in clear cases without deterring lawyers from asserting their client's rights).
315. Thus, for instance, North Carolina has, by rule, specified a flexible approach to the
determination of the amount or nature of sanctions in a particular case. See N.C.R. App. PRoc.
Rule 34(b) (Michie 1992) (permitting courts to impose following sanctions: dismissal of appeal,
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with nominal or compensatory damages in appropriate cases.3 16 Fur-
thermore, nothing in the rules precludes the courts from holding attor-
neys to the ethical and professional standards of the relevant rules of
professional responsibility.317
But what of the policy against impeding the filing of meritorious
appeals? If parties are free to seek sanctions in even the most non-
egregious circumstances, then the effect may be the opposite of that
intended. The situations in which sanctions can be imposed have in-
creased and as a result the temptation to seek sanctions more often
ought to increase as well. And the increase in the number of motions
for sanctions may well increase the cost of filing or pursuing an ap-
peal. But an increase in this type of satellite litigation need not invari-
ably follow from the adoption of a modulated approach to appellate
single or double costs, damages for delay, reasonable expenses, attorneys' fees, other sanction
deemed just and proper). Several states permit their appellate courts to impose additional pen-
alties upon a finding that an appeal was frivolous. See, e.g., Burleson v. Jordan, 295 S.E..2d 335
(Ga. 1982) (penalty of 10% of the amount in dispute as additional cost); Property Management
Serv., Inc. v. PMC Village Inn, Ltd., 754 P.2d 611 (Ore. 1988) (same). Other states have made
the imposition of this type of penalty mandatory. Collins v. North Miss. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 445
So. 2d 828, 831-32 (Miss. 1984) (15% mandatory penalty when appeal unsuccessful); Note,
Mandatory 10 Percent Penalty on Unsuccessful Appeal of Money Judgments in Alabama- Consti-
tutional and Policy Considerations, 32 ALA. L. Rv. 197 (1980). Cf. Bankers' Life & Casualty
Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988)(holding that such a penalty statute is constitutional), Bur-
lington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987) (noting penalty provisions may be inapplicable
in diversity cases).
316. William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181, 201-204 (1985) (advocating the use of public reprimand of attorneys to be included
in a published order or opinion). See Linda 1R Hirshman, Tough Love: The Court of Appeals
Runs the Seventh Circuit the Old Fashioned Way, 63 CHL-KENr L. REv. 191,204-06 (1987) (dis-
cussing increasing use of public scolding of counsel in addition to the assessment of monetary
sanctions in the Seventh Circuit). Professor Hirshman notes that scoldings seem to occur most
frequently in cases where the court feels the lawyer takes the law too far, or lend themselves to
their clients' feuds, or commit breaches of etiquette. In that respect, see especially, In re TCI,
Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 447-48 (7th Cir. 1985). See also Mark S. Stein, Of Impure Hearts and Empty
Heads: A Hierarchy of Rule 11 Violations, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 393,404-13 (1991) (discuss-
ing the incentives and disincentives to violate FED. R. Civ. P. 11 as a strategic decision). Broad
ranging approaches to sanctions have been applied by the federal courts. See, e.g., N.C.N.B.
National Bank of North Carolina v. Tller, 814 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1987) (assessing sanctions
against appellants for filing frivolous appeal and additional sanctions against appellant's counsel
for filing in brief appendix materials which court had struck); In re Bithony, 486 F.2d 319 (1st
Cir. 1978) (suspending for six months and fining $500 attorney for filing appeals solely to delay
deportation of clients). These broad ranging sanctions have been applied by courts of other
states in disciplining attorneys prosecuting frivolous actions. See ABAJBNA LAWYERs MANUAL
ON PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr 61:104-105 (1993) (and cases cited therein).
317. See, e.g., McConnell v. Crithlow, 661 F.2d 116, 119 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding attorney to
the standards prohibiting pursuit of frivolous claim in MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPON-
smirrY D.R. 2-109(A)(2) and D.R. 7-102(A)(2) and E.C. 7-5 (1979)). In a related vein, Victor
Kramer has proposed that sanctions under FED. R. Civ. P. 11 be used primarily as a means of
enforcing the Rules of Professional Responsibility and that their compensatory role be mini-
mized. Victor H. Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve Professional Responsibility, 75
MINN. L. Rev. 793 (1991).
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sanctions under the new statute. First, as the commentary to the 1993
amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 11 explain 3"8 since the purpose of the
sanctioning rule is to deter rather than just to compensate, many sanc-
tions imposed will not be monetary. Censure, or referrals to educa-
tional seminars do not directly reward the moving party with a
monetary award for his or her efforts.319 Likewise, the requirement
that any monetary sanctions be payable to the court as a penalty,
rather than as damages to the complaining party, also substantially
reduces the amount of economic benefit to a party otherwise tempted
to seek sanctions. Moreover, the resort to sanctions to increase the
cost of appellate litigation for appellant can be reduced by imposing
an offsetting charge on an appellee tempted to play the sanctions
game. This has been done. Thus, some jurisdictions impose sanctions
on opposing counsel who file meritless motions for sanctions on
appeal.320
But the approaches to minimizing this unintended and perverse
effect of a modulated approach to sanctions might not succeed in
eliminating all of the perverse effect of potentially broader sanctions.
First, it ignores the grossly disproportionate effects of court discretion
on plaintiffs, and public law claims.321 This fusion of procedural and
substantive goals has become unremarkable in the literature. Con-
sider the substantive assumptions in statements such as the following:
318. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (Committee Notes, 1993 Amendments).
319. See also discussion in William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule
11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 201-04 (1985).
320. See Partington v. Gedan, 880 F.2d 116, 131 (9th Cir. 1989) (awarding sanctions under
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 against party filing a frivolous motion for FED. R. APP. P. 38 sanctions). See
generally Alliance to End Repression v. Chicago, 899 F.2d 582, 583-84 (7th Cir. 1990); Nakash v.
United States, 708 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Annual Judicial Conference of the Second
Circuit, 101 F.R.D. 161, 200 (1984); J. Michael Medina, Ethical Concerns in Civil Appellate Ad-
vocacy, Sw. L.J. 677, 683 n.20 (1989). Such actions would be based either on power implicit in
the new statute, or on the inherent power of the court. City National Bank and Trust Co. v.
Owens, 565 P.2d 4 (Okla. 1977).
321. A recent Third Circuit study of the effect of the application of FED. R. Civ. P. 11
demonstrated that sanctions had a disproportionately adverse effect on plaintiffs, and especially
on plaintiffs in civil rights cases. See RULE 11 iN TRANsITION: THm REPORT OF THE THImD
CIRcurr TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 65-71 (1989). Other com-
mentators have also recognized the effect of procedural rules on public law claims, and the
failure of the rules to recognize the adverse impact of these facially neutral rules. See, e.g., Carl
Tobias, Public Law Litigation, Public Interest Litigants and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
74 CORNELL L. REv. 270 (1989); Stephen B. Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68--Time to
Abandon Ship, 19 U. MicH. J. L. REF. 425 (1986) (discussing impact on risk-averse of proposals
to modify the fee shifting of FED. R. Civ. P. 68); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Triak A
Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 55, 63-69 (1982) (discussing the disparate impact that changes on the economic incentives
to settle have on litigants with different financial resources in the context of the settlement rules
of FED. R. Civ. P. 68).
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"[C]ircuit judges commonly complain that their dockets are clogged
with routine, even frivolous appeals. Countless prisoner petitions, so-
cial security claims, and factual reviews they say, lack legal merit and
warrant short shrift."322 Any presumptions -made by the courts that
certain types of claims are meritless or that certain litigants bring mer-
itless claims may substantially affect the way in which the courts exer-
cise their discretion. Second, it may also ignore the effect of sanctions
on the attorney/client relationship. An attorney who may be sanc-
tioned for failing to uncover the duplicitous litigation conduct of a
client may be less willing to subscribe to the traditional notion that
lawyers owe their clients an absolute duty of loyalty. 3 The result is
that the new rule would carry with it the potential for increased litiga-
tion costs to appellant including, but not limited to the cost of warding
off marginal motions for appellate sanctions. To that extent, it might
well chili some appeals. Though one may seek comfort in hoping that
the appeals chilled would be the most marginal, it is as likely that the
chilling would affect the marginally financed appeal as well. As such,
the wholesale adoption of an aggressive federal approach might create
an increased potential for chilling appeals, one which exceeds the tol-
erance of the Oklahoma courts. To the extent that the courts seriously
entertain this fear, they might well adopt a "conservative" approach,
sacrificing the policy of chilling frivolous appeals to encourage the fil-
ing of meritorious appeals.
But the Oklahoma courts would have to shift direction in order to
arrive at a traditionalist approach to the new statute. That is the point
of discussion in this section. To summarize: In TRW/REDA Pump,
the Supreme Court clearly indicated both that statutory grants of
sanctioning power are to be construed independently of the limita-
tions of other grants of sanctioning authority,3 24 and that federal case
law interpreting the power of the federal courts to sanction frivolous
appeals can be used as persuasive authority in construing Oklahoma
322. J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Query: Are Heavy Caseloads Changing the Nature of Appel-
late Justice? 66 JUDiCATURE 57, 59 (1987). A close examination of the substantive nature of
procedural rules is beyond the scope of this article.
323. See Business Guides v. Chromatic Communications Enter., 119 F.R.D. 685 (N.D. Cal.
1988), affd 121 F.R.D. 402 (N.D. Cal. 1988), affd in part, rev'd in part, and vacated in part, 892
F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1989), affd, 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991). This implication of flexible approaches to
sanctions is explored in Karen S. Beck, Note, Rule 11 and Its Effect on Attorney/Client Relations,
65 S. CAL. L. REv. 875 (1992).
324. For instance, the power to sanction frivolous appeals under the inherent common law
power of the courts was held not to be coextensive with the power of the courts to award attor-
neys' fees as a sanction under OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 15.1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). See
TRWIREDA Pump Co. v. Brewington, 829 P.2d 15, 23 (Okla. 1992).
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law.32 New OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 995 is different from OKLA. STAT.
tit. 20, § 15.1 in at least two obvious respects. First, the new sanctions
provision speaks of frivolous appeals. Existing law describes the ap-
peals over which the statutory power to sanction extends as "merit-
less." It might follow that, to paraphrase the TRW/REDA Pump
Court, the power to sanction frivolous appeals is not co-extensive with
either the meritless appeals sanctions of existing law or the bad faith
or oppressive conduct exception to the American Rule applied in
Oklahoma. Second, the new provision does not set the sanctions
which the court might impose. Since the court is not limited to award-
ing attorneys fees, and since federal law has begun to recognize the
modulated approach of FED. R. Civ. P. 11 in assessing appellate sanc-
tions, it is possible that the two statutory bases of imposing sanctions
will be given differing effect, the new statute permitting the court to
assess small penalties for less significant acts of frivolity in appeals and
saving large sanctions for truly egregious cases.326 Rather than char-
acterizing an appeal as either meritless or not, or oppressive and vexa-
tious or not, and imposing an unchanging sanction on that basis, the
new sanctioning power permits a more refined approach, allowing the
imposition of sanctions (on the basis of a sliding scale of severity) on
appeals, some, but not all, of which may be frivolous as asserted or
argued. Indeed, the cases considered in TRW/REDA Pump serve as
good examples of the different results possible under the new sanc-
tioning statute as compared to existing law.3 27 As such, a restrictive
325. Indeed, the latest interpretation of OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 15.1 (West 1988 & Supp.
1993) makes clear that the federal rules for determining whether an appeal is frivolous can be
used as persuasive authority in such cases. TRWIREDA Pump, 829 P.2d at 22-3.
326. Mullen v. Household Bank-Federal Savings Bank, 867 F.2d 586, 589 (10th Cir. 1989);
Granado v. Comm'r, 792 F.2d 91, 94-95 (7th Cir. 1986) (awarding FED. R. Crv. P. 38 sanctions
despite appellant's one non-frivolous argument because 22 of 24 pages of appellant's brief con-
cerned frivolous arguments), and discussion above at Part I.C.2., House Bill 1468 Changes.
327. In that case, in the appeals which were found to be "meritless," the appellant sought
review on theories not presented, sought a reweighing of the evidence both where the record
below was devoid of evidence to support the claimed error and where there existed sufficient
evidence to support the findings, and ignored well established law. There appeared to be no
issue raised worthy of consideration. In contrast, in the appeals where frivolousness was not
found, at least one of the issues raised was not frivolous (although others raised might well have
been). This distinction makes sense when the only sanction is attorneys' fees on appeal. How-
ever, where the court has some discretion in setting the quantum of the sanctions, the court
should be able to sanction a party who raises one or more frivolous contentions along with non-
frivolous ones under the new statute. To the extent that the court's time is taken up by having to
sift through the various contentions, the policy rationale remains the same; the court must still
devote itself to the consideration of a frivolous contention. Clearly, a court does not desire to
chill the filing of meritorious appeals; however, there is no reason it should be prevented from
chilling the interposing of frivolous issues on appeal, even when those issues are presented along
with non-frivolous ones. Under the new statute, the appeals which the court found not to merit
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interpretation of the new sanctioning statute would be unfortunate
and unnecessary, in effect gutting the statute of its possibilities and
robbing the courts of the flexibility intended by the Legislature.
2. Consensus and the Additional Burden on Appeal
A strong argument, therefore, can be made that the addition of
new section 995 to Oklahoma law is meant to provide the appellate
courts with a substantial amount of flexibility in assessing sanctions in
the face of frivolous appeals. It provides the courts with a third alter-
native ground for assessing sanctions for appeals the courts believe
should not have been brought in the first place.3 8 But as an analogue
to the complexity which follows from the creation of action-specific
adjustments to the costs of delaying the effectiveness of judgments,
the flexibility possible from the new sanctions statute brings with it the
probability of arbitrariness, or at least of unpredictability (confusion)
in its application. That seems to be the lesson from the ten year old
experiment in district court sanctions under FED. R. Civ. P. 11.329 The
diminution of predictability may be a high price to pay for flexibility,
especially if one believes that predictability is necessary to maintain
the perception that the adversary system is fundamentally fair.33° The
the imposition of sanctions in TRW/REDA Pump might still have been subject to some sanction,
perhaps in an amount significantly less than that imposed on the more egregiously frivolous
actions (where no issue raised was not frivolous). In both cases, frivolous appeals would be
sanctioned, but under a more modulated approach to the new sanctions statute, the court might
have imposed sanctions in all of the appeals, but in amounts corresponding to the magnitude of
the offense. The federal courts have recognized the value of this approach. See, e.g., Granado,
792 F.2d at 94-5. (awarding FED. R. Civ. P. 38 sanctions despite appellant's one non-frivolous
argument, because 22 of 24 pages of appellant's brief concerned frivolous arguments).
328. Since the appeal should not have been brought at all, the very act of bringing and prose-
cuting it, harms the other parties, primarily the other litigant who should have had full benefit of
his judgment earlier and the court, whose personnel could have used the time to process other
appeals. In this later sense, all other appeals suffer damage, since the frivolous appeal delays
their final resolution. For a general discussion of these issues, see Ben F. Overton, A Prescrip-
tion for the Appellate Caseload Explosion, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. Rnv. 206 (1984); Thomas B. Mar-
vell, Appellate Capacity and Caseload Growth, 16 AKRON L. REv. 43 (1982). A number of
studies analyze the perceived effect of caseload congestion in state courts. See, e.g., Julie M.
Carpenter, Appellate Delay as a Catalyst for Change in Virginia, 23 U. RICH. L. REv. 141 (1988);
Mark McCormick, Appellate Congestion in Iowa: Dimensions and Remedies, 25 DRAKE L. REv.
133 (1975); Laurence C. Harmon & Gregory A. Lang, A Needs Analysis of an Intermediate
Court, 7 WM. MrrcHELL L. Rnv. 51 (1981); Philip A. Talmadge, Toward a Reduction of Wash-
ington Appellate Court Cases and More Effective Use of Appellate Court Resources, 21 GONZ. L.
REv. 21 (1985). Cf RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985).
329. See William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HAIv. L. REv. 1013, 1015-16 (1988)
("In interpreting and applying Rule 11, the courts have become a veritable Tower of Babel.");
Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11,
137 U. PA. L.Rv. 1925, 1941-42 (1989).
330. See Burbank, supra note 329, at 1942-43.
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changes continue the new tradition of ignoring the impact of a discre-
tion-based consensus on public law litigation, maintaining the sense of
unfairness in the use of the rule for substantive effect.331 But unpre-
dictability has positive uses for litigants seeking manipulative tools to
advance their substantive objectives. Unpredictability can price some
litigants out of the law market.332
Thus, the core message of the potential for the imposition of ad-
ditional sanctions may well be that litigation is not worth the risk.333
As a consequence, attempts to obtain sanctions should increase.334 It
follows, then, that there should be a net increase in the cost of the risk
of appeal, to the extent that the courts accept the statute's invitation
to creatively craft both a flexible standard for the determination of
frivolous appeal, and a scale of sanctions for the varying severity of
frivolousness. To that extent, the incentive should be to decrease the
number of marginal appeals. Additionally, it should also decrease the
number of otherwise meritorious appeals where the appellant does
not have the financial means to meet the added costs (risks) of appeal.
Indeed, it is assumed that an aggressive approach to sanctions should
increase the cost of pursuing an appeal, and perhaps reduce the flow
of appeals. 33 5
331. For a discussion of the disparate impact of sanctions on public interest litigation see
RULE 11 rN TRANsroN: THm REPORT OF THE THIRD Cmcurr TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 67-69 (1989); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118
F.R.D. 189, 200-201 (1988); Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation, Public Interest Litigants and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 270 (1989).
332. This result is consonant with recent efforts by appellate courts to reduce their caseloads
through the introduction of mandatory settlement conferences at some point prior to trial. See
Irving R Kaufman, Must Every Appeal Run the Gamut?-The Civil Appeals Management Plan,
95 YALE L. J. 755 (1986) ("CAMP reduces frivolous appeals while preserving the availability of
appellate review. Staff Counsel often identifies weaknesses in the arguments of parties who
bring meritless claims, and in such cases, the appellant not infrequently decides to withdraw the
appeal."). Such settlement procedures have been recently instituted in Oklahoma. See Nancy K.
Anderson, Settlement Conferences Begin In Cases on Appeal, 64 OKLA. BJ. 1991 (1993). For a
critical assessment of alternative dispute resolution, see, Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IowA L. REv. 889 (1991).
333. I paraphrase similar concerns noted in RULE 11 IN TRANSrION: THE REPORT OF THE
THIRD CiRcurr TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 44 (1989).
334. See, e.g., Linda R. Hirshman, Tough Love: The Court of Appeals Runs the Seventh Cir-
cuit the Old Fashioned Way, 63 Cm.-KRNT L. REv. 191,199-208 (1987); Stephen B. Burbank, The
Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925,
1958 (1989).
335. See Hirshman, supra note 334, at 206. Professor Hirshman argues that the aggressive
approach to sanctions by the Seventh Circuit in recent years, by sanctioning as frivolous what is
actually sloppy litigation, has had the effect of raising the standard of performance. Better per-
formance in turn has increased the expense of appellate litigation in the Seventh Circuit, which
should reduce the flow of business into the judicial system.
1993]
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But consider the effect of the new sanctioning power if it is inter-
preted in a manner that adds redundancy, rather than flexibility, to
the sanctions arsenal of the Oklahoma courts. After all, as I argued
above, new section 995 neither sets a standard for what constitutes
frivolousness, nor does it impose particular rules for determining the
appropriateness of particular types of sanctions in particular cases.
The new statute only amplifies what the Oklahoma appellate courts
have been saying for years: if you interpose a meritless appeal, you
will pay your opponent's legal fees (at least those generated by the
appeal).336 Even so, the mere presence of this additional provision
should affect the risk (cost) of appealing, especially by those advanc-
ing marginal positions, and those who are financially marginal (irre-
spective of the bona fides of their positions).
Let's consider this more closely. The new statute will tend to chill
appeals, even if the courts apply the new statute sparingly. Why? Be-
cause there are a greater number of cases now within the group of
appeals which might be subject to sanctions on appeal. The odds of
being in the "at-risk" group of appeals (those which could be deter-
mined to be frivolous AND merit sanctions of some kind) have in-
creased. Even if the appellate courts substantially ignore the
possibilities offered under the new source of authority to punish "friv-
olous" appeals and continue to apply its sanctioning power spar-
ingly,337 there will still exist an additional source of potential cost
(increase) to the potential appellant, which will have to weighed
against the value of appeal. Since litigants really never know in ad-
vance whether or not their appeal will be spared sanctions (except
perhaps, in the most egregious cases), each marginal appeal bears a
greater risk of incurring significant cost. Moreover, rational litigants
must assume the possibility that the Supreme Court will use their ap-
peal to express or review their approach to sanctions. Stated some-
what cynically, no one wants to be the appellant in a ground-breaking
336. See, e.g., Hervey v. American Airlines, 720 P.2d 712,713 (Okla. 1986) ("Just as taking a
vacation carries with it the risk of encountering rainy weather, filing a frivolous and vexatious
appeal carries with it the risk that the Supreme Court may impose attorney fees as costs.").
337. But see discussion, above at Part II.B.I., The New Sanctioning Power, Traditional Sanc-
tions Jurisprudence and the Effect of the Federal Rules for an argument that, in fact as well as in
theory, the new statute ought to result in the assessment of more sanctions for frivolousness, but
the size of the sanction should become smaller on average. Indeed, several commentators have
questioned whether, in fact, the emphasis on sanctions does not constitute a covert attempt to
"lead litigants out of the courthouse." Hirshman, supra note 334, at 207 (describing Seventh
Circuit's approach to appellate sanctions); Burbank, supra note 334, at 1947.
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case like TRW/REDA Pump, and no one knows when the next
ground-breaking case will be announced.
What results? Again, marginal appeals should decrease. How-
ever, at the same time, the additional sanctioning authority increases
costs to the financially marginal litigant with a meritorious appeal.
Consequently, along with the potential for decreasing "meritless" ap-
peals (if only by the in terrorem effect of the existence of the new
sanctioning authority), the new grant of sanctioning power may well
also decrease the number of meritorious appeals prosecuted.3
38
Therefore, as trial court judgments become more firmly final, they will
increase in value whether or not correctly decided. Judgment winners,
along with plaintiffs, may benefit most from this new rule-without
regard to the merits of the judgment rendered. The lower courts also
"win," at least to the extent that increased deference reduces any ad-
ditional caseloads resulting from retrials of cases reversed on appeal.
At the broadest level, parties unsuccessful at the trial court level, bear
the heaviest costs of the new statutory scheme. On the bright side, it
should be more costly to appeal merely for the purpose of delaying
the inevitable.339 Unfortunately, however, the resource-poor litigant
on the losing side of a bad decision may find it harder to bear the cost
of appeal, and it is not clear that our process of consensus building will
respond to this contingency in any material way. Once again the
message is that litigation (or appeal, in this case) is not worth the risk.
At the practical level, the new sanctions statute may well increase the
resources that litigants expend at the trial court stage; since the
"value" of lower court determinations has increased (because of the
potentially increased cost (risk) of appeal), any given dollar of litiga-
tion resources may have greater impact at the trial level than in post
trial proceedings.340  "Bad" law at the trial court level assumes a
greater permanency, because appeals become less likely. To the ex-
tent one chooses to believe the rate of "bad" trial court law is low, this
result should not be troubling.
338. On the in terrorem effect of the sanctioning power in the context of FED. R. Civ. P. 11,
see Georgene Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 197-198 (1988).
339. This is true except to the extent that the additional costs of appeal still are less than the
value of delay. As it becomes clearer that, in a large (and growing) number of cases, this is so,
then, the consensus itself would have to shift further in favor of tighter controls on the ability to
appeal.
340. Of course, I speak here of a nuance, and of resource allocation at the margin. Clearly,
the enactment of OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 995 will not revolutionize the nature of jurisprudence in
Oklahoma. But even subtle changes can have significant effect at the margin, and the potential
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IV. PUTING THE CHANGES IN PERSPECTIVE
Appeal adds delay to the finality of judgments. Suspension adds
delay to the effectiveness of judgments. Appeal as of right, coupled
with the near certainty of little punishment for marginal appeals, when
combined with automatic stays and stays as of right, creates an envi-
ronment that fosters appeals, including marginal appeals.3 41 As the
costs of appealing a determination of the trial court decrease, the in-
centive to appeal the more marginal cases (since there is less to lose)
increases. In the current climate, even if one is convinced that there is
little chance of victory, it might even constitute malpractice to fail to
appeal. 42 Consequently, perhaps, we begin to fear that meritorious
appeals tend to get lost in the pile of marginal appeals. The number
of appeals exceeds the optimum that ought to be prosecuted increases.
Appellate court resources are spread thin as courts devote less and
less time to consideration of individual cases. Alternatively, the time
between appeal and decision grows and grows. All of this costs the
state money-money to hire appellate personnel-not only judges,
but also the administrative machinery needed to service the growing
number of appeals. Both parties run the risk that appellate review
will result in a determination equally erroneous.3 43 Moreover, the
costs of litigation, on both winners and losers is distorted (both in-
creased and decreased) not by the bona fides of the proof of damages,
but by the significant costs of the process itself.344 Victorious plaintiffs
may be induced to settle cases and defeated defendants may have to
341. And these are costs which may not be recoverable. E.g., Allen v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co., 123 P.2d 252, 253 (Okla. 1942) (allowing no recovery against surety on superse-
deas bond for damages suffered as a result of delay caused by unsuccessful appeal in recovery of
judgment in the absence of specific provision therefor in the bond instrument).
342. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 334, at 1958 (noting the same tendency in connection with
sanctions motions under FED. R. Civ. P. 11).
343. Thus, some commentators have noted that a problem with free review is that it may not
reduce the systemic deficiencies of dispute resolution, of which faulty judging is merely sympto-
matic. Thus, "the problems of inconsistency, irrationality, and bias may only be moved from the
first to the second tier, and possibly from individuals of lower social classes to those of higher
status." Resnick, supra note 12, at 866. But see RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CRISIS AND REFORM (1985) (discussing problems of free appeal).
344. These internalized costs have provided a significant spur to the settlement and dispute
resolution movements. See, e.g., Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons From the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 424, 429 (1986); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31
UCLA L.REv. 754, 789-93 (1984); Peter H. Schuck, The Role of the Judge in Settling Complex
Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 337 (1986) (discussing positive costs
associated with judicial settlement).
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abandon appeals, because of the financially coercive nature of the ap-
pellate process.345
Appellate procedural rules, and specifically those determining fi-
nality and effectiveness of judgments, then, are not abstractions. It
follows that the manipulation of these rules does not have a neutral
effect on litigants. Rather, procedural rules affecting finality and ef-
fectiveness are an expression of a societal consensus, which shifts over
time, respecting the "importance and difficulty of passing judgments
on individual's conduct, and of the place of government in citizen's
lives."3" The current consensus evidences a substantial general dis-
comfort with the finality of lower court determinations,347 but also an
unwillingness to substantially repudiate such lower court determina-
tions in a variety of contexts.34s As a result, a number of alternatives
to the current model of appellate decision-making are not taken
seriously.3
49
Consider, in this context, the currently problematical notion that
345. Indeed, in this sense, appellate procedural rules may perform the same coercive func-
tion as settlement pressure before trial. See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.. 1073,
1076-78 (1984). Appellate procedure, to the extent it increases the cost of victory or that of
defeat, acts much like the aggressive federal trial court judge pushing for settlement using his
manipulative authority under FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 16. See, e.g., ScrucK, supra note 344, at 150-
166 (describing judge's aggressive settlement promotion in Agent Orange case). But see Richard
L. Marcus, Apocalypse Now, 85 Mic. L. REv. 1267, 1292-95 (1987) (reviewing PETER H.
ScHucK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRL. MAss TOXIC DISASTERS IN HE COURTS (1986)); Judith
Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 402 n.115 (1982).
346. Resnick, supra note 12, at 840. (describing values reflected in crafting of procedural
rules and how their interaction shapes such rules).
347. Professor Dalton discusses the negative implications of this consensus, including grow-
ing disrespect and disregard of lower court determinations. Harlon Dalton, Taking the Right to
Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62 (1985).
348. Thus, for instance, appellate courts tend to resist review of evidentiary conclusions of
the lower court, for example, see TRW/REDA Pump v. Brewington, 829 P.2d 15, 25 (Okla.
1992), as well as determinations with respect to which the lower court did not have a chance to
rule, see id. at 24. But compare the de novo review standard of federal magistrate's decisions by
federal district judges pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (1988 & Supp. 1993) (limited defer-
ence), or in some state courts. See Justices of the Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 104 S. Ct. 1805,
1808 (1984) (determination in first action not communicated to second judge); Resnick, supra
note 12, at 866-867.
349. Professor Resnick has identified six (6) different models of judicial decision-making and
review: (i) The single judge/finality model, (ii) the single judge plus same judge model, (iii) the
single judge plus limited review model, (iv) the single judge plus unlimited review model, (v) the
single judge plus limited review plus limited review model, and (vi) the single judge/different
forum plus unlimited review model. Resnick, supra note 12, at 860-70. Many states, including
Oklahoma, and the federal system, are based on the single judge plus limited review plus limited
review model, though others are still based on the single judge plus limited review model. "This
model offers litigants more occasions to persuade state officials and increases the opportunities
for revisionism." Id. at 868. Professor Resnick has also recognized the costs of this model: The
costs of maintaining the judicial apparatus are high compared to systems of more limited review.
The victors in the proceedings below are forced to participate in additional rounds of dispute
resolution, and the losers below may not have the resources or experience to proceed onto the
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all trial court determinations ought to be confirmed by appellate re-
view before such judgments become effective and enforceable. Note,
however, that our model of appellate procedure contains substantial
elements consistent with this notion. Thus, it may not be all that far-
fetched to envision a system in which appellate review is automatic,
eliminating entirely the machinery of appeal, and the traps (and costs)
it creates for unwary litigants. Such a regime might require automatic
stay of all judgments, since all judgments will be appealed. Such sus-
pension would be effected with or without the posting of a bond be-
cause a bond doesn't matter much if the notion is that judgments lack
merit unless passed on in an appellate proceeding).350
For the same reason, it is difficult to consider the notion that in
the ideal world judgments of the trial court are more often than not
fair and just, as we prefer to understand these terms.3 51 Embracing
this notion would make barriers to finality and effectiveness more dif-
ficult to erect than is currently possible to do. Such a system would
treat suspensions of judgment as a form of extraordinary relief, and all
appeals would be presumed frivolous, absent compelling proof to the
contrary. Finality would be greatly strengthened, and the value of an
award would approach the amount actually awarded.352 Of course,
under such a regime, a shift in consensus regarding the rate of errone-
ous trial court decisions might create significant incentives for litigants
to adjust their conduct accordingly. In a context where appeal is diffi-
cult, the stronger the consensus that judicial decision making tends to
next rung. Lastly, delay may impose significant costs not only to the litigants, but to society. Id.
at 869.
350. In a system of mandatory appeal, the trial court's role is insignificant. Arguments are
made and evidence is presented primarily for the benefit of the reviewing court, the trial court
reduced to a court of dress rehearsal. Since finality and effectiveness both await the determina-
tion of the reviewing court, the time between the initiation and the resolution of lawsuits will
grow, and with it the cost of obtaining resolution. Perhaps, this would not be a bad thing for
those who desire reducing court caseloads. But this regime increases the cost of defense as well.
While those who require quicker resolution might be affected adversely, those with little to lose
might be encouraged to sue for the settlement value of the suit. Worthy impecunious defendants
would tend to be adversely affected by the mere operation of the system itself.
351. Compare the German system of dispute resolution where judges, rather than lawyers,
investigate the facts. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U.
Cm. L. REv. 823, 824, 833-48 (1985).
352. Under a regime of severely limited appeals, trial court determinations assume a greater
significance than they have under the present regime. Moreover, to the extent that our appellate
rules approach a situation where all losers on appeal will have to bear additional costs (as sanc-
tions, or however else denominated), the additional risk of appeals may be high enough, per-
haps, to deter the interposing of a significant number of otherwise well taken appeals. The same
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be erroneous the more likely are litigants to resort increasingly to al-
ternative methods of dispute resolution rather than risk being on the
short end of an erroneous decision.353 In addition, our system of ap-
pellate procedure contains elements consistent with this view as well,
limiting appellate review of many aspects of the proceedings below.
But we recoil from either extreme. We are comfortable con-
structing systems which are neither fish nor fowl, and in characterizing
non-conforming approaches as "extreme." But why "extreme"? Pre-
cisely because each extreme acutely deviates from the ideal standard
of the system of dispute resolution, the "adversarial system," we have
adopted." 4 This adversarial system, in idealized form, requires the
existence of adversaries-plaintiffs and defendants, winners and
losers-locked in "combat," presenting cases to an ideally neutral and
relatively passive judicial machinery. Civil procedure provides a for-
malized vehicle through which substantive contests are played out.
And the civil process is concerned, in non-criminal matters at least,
with the resolution of conflicts of interests as between the disputants,
in which the attainment of "scientific" truth is largely irrelevant, but in
which a consensus of "fair" result more often than not becomes
paramount.355
However, the judicial machinery required by this system is one
which now balances the need to fully consider each case against the
reality of a large and unending stream of such cases.35 6 Moreover, the
353. Indeed, Professor Resnick argues that many procedural innovations over the last two
hundred years have resulted in a substantial movement away from a system of extreme finality
of trial court determination. See Resnick, supra note 12, at 861.
354. For a discussion of the nature of the adversarial system, from which arise the critical
assumptions shaping our notions of jurisprudence, see LON L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURIS-
PRUDENCE 706-07 (1949). Fuller lists among the critical assumptions of this system of dispute
resolution:
1) The judge does not act on his own initiative, but on the application of one or more
of the disputants. 2) 'The judge has no direct or indirect interest (even emotional) in the
outcome of the case. 3) The judge confines his decision to the controversy before him
and attempts no regulation of the parties' relations going beyond that controversy. 4)
The case presented to the judge involves an existing controversy, and not merely the
prospect of some future disagreement. 5) The judge decides the case solely on the basis
of the evidence and arguments presented to him by the parties. 6) Each disputant is
given ample opportunity to present his case.
Id. at 706. For a critical view of the adversarial system in light of the German model of litigation,
see Langbein, supra note 351. But see Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L.REv. 374,
386 (1982) ("Ironically [the] description of the German judge.., now seems apt for the Ameri-
can judge as well.").
355. John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. RFv. 541, 544
(1978) ("Our own research on this topic has shown that persons whose interests are in direct
conflict place no value on the attainment of 'truth,' and, indeed, truth is not for them a salient or
relevant consideration.").
356. For a discussion of the evolution of the judicial function from that of passive decision
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adversarial model also requires, at least in ideal form, rational dispu-
tants, equality of resources, and counsel of roughly equal abilities.357
As reality departs from these assumptions, facially neutral procedural
rules can be used to substantive effect.358
Since rules can be skewed to favor the substantive position of one
side or the other, the actors affected by these rules are always skir-
mishing among themselves respecting the scope, coverage and appli-
cation of the rules, seeking advantage for their position not only in the
evidence, but in the rules of the contest between them. The language
of these debates is "fairness"-or rather the perception of fairness,
because it is the perception (not the "reality" of fairness, the existence
of which might well be highly debateable) that drives shifts in proce-
dural rules for the purpose of imposing greater or lesser costs on one
or the other litigant.359 Indeed, as the recent debates over a related
procedural device, trial court sanctions under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, amply demonstrate, procedural rules have become
far more self-consciously used as vehicles for both substantive law re-
form on a global scale (that is, the notion that potential litigants are
too eager to press claims of violation of legal obligations by others and
procedural rules can impair their ability to readily bring claims in de-
fense of such rights) and at the level of the individual case (that is, the
makers to managers and facilitators of cases, and the implications of this evolution, both good
and bad, see Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 414-431 (1982); Shapiro,
Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1969,
1983 (1989). After the 1983 amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 16, "[j]udges began to see them-
selves less as neutral adjudicators-deciding what the parties brought to them for decision and
proceeding at a pace to be determined by the parties " and more as managers of a costly and
complicated process." Id. Professor Resnick argues that the success of the new role, decreasing
delay, reducing costs and increasing the number of case dispositions, has come at the price of
eroding traditional due process safeguards by vesting judges with greatly enhanced power over
cases, and threatening their ability to impartially judge. For a critical view of Professor Res-
nick's argument, see Steven Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to Professor Resnick, 35 HAs.
mNGs L.J. 505 (1984) (arguing judicial case management not inconsistent with due process).
357. Judith Resnick, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv.
494, 513 (1986). ("With the two sides of a dispute more or less evenly matched, then, at least in
theory, the contest permits the 'correct' winner to emerge.").
358. From these departures from the ideal spring criticisms from traditionalist and non-tradi-
tionalist commentators decrying their perception of the courts' increasing abuse of its discretion-
ary power for substantive effect. See, e.g., JOEL HANDLER, THE CONDrriONS OF DISCRETON:
AtrroNomy, COMMUNrry, BUREAUCRACY (1986); Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organiza-
tional Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DuKE L.J. 1265; Richard L. Abel,
Informaism- A Tactical Equivalent to Law, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE Rev. 375 (1985).
359. See Laurens Walker et al., The Relation Between Procedural And Distributive Justice, 65
VA. L. Rev. 1401, 1415-20 (1979); cf. Judith Resnick, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in
Decline, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 494 (1986).
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notion of promoting judicial management as a means to alter substan-
tive outcomes by shifting litigation costs on a case by case basis).360
But the commentators concentrate on the incentives of the courts to
manipulate the substantive potential of procedural rules, either to
limit the right of litigants to protect their substantive rights in court or
to reduce dependence on traditional trials for the vindication of such
rights.361 Equally important to consider, however, are the incentives
of the litigants themselves to indulge in the penchant for manipulation
and the use of discretionary authority and procedural rules for sub-
stantive gain. The effect of the manipulation of the rules can be
striking.362
The adversarial model of litigation promotes systems of proce-
dure, including appellate procedure, that at best are temporary com-
promises, treaties, or points of equilibrium, in the contest between
winners, losers and decisionmakers as each seeks to use seemingly im-
partial rules to advantage.3 63 Thus, litigants and their counsel do not
confine the advancing of their cases to the aggressive presentation of
evidence and law in support of their position; they seek, on a systemic
level, to manipulate the underlying rules by which cases are made and
defended for substantive effect. This goes beyond the substantive ef-
fect of a victory, for instance, on statute of limitations grounds. It
involves the use of procedure to reduce the value of judgments actu-
ally awarded, or to avoid them in substantial respect. The courts seek
360. See Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. Rnv. 374 (1982). Stephen Burbank
has correctly noted that:
[S]trategies have dominated recent efforts of the rulemakers and debate... literature.
One is to enhance the power of trial judges to manage litigation. (footnote omitted)
Another is to enhance incentives for people to avoid litigation. (footnote omitted)
Both represent steps in the flight from law.
Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common
Law, 63 NOTRE DAM L. REv. 693, 716 (1988).
361. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation, Public Interest Litigants and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 270 (1989); Burbank, supra note 329, at 1955-62;
Judith Resnick, Failing Faith. Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 494 (1986);
J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Query: Are Heavy Caseloads Changing the Nature of Appellate Jus-
tice? 66 JuDicATuRE 57 (1987).
362. Thus, FED. R. Civ. P. 11 can be seen as a means of distorting the ability of plaintiffs to
obtain relief in particular areas, notably civil rights cases. Georgene Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical
Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200-201 (1988) (including civil rights and employment discrimination
suits as disfavored actions). See Burbank, supra note 329, at 1937-38; Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and
Civil Rights Litigation, 37 Burr. L. Rlv. 485 (1988/89); Abel, supra note 358.
363. Walter V. Schaefer, Is the Adversary System Working in Optimal Fashion, 70 F.R.D. 159,
176 (1976) (paper presented at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
With the Administration of Justice) ("Like our doctrines of substantive law, our procedural rules
are molded by the impact of the situations presented to the courts... and our procedural rules
like our substantive rules must be remolded in response to the impact of those forces.").
1993]
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to employ the rules as well, favoring creation of a system of procedure
that does not result in duplication, that speeds the processing of cases,
and that accords more finality to the determinations of lower courts
and also perhaps, that limits the availability of the courts to potentiallitigants. 6
Adherence to the basic controlling assumptions of the adversarial
ideal also precludes serious consideration of alternatives to the almost
rhythmic fluctuation of notions regarding the finality of trial court
judgments. Alternative dispute resolution-negotiation, mediation,
arbitration-is kept at the margins, never seriously considered, except
as a necessary expedient, a poor cousin, whom we must entertain be-
cause we don't have the resources to provide true, full justice to all
litigants . 65  Less drastic alternatives are also shunted aside, perhaps
more thoughtlessly than they ought to be. This is the fate of our ap-
proach to civil appellate procedure. Consider, for instance, a concept
of dispute resolution that required the state to pay litigants for dam-
ages suffered as a result of erroneous determinations either at the trial
court or intermediate appellate level.3 66 After all, it can be argued,
that the error ought to be borne by the entity responsible. However,
our critical model of dispute resolution assumes that litigants bear all
the costs (and risks) of the dispute and its resolution, including the
risk that the dispute resolution machinery is not working at its best in
a particular case. A concept such as this would be characterized as
ludicrous, even if it substantially reduced the cost of obtaining a just
364. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion, supra note 360, at 716. The need to retry a case
reversed on appeal is quite burdensome on a court attempting to deal with a clogged calendar.
Moreover, the ability to narrow the range of cases that may be appealed invariably strengthens
the finality of lower court determinations. Appeals as of right reduce the weight of finality to
lower court determinations. The process of an increasingly selective certiorari process strength-
ens such finality, even in the face of patently erroneous lower court determinations. Thus, in
Oklahoma, the certiorari power of the Supreme Court, and its determination that mere error on
the part of lower courts is insufficient to warrant review, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 15,
App. 3, Rule 3.13 (Rules on Practice and Procedure in the Court of Appeals and on Certiorari to
that Court) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993), effectively reduces the case load of the reviewing court
while it increases the finality of even erroneous decisions. The appellate courts, in this manner,
are able to shift more of the risk of erroneous determination to the litigants. Cf., E. Donald
Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. Cm. L.Rnv. 306,322-41 (1986)
(arguing that the essence of managerial judging "is ad hoc action by judges to impose costs on
lawyers.").
365. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L". 1073 (1984); Harry T. Edwards,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. Rlv. 668, 676-79 (1986);
Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TuL. L. REv. 1,
19-24 (1987); Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76
IowA L. REv. 889 (1991).
366. This concept could even be coupled with a requirement that the appellant pay all of the
costs of the appeal, including all attorneys fees and costs irrespective of the merits of the appeal.
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result.3 67 But, for good or ill, our legal system is not designed to con-
ceptualize problems or solutions in this manner. Ironically, in the
guise of a purely procedural device meant to encourage settlement,
the substance of such a notion can be readily accepted. 68
And so the wrestling with finality and effectiveness of judgments
continues. House Bill 1468 represents the completion of another iter-
ation, another point of rest, in the evolution of a new consensus re-
garding the manner in which costs can be imposed on opposing
litigants. The changes are not revolutionary; they do not evidence a
strong turn in the consensus in any direction. Rather they demon-
strate a tendency to modify at a secondary level, based on a determi-
nation of the utility of appellate review, even as the general outline of
consensus remains substantially unmodified. However, adopting a
longer term perspective, the changes may well also evidence the con-
tinuing movement of consensus from one motivated by the desire to
use procedural rules to foster decisions on the merits, to one moti-
vated by the desire to use procedural rules to limit the availability of
the courts to potential litigants.369
In this respect, the changes brought by House Bill 1468 add to the
substantial effect of the weight of changes which have been creeping
through procedural rules for a number of years. In particular, they
367. For similar reasons, a slightly more modest concept, that the state eliminate entirely the
concept of suspending the effectiveness of judgments, but that the state (or the judgment win-
ner) fully compensate the judgment loser for all costs (damages suffered) in the event that the
trail court judgment is overturned on appeal would seem alien. For those who find something
wrong with the notion that a judgment winner must bear the cost of a review of a lower court
determination, and, win or lose, suffer a decrease in the value of his judgment, such a concept,
might have more merit.
368. FED. R. Civ. P. 68 provides a good example. It imposes cost (and potentially attorneys
fee) shifting in the event a pre-trial offer of settlement is greater than the amount actually recov-
ered by a plaintiff after trial. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985). But the cost and potential
fee shifting effect of FED. R. Crv. P. 68 can have a disproportionately negative effect on the
availability of substantive rights to the risk averse. See Stephen B. Burbank, Proposals to
Amend Rule 68-1me to Abandon Ship, 19 U. Micm J. L. REF. 425,439 (1986); Judith Resnick,
Failing Faith. Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cmi. L. REv. 494, 531-32, 534 (1986).
369. See generally, RICHARD POSNEmR, Tim FEDERAL COURTS: CRisis AND REFoRm (1985);
Burbank, supra note 329, at 1944 (describing an emerging consensus of "faith in the need for
lawyers and clients to exercise some restraint in the consumption of resources, private and pub-
lic, and in the need for federal trial judges to help them do so"); Judith Resnick, Failing Faith.
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHL L. REv. 494,497-98 (1986) (arguing discussions of
functions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have changed substantially over last fifty years).
Professor Resnick notes that:
"Whether the cry is for more therapeutic methods of dispute resolution or for manage-
rial judges to control wayward attorneys and to stabilize a malfunctioning process, the
requests are often the same: limit opportunities for adjudication by judges and for trial
by jury and offer different mechanisms for the disposition of disputes."
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affect the appealability of certain causes of action more than others,
and they affect different causes of action in different ways. They evi-
dence a revised distribution of procedural advantage which can be
gained (in terms of money, and time) by manipulating the rules of
appellate procedure. And procedural advantage now more forcefully
favors a greater final effect for trial court determinations. The enact-
ment of the new frivolous appeals rules strengthens the hand of the
courts. The in terrorem effect of the rules may reduce, for practical
purposes, the availability of appeal as of right, where counsel is unable
to second guess an appellate panel on the weightiness of the appeal.
The Oklahoma courts are encouraging counsel to think in these
terms.370 However, there may be a pernicious side to this as well, an
effect which has lurked just beneath the discussion throughout this
article " shifting costs, and the possibility of punishment, especially for
the vindication of politically unpopular rights, may effectively reduce
the availability of certain rights to potential litigants.371
The costs to judgment winners, in the aggregate, is also reduced
to the extent that, on average, the probability of an appeal decreases.
Since the finality of lower court determinations has been enhanced,
lower courts have received an additional advantage as well. Litigants
will have more to lose at the lower court than in a system of freer (or
cheaper) appeals and should tend to concentrate more resources at
that level. Moreover, to the extent that appeals decrease, the work of
the lower courts should decrease as well (at least with respect to the
cost of processing appealed cases). Retrials may also decrease (at
least, that would be the hope where the consensus favors more defer-
ence to the determinations of the trial court). In close cases, or where
judicial impartiality may be questioned (at least where it may be evi-
denced by a pattern of abusive evidentiary and procedural determina-
tions), the threat of reversal-inducing self-correction is diminished.372
370. Thus, the warning of the Oklahoma Supreme Court: "The decision to appeal should not
and cannot be made as a knee jerk reaction simply because a party lost in the lower court. More
is required to make the decision to appeal." TRW/REDA Pump v. Brewington, 829 P.2d 15,29,
n.16 (Okla. 1992).
371. As mentioned earlier in related contexts, foremost among these might be civil rights
claims. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. RULE 11 rN TRANSrIION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRcurr
TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CrviL PROCEDURE 11 69-72 (1989). The courts have also
expressed this concern on occasion. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 392-93
(1990).
372. But see Harlon Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE
W. 62, 92-3 (1985). Professor Dalton states:
Even if appeal of right does promote self-correction by trial judges, any consequent
gain in accuracy may be more than offset by harm done to the trial court as an institu-
tion. The more we underscore the fact that trial courts are hierarchically inferior to
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There is more risk now to obtaining a stay in a greater variety of
proceedings. Discretionary stays can potentially increase the cost of
suspension (and therefore the value of appeal), as judges are exposed
(successfully) to arguments seeking the imposition of the most oner-
ous set of conditions the judgment winner can persuade the court to
adopt. Potentially, this can preclude pursuing review of the trial court
determination. On the other hand, the judgment debtor in money
judgment proceedings may well have an easier time of it; one "easy"
payment may serve to suspend the effectiveness of a judgment and
discharge the lien of judgment as well. To the extent that an adverse
judgment can be taken care of in this way, monied judgment losers
have a substantially greater incentive to appeal. As a result, judgment
winners in money judgment cases will suffer a substantially greater
potential diminution in the value of their award, and have a greater
incentive to settle on appeal. Additionally, the Appellate courts are
making settlements on appeal easier.373 Additional sanctions powers
raise the potential for adverse disproportionate effects on plaintiffs
and also reduce the value of litigation to that group. To the extent
that an anti-plaintiff bias (or, for that matter, any other discretionary
bias) becomes both apparent and common knowledge among a local
bar, it inevitably becomes another variable to be factored in the
calculus of suit, or the determination to appeal and therefore vindicate
rights. As a result, the signals sent by the rules changes are complex,
and diverse. The only clear shift, though, seems to be in a continuing
expansion of the power of the courts to use procedural rules to effect
substantive decisions in the name of efficiency, fairness and docket
control.
So we continue to express concern about consensus. We balance
the risks of winning and losing, of preventing judgment winners from
actually collecting their award, or increasing the costs of doing so,
against protecting litigants from errors in the resolution of a dispute,
and preserving the value of the relief accorded a judgment winner
appellate courts, the more we feed the notion that they are inferior in other ways as
well.
This view is subject to vigorous dispute. See Paul Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeak
A Late-Century View, 38 So. CAR. L. REv. 411, 431 (1987).
373. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 15, App. 2, Rule 1.14A (Supp. 1992) (establishing voluntary
and confidential settlement conference program for cases on appeal). For a discussion of the
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from collateral attack through the aggressive use of the appellate pro-
cess. Consensus is a good thing, to the extent it reflects current, gen-
erally held assumptions of acceptable risks and costs in the appellate
aspects of the adversary process. It increases the litigant's perception
of the fairness of the process as well as the result.3 7 4 However, it is
also a temporary understanding, subject to criticism and change as liti-
gants, and those paid to serve them, come to a different understanding
of what constitutes an acceptable balancing of costs and benefits to
judgment winners and losers in the process of appellate litigation.
And it is a consensus reflecting the power of some groups and the
relative powerlessness of others to affect the debate on procedural
rules. Even as the new Oklahoma rules reflect an agreement about
costs of appeal, the utility of review, and the value of substantive
rights in private litigation, consensus remains elusive in the area of
public interest litigation.
Oklahoma courts have suggested that "the decision to appeal a
case must be made on an individual case-by-case basis depending on
the special facts and applicable law. '375 But litigants have an incen-
tive to appeal precisely because they lost. The decision to appeal is
not merely a function of the weighing of the merits. It is also a func-
tion of the value or cost of using the process of appeal to substantially
affect the value of a claim. Consensus balances the danger of permit-
ting bad trial court decisions to stand against that of permitting good
trial court decisions to be diminished by unregulated appellate rights.
The balance currently favors the trial courts. It is strengthened by the
perception that too many "marginal" cases are being asserted in the
first place. The danger of consensus-making which does not disturb
the manipulative potential of the procedural rules themselves is that
consensus will remain elusive. Oklahoma's travails in this regard pro-
vide strong evidence of this. Perhaps of more significance is the dan-
ger of the loss of the consensus makers' grounding in the principles
from which it derived its legitimacy. In particular, the principle of
equality of treatment can be lost in the flight toward greater judicial
discretion and an emphasis on case management. And with the loss of
374. See Laurens Walker et al., The Relation Between Procedural And Distributive Justice, 65
VA. L. RFv. 1401, 1415-20 (1979); John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66
CAL. L. REv. 541, 551 (1978). "The procedural model best suited to the attainment of distribu-
tive justice in disputes entailing high conflict of interest is ... the Anglo-American adversary
model." Thibaut & Walker, supra, at 551. But this conclusion rests on the assumption that the
parties seek "justice" not "truth" and that the disputants are of equal strength and ability. Id. at
552-54.
375. TRW/REDA Pump v. Brewington, 829 P.2d 15, 29 n.16 (Okla. 1992).
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the perception of equality of treatment may come the loss of any abil-
ity to reach consensus at all.
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